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Abstract
This dissertation examines the role that an individual leader’s background (e.g. what
they did before gaining power) plays in public evaluations of their performance man-
aging international conflicts. I propose a novel theory arguing domestic audience
members (e.g. the citizens of a leader’s state paying attention to international con-
flicts) heuristically analyze the competence of a leader by examining their professional
and educational background. Once audience members determine whether a leader is
competent, they use these judgments to inform whether a given leader deserves blame
or credit for the outcome of a given conflict. I find support for this theory by field-
ing a survey experiment designed to capture performance evaluations of leaders who
fight conflicts resulting in different outcomes. Next, I develop a theoretical argu-
ment explaining why these backgrounds matter for the way leaders behave. I argue
that leaders with stronger educational backgrounds (e.g. those with college/graduate
degrees) should possess more cosmopolitan world views and critical thinking skills
reducing the casualties their states suffer. Additionally, I argue that the leaders with
combat experience should also be casualty averse reducing the battle deaths their
states experience when engaged in armed conflict. Using cross-national analysis, I
find mixed support for my hypotheses but identify important and consistent patterns
that merit further empirical investigation. Finally, I investigate the way individuals
assign culpability after surprise attacks to explore the conditions that make political
leaders more likely to receive blame for surprise attacks. An initial study reveals that
the level of certainty and agreement among the intelligence community revealed after
the attack matters for how individuals hold politicians accountable.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
This chapter is an introduction to the dissertation International Conflict, Political
Leaders, and Accountability. This dissertation provides three standalone papers inves-
tigating the relationship between leader characteristics, conflict behavior, and public
opinion—along with a chapter that provides concluding remarks and outlines future
research. This project centers upon a recurring narrative prevalent within the search
for blame after conflicts end. After the zeal of rallying before conflict has been re-
placed with the sorrow of loss and death, political society finds a consistent need
to determine a justifiable locus of blame. Nearly a decade after the Iraq War initi-
ated under George W. Bush’s administration, political candidates from both sides of
the political aisle experience trouble justifying their initial support for the invasion
(Glueck and Kaplan, 2020).
In some sense, the field of international relations originated as a response to the
gap in our ability to understand why conflict occurs. From Thucydides’ seminal
project on the Peloponnesian War to modern attempts to blame particular leaders
for failures and loss of life during international conflicts of smaller scale, assigning
blame continually resurfaces after conflict in an attempt to provide an explanation
for one of the most despicably consistent features of political society—death as result
of international conflict.1 Although it might seem that recent wars are becoming
1Estimates of the total amount of death as a result of war (conflicts with over
a 1000 deaths range widely between 150 million to over 1 billion lives lost (Hedges,
1
less deadly with the advancement of automated weaponry and appearance of a de-
cline in large scale war, studies show that ongoing conflicts like the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan have already produced approximately half a million casualties (Craw-
ford, 2018). Further attesting to this project’s importance, prominent scholars have
recently cast further doubt on the accuracy of claims that war is less likely, declining
in frequency, or in costs (Fazal and Poast, 2019).
This dissertation provides nuance to society’s attempt to assign blame for war.
In the first paper, I examine why some actors, specifically leaders, are more likely to
receive disapproval for their performance in a given conflict while holding costs fixed.
In the second chapter, I examine whether particular leaders are more deadly when
they find themselves in international crises and wars. Such studies are often coined
“leader-centric” in political science due to their focus on a variety of contextual factors
related to leadership (e.g. leadership turnover and transitions) and the characteristics
of leaders themselves. Both types of leader-centric work represent a family of theories
and studies attempting to unpack the state-level processes by looking directly at
leadership.
The state’s internal or domestic attributes are commonly modeled by capturing
the role a state’s domestic institutions play in foreign policy. In contrast, the leader’s
internal characteristics are modeled as a function of their backgrounds (what they
did before become a leader), their psychological traits (e.g. narcissism), behavioral
patterns (e.g. hawkishness), and physical traits attached to notions of identity and
power (e.g. sex, race, height, etc.). In most settings, political leaders at the highest
level or, executives, possess strong influence over their state’s foreign policy. For in-
stance, presidents (usually reserved for popularly elected heads of republican states),
are gifted authority over international crises, membership in international organiza-
N.d.). It is likely that these estimates are conservative counts of all conflict deaths
since many small conflicts are left out of the analysis.
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tions, adherence to international regulations, and a state’s economic relationships
abroad. As a response to these powers, executives are often the subject of leader-
centric studies of foreign policy behavior. These research agendas are beneficial to
the field as they develop the reach of international relations in terms of the actors
scholars possess theoretical expertise over. However, the international relations and
political science scholarship has paid scant attention to a vast amount of literature
on leadership characteristics from other fields.
This introduction reviews prominent leader-centric studies in political science and
several other disciplines. I situate this review alongside a discussion of why these
studies are so often attached to patterns of public opinion and issues of accountability.
It concludes by proposing the research performed in this dissertation and summarizing
each substantive chapter for the reader.
1.2 Studying leaders and conflict
King, kaiser, and commander-in-chief are all titles that grant leaders substantial
authority over their state’s foreign policy decisions. This point is important as it
speaks to a concern over whether individuals can exert enough influence over an
extremely complex international system while being constrained by other actors.
Counter-arguments to the rise of leader-centric research are discussed too little in
an effort to demonstrate their importance empirically. A naysayer to this type of
project could claim that individual leaders are often in power for short periods of
time, constrained by the court of public opinion, are limited in their ability to sig-
nificantly alter the outcome of historical events by material realities like geography,
natural resources, and power networks within the international system. All of these
claims represents potential hurdles for scholars to consider when thinking about the
impact of individual leaders upon a given outcome. Projects examining how public
3
opinion responds to foreign policy outcomes by blaming leaders are still important
even if members of the public incorrectly assign blame.
Discussions over the ability of the U.S. President to control gas prices elucidate
this point. While the president has no direct authority over how much gas stations
charge people at the pump, gas prices are sensitive to a variety of their foreign policy
decisions (e.g. speculation concerning war in the oil producing countries, releasing
national reserves of surplus oil). A president does not need direct control of prices
to be blamed for it and this blame does not need to pass peer reviewed tests of
logical coherence to constitute a strong narrative that could harm a leader’s prospects
of remaining in power (Mufson, 2012). While presidents do not directly decide the
amount of casualties or costs a given conflict produces, they make an array of decisions
that could theoretically affect casualty counts (e.g. proportionality of response, grand
strategy, willingness to bargain). Studying the actual effect of individual leaders
upon casualty counts is much more susceptible to failure from the counter-arguments
discussed above. It is a tougher task argumentatively and empirically to demonstrate
that a leader’s attributes led to a difference in battlefield casualties than to show that
people care about the attributes of leaders when assigning blame.
Political executives, at least in the modern age, are surrounded by a complex net-
work of domestic and international institutions that constrain them directly through
rules and indirectly through establishing precedents and norms for how leaders should
behave. As such, we should only expect direct effects of leader characteristics upon
policy outcomes where they possess explicit authority over the decision-making set-
ting. This limit still leaves a great deal for scholars to explore. Scholars have discov-
ered effects of individual leader characteristics upon business performance, the effec-
tiveness of bureaucratic agencies, economic performance, crisis avoidance/resolution,
and a growing variety of policy choices (Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2011;
Carreri, 2017; Jochimsen and Thomasius, 2014; Kaiser and Craig, 2008). In respect
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to the focus of this dissertation, scholars have examined both the impact of leaders
upon conflict and the reverse: how international conflicts affect the longevity and
domestic support of leaders (Stam, Horowitz and Ellis, 2015; Croco, 2011; Croco and
Weeks, 2016).
As the subset of international relations scholars that focus on leaders grow, so
should our attention to the projects outside this recent bubble that were paying at-
tention to leadership before it existed. Leadership studies, psychology, organizational
science, economics, and history all have important insights for researchers attempting
to break new ground in this area of literature.
1.3 Leaders in the literature
Machiavelli’s work in The Prince can be seen as a very early leader-centric work re-
lated to potential dangers of foreign conquest and conflict (Machiavelli, 1532). The
book highlights multiple areas where leaders influence the outcomes of war and mul-
tiple ways leaders can mitigate the risks of conflict and territorial expansion to their
political survival. Biographical works detailing the historical role of leaders during
conflicts should be thought of as contributing to the development of leader-centric
projects. Most prominently, Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian detailing the
role of multiple leaders (e.g. Pericles, Brasidas, Alcibiades, and Nicias) in cultivating
freedom and wealth during conflict (Nichols, 2017).
While there are studies left out due to how quickly this area of research is de-
veloping, I focus on prominent work related to leaders and classify these studies by
their attention to the contextual factors surrounding studies and the characteristics
of leaders themselves. The most important advancements in leader-centric interna-
tional relations research stem from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005). A renewed
attention to the ultimate goal of leaders has paved the way for a variety of studies
examining the role of domestic political selection upon a leader’s foreign policy be-
5
havior.2 Simply put, all leaders desire to stay in power and must please a portion of
the selectorate (i.e. those who can influence the selection of the leader) referred to
as their winning coalition (i.e. the part of the selectorate responsible for the leader
gaining/maintaining power) through the provision of private goods. If leaders are
primarily interested in power, they will enact foreign policies that at least maintain
the amount of public resources the leader can redistribute among the members of the
winning coalition and maintain the necessary size of the coalition needed to retain
power.
The assumption that leaders desire the retention of power has implications for how
we view transitions between leaders as well. Wolford (2007) argues in similar fashion
to Bueno de Mesquita (1981) that conflict can become inevitable and prolonged where
the expected domestic benefit from winning is higher than the consequences from
losing. However, Wolford (2012) argues that states can be stuck in wars they would
otherwise not fight since new leaders possess incentives to strongly signal resolve early
in their executive career. Even though populations might elect a new leader for the
purpose of peace, doing so may force the other side to make less palatable offers to
signal resolve to the new leader resulting in prolonged conflict. Furthermore, Wolford
(2012) demonstrates that leader turnover can be seen as a commitment problem where
new leaders cannot commit to keeping current deals. As such, deals are harder to
strike as leaders approach elections or the prospect of them retaining office decreases
more generally.
This implies a spiraling effect for leaders where costly conflict dampens their do-
mestic support to the extent they cannot strike a deal for peace as the opponent
believes they will not hold office for much longer. The longer they cannot strike
the deal, the more likely the are to be blamed for costs associated to conflict and
2Google Scholar, as of 1/7/2020, has 4,754 separate citations for Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2005).
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removed from power (Croco and Weeks, 2016). We can think of leaders being backed
into a corner or experiencing a “Catch 22" in these situations. Failures in battle lead
to reduced domestic support while reduced support prolongs the conflict further by
reducing the leader’s ability to strike a bargain that does not increase subsequent
criticism from their winning coalition. These studies expand our knowledge of con-
flict by identifying the circuit breakers of state power. That is, recognizing that state
interests and leader interests are not necessarily equivalent allows researchers to ex-
plain aspects of conflict not readily explainable by state driven theories of conflict.
This approach is further supported by research agendas examining power and social
hierarchies outside of mainstream political science.
Other studies outside of political science offer paths forward for international con-
flict research by delving into the qualities of individual leaders. The fields of applied
psychology and leadership studies offer insights as to how a leader’s characteristics
matter for how they behave and are perceived by those they lead (Judge, 2002; Kaiser
and Craig, 2008; Zaccaro et al., 1991). Judge (2002) analyzes the extent to which
character traits correlate with indicators of leadership and leader effectiveness finding
that extra-version is the strongest correlate with both. This suggests that leaders who
socially outgoing and externally oriented (e.g. engaging their followers with speeches
and consistent interaction) are more skilled at identifying effective leadership strate-
gies. Future work could examine why by determining whether extroverted politicians
are only perceived to be more active in an experimental setting or if they indeed pass
legislation at higher rates, receive higher approval ratings, and achieve better policy
outcomes.
Studies beyond political science reveal a careful attention to what “effective lead-
ership” means. Kaiser and Craig (2008) improves upon former studies of leadership
by distinguishing the success of particular careers (e.g. a leaders wealth, reputation,
longevity in power) from the organizational outcomes related to the team or popula-
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tion they are tasked with leading. After measuring effectiveness in this manner, they
find that the individual traits of leaders matter for performance (Kaiser and Craig,
2008). The authors note that their work applies to politics as well as business in that
politicians who are often “charming” or effective campaigners can relate to poor gov-
ernance. Anecdotal evidence from U.S. presidents is cited exposing the need for more
rigorous research on the applicability of this framework to interactions more political
in nature. We could imagine a political leader who enhanced their personal positions
and established a lasting legacy without necessarily producing any measurable im-
provements for the lives of their followers. Examining why some leaders are afforded
this luxury while others are held more accountable for the measurable outcomes of
their actions could be a fruitful area of research for those interested in how leader
characteristics, bias/discrimination, and political accountability relate to each other.
It is important to look at the characteristics and traits of leaders to determine the
extent to which structural, systemic, and state-level theories overlook factors that
increase the effectiveness of foreign policies.
Zaccaro et al. (1991) reviews leadership effectiveness in a similar way to Kaiser and
Craig (2008) by looking measurable outcomes attached to the organization/group.
Their specific interest or causal relationship is between effectiveness and “behavioral
flexibility”. Their work suggests that flexible leaders or those that do not adopt
strict patterns and rituals in their leadership style are best suited to lead. This
research points to multiple areas of inquiry important for political science scholars.
It is possible that leaders are more flexible when their experience as leaders is not
restricted to one particular domain. That is, political leaders are likely to implement
and experiment with different approaches to leadership the more experience they have
leading different types of organizations. This implies that leaders with more diverse
professional experiences prior to political office might approach political leadership
with more flexibility, generating improved policy outcomes for their constituents.
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Beyond behavioral patterns, scholars can also look at the influence of particular
psychological or mental states have on the way one leads.
It might be the case that leaders with particular mental conditions behave in ways
that followers perceive as ‘leader-like’ (Derue et al., 2011). Deluga (1997) finds that
“narcissism was generally positively associated with presidential charismatic leader-
ship and rated performance" suggesting that particular psychological traits can result
in systematic differences in the way followers evaluate their leaders. It is not clear
why a self-obsessed leader would act in a way benefiting followers. Leaders possessing
these traits could more confidently frame their actions/choices to the public resulting
in a perception of increased performance but it is largely unclear why this would make
them better leaders in terms of observable policy outcomes. More research is needed
in order to extend these findings beyond the U.S presidential context to determine
the extent to which psychological traits affect perceptions of leadership and policy
outcomes. It might be prudent to have a wide pool of psychological experts evaluate
leaders from around the world in an effort to generate aggregated measures reflecting
a leader’s psychological condition. These ratings could help political science scholars
investigate the relationship of psychological traits and policy outcomes in a variety
of contexts. If leadership is related to a leader’s psychological conditions, a leader’s
level of knowledge could also affect their ability to lead depending on the type of
decisions being made by the leader.
Surprisingly, few studies examine the relationship between leadership performance
and traits associated with competence, intelligence/critical thinking ability. Judge,
Colbert and Ilies (2004) finds that indicators commonly associated with cognitive
ability have a moderate impact on organizational outcomes. More specifically, House
and Aditya (1997) performs a wide-ranging review of trends in leadership studies
arguing that the field finds a pattern between experience, intelligence, and organi-
zational outcomes. First, experienced leaders do poor in low stress environments as
9
compared to intelligent ones implying leaders with experience are better paired for
resolving crisis-like situations rather than issues more amenable to deliberation. If
these findings map onto political organizations, we would expect a president with a
great deal of experience to fare better in time-sensitive, high-stress situations and
leaders with higher intelligence perform better where there is less stress and more
time to critically analyze relevant information. These studies suggest that political
organizations might be constrained or enhanced by the cognitive abilities of their
respective leadership.
This field also pays attention to the psychological traits that characterize one’s
perceived ability to lead and one’s willingness to serve as a leader. Rubin, Bartels
and Bommer (2002) shows that intellectual competency is a key prerequisite for
those attempting to find effective leadership. This suggests that individuals should
prefer leaders that appear more competent, although these leaders are often seen
as less relatable to some groups (Gift and Lastra-Anadón, 2018). Voters also look
to physical characteristics they think determine effective leadership. Spisak (2012)
demonstrates that masculine leaders are more likely to be selected in times of conflict
and feminine leaders are more likely selected in times of peace. This provides evidence
that individuals are using the traits of leaders to determine whether they possess an
underlying attribute desirable for resolving a particular problem. It could be the
case that individuals believe that masculine leaders are more hawkish or defensive
in conflict, or that feminine leaders are more equipped to deal with challenges not
related to conflict. While these biases are somewhat absurd, they contain information
on how voters analyze leader characteristics. These findings suggest that voters think
heuristically. That is, they develop mental shortcuts or rules of thumb to determine
what traits signal a leader’s ability and willingness to govern. Beyond perceptions
of effective leadership, it is also important to know which characteristics produce
effective leadership defined by measurable policy outcomes.
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While political science literature of this kind is rare, it is expanding. Researchers
have commonly focused upon the relationship between leader traits and economic
or political outcomes. The approach adopted in this dissertation is supported by
a recent push towards individual-level analysis of leaders in the international set-
ting (Wolford, 2012, 2014; Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2011; Besley and
Reynal-Querol, 2011; Carreri, 2017; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005; Croco, 2011;
Dafoe and Caughey, 2016; Saunders, 2011). If it is indeed the case that leaders with
the “ideal set” of characteristics are more effective, then we should expect informed
individuals to select leaders based off of these traits to maximize the likelihood that
the commitments they care about become reality. Recent research suggests that more
educated leaders are better at reducing deficits and creating economic growth (Besley,
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2011; Carreri, 2017; Jochimsen and Thomasius, 2014).
These studies are agnostic on how education relates to political competency yet imply
that the ability of leaders to develop and implement policies creating growth varies.
Carreri (2017) argues that leaders with higher levels of education are compensating
for poor institutions in their efforts to reduce economic deficits. In line with economic
performance, Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2011) finds that educated leaders
are strongly associated with positive economic outcomes yet does not relate this to
other leader traits or develop a theory explaining exactly how political leaders use
education to their advantage and how this affects public perception.
Once again, literature outside of political science reveals a similar consistent re-
lationship between expertise, education, and effective leadership. Jochimsen and
Thomasius (2014) examines the traits of finance ministers concluding professional
experience prior to becoming minister and tenure as minister lower budget deficits.
It is unclear whether ministers always prefer lower deficits when pursuing long term
economic strategies yet other studies provide more evidence suggesting similar effects
of experience. Moessinger (2014) finds that ministers with finance experience corre-
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late with lower national debt to GDP ratios yet surprisingly find null results for the
affect of education upon these outcomes casting doubt on the ability to generalize
from Carreri (2017) and Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2011). It could be the
case that particular positions require such a unique and high level of training that
only extremely domain-specific experience result in the learning needed to improve
performance. That is, general education might not improve policy outcomes where
the issue matter is extremely complex. Further training like an advanced degree or
on the job experience might be the only path to effective leadership.
Other research suggests that education and particular forms of identity matter
for how leaders govern. Fuchs and Richert (2018) examines the effects of physical,
character, and background traits upon aid giving finding “female ministers as well
as officeholders with prior professional experience in development cooperation and a
longer time in office provide higher-quality ODA (official development assistance).”
This research implies that domain-specific experience matters for performance in
a variety of political positions responsible for economic policy decision-making. It
suggests that identity matters for organizational outcomes. It is not clear whether
female ministers devote more time to ODA related policies or if structural biases
working against women required them to be that much more skilled, educated, and
trained to acquire the position in the first place. An important extension in this
area could involve utilizing data on leaders from the Global Leadership Project and
LEAD (Leader Experience and Attribute Descriptions) to determine the extent to
which leaders from poorer backgrounds distribute higher levels of development aid
(Ellis, Horowitz and Stam, 2015). This implies that certain backgrounds modify
the willingness of leaders to exert effort in particular policy areas. It is possible that
backgrounds provide some leaders with higher levels of ability when willingness/effort
are held constant.
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Indeed, multiple studies suggest that gender identity matters for public evalua-
tions of people in leadership roles and for how leaders behave. Farvaque, Hammadou
and Stanek (2009) analyzes the relationship between central banker professional back-
grounds and inflation finding that academics, bank insiders, and those private sector
members are better equipped at preventing inflation. They also find that women ap-
pear to be more hawkish over inflationary policy which is potentially contradictory to
studies associating male identity with general conflict hawkishness. Scholars looking
to contribute to this area of inquiry could develop experimental projects examining
the role that gender identity plays in voter perceptions of aggression in particular
policy domains. If identity in this context matters, it might also matter for partic-
ular characteristics directly attached to a leader’s experiences in the economy. For
instance, it could be the case that a leader’s socio-economic status affects the way
they approach producing economic policy.
Indeed, research on socio-economic status indicates leaders from poorer back-
grounds care more about the development of social safety nets. Hayo and Neumeier
(2014) shows that German Prime Ministers with from lower classes are more likely
to increase public spending and debt financing. This implies that leaders care more
about policy domains that had a memorable impact on their lives before governing.
Similarly, Dreher et al. (2009) further demonstrates that the background of political
leaders matters for the type of economic policy they enact by reviewing the back-
grounds of 500 leaders from 73 countries. Specifically, they find that leaders with an
entrepreneurial background are more likely to enact reforms inducing market liber-
alization and that education has little impact on such policies (Dreher et al., 2009).
This shows that leaders may be motivated to dedicate effort towards specific policies
based off of their own life experiences prior to entering office. It suggests that, regard-
less of one’s success as an entrepreneur, this experience at least represents a signal for
a leader’s willingness to prioritize removing constraints on businesses. More broadly,
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it demonstrates the limits of education on effectiveness as educated leaders could al-
ways apply very little effort to areas they find less salient due to other characteristics
they possess. In this way, a picture of leaders emerges where these traits compete to
compel a leader to care and limit their ability to generate effective policies over what
they find important.
Research on the relationship between leader traits and conflict is, perhaps, the
fastest growing field of literature over the past twenty years. Historically, scholars ig-
nored these traits to focus on system/state level indicators (Horowitz and Fuhrmann,
2018). Literature related to the ability of leaders to avoid punishment for their
inconsistency during conflict (commonly audience costs) relates to this project as in-
consistency is commonly associated with a signal of incompetence (Levy et al., 2015;
Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012).3 Their research points to a growing area of inquiry:
the relative ability of leaders to groom support for their international actions. What
is left unknown is why some leaders pay larger costs for casualties than others. More
competent leaders could be able to identify situations where commitment inconsis-
tency is unlikely. Levendusky and Horowitz (2012) calls for the research performed
here arguing that we could benefit from studies, “...examining the causal mechanisms
by which the public evaluates presidential behavior in the international realm is cru-
cial to understanding not just audience costs, but foreign policy decision making as
a whole.” Potter (2007) answers this call with research that demonstrates the “prob-
ability of an international crisis involving the United States declines as a presidential
administration gains time in office". This finding implies that leaders could be learn-
ing how to avoid crises as they become more competent at their position. Political
experience in office is invaluable yet we do not know what explains why this rate of
decrease varies across leaders. That is, why do some leaders learn more quickly than
3For an experimental study of audience costs casting doubt on the strength of
previous findings, see Kertzer and Brutger (2016).
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others? Literature examining the role of education on political outcomes suggests
leader backgrounds strongly inform the effectiveness of a leader’s attempts to resolve
multiple challenges related to political survival.
Similar to ministers with direct finance experience, scholars have begun inves-
tigating the relationship between a political leader’s experience in the military and
conflict behavior. Horowitz and Stam (2012) finds evidence that a leader’s experience
in conflict matters for how risky they are once they become leaders. Leaders with the
rank of officer are more experienced in making large scale decisions that result in ca-
sualties where those who enlisted and are more combat experienced and risk-adverse
concerning casualties. This is an extremely important finding as it demonstrates
the countervailing effects particular backgrounds can have on a leader’s behavior.
It appears that military experience may make a leader better at avoiding casualties
but, depending on whether you saw combat or not, could also make them callous or
traumatized in a manner that changes the effort one exerts over casualty avoidance.
Other research limits the role of military experience in determining approaches to
foreign policymaking. Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer and Renshon (2018) examine the impact
of leader traits upon how credible they perceive signaling surrounding conflicts to
be “leaders vary significantly in how credible they perceive signals to be, depending
on their foreign policy dispositions, rather than their levels of military or political
experience.” It is not clear whether leaders fare better in conflicts who perceive sig-
nals as credible but nonetheless represents a potential limit to the ability of military
experience alone to explain foreign policy choices related to conflict.
These studies closely correspond to research that explains leader resolve or will-
ingness to fight for reputation via geographical origin. The most prominent study
investigating this relationship is Dafoe, Renshon and Huth (2014), which investigates
why the culture of honor in southern states (i.e in the U.S.) instills certain leaders
to be more likely to fight for reputation and status. Their framework posits that
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leaders from the south, emigrating from predominantly Scot-Irish regions, are more
culturally conditioned to fight for honor. These projects imply that leaders traits can
impact the very reasons why leaders fight.
Recent research focusing on whether leaders are hawks or doves demonstrates that
leader types also diffuse across regions due to individuals viewing nearby hawks as
a security threat and desiring their own hawkish leader to respond (Carter, 2018b,a;
Carter and Smith, 2018). This finding is plausible yet is entirely consistent with a
theory arguing that the traits individuals deem ‘hawkish’ (e.g. military experience,
aggressive statements of resolve) signal competence. Is it the case that an individual
wants another hawk if this only increases the overall propensity of violence? Or
is it more likely that individuals want a leader who is able or competent enough to
provide security from the threat of an external hawk? The research in this dissertation
strongly suggests that individuals care about a leader’s level of competence when
evaluating their performance and use a leader’s background to help evaluate whether a
leader possessed competence over a particular policy area. Horowitz et al. (2018) finds
that leaders with military experience are indeed observably different in respect to how
they approach coercion surrounding conflict where “leaders with combat experience
and careers in national militaries are relatively better judges of their own military
power.” As a result, their threats are taken more seriously. They also find that leaders
with military careers lacking combat experience are less selective in their demands
and “correspondingly less successful when they make threats” (Horowitz et al., 2018).
If leaders with military experience are better at measuring the capabilities of states,
it is possible that they are better at determining the appropriate amount of risk to
take and effort required in order to secure conflict related objectives (e.g. territorial
gain/retention, casualty avoidance, collateral damage).
This logic is supported by research finding that leaders with varying competence
(higher levels of cognitive complexity) and psychology (locus of control or the extent
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to which people think they have power over their lives) are more willing to adopt
simple policies like diversionary uses of force (Foster and Keller, 2014; Keller and
Foster, 2012).4 measures cognitive complexity by analyzing the words leaders use.
The score is the ratio between highly complex words and all words appearing in
the data meaning higher scores represent leaders who are able and or willing to
discuss policy challenges with complex language. If leaders who are less competent
are more willing to adopt highly risky policies like diversionary war, it could be the
case that highly competent leaders approach complex international disputes with a
more complicated, but potentially more rewarding policies.
Studies like Smith (1998) derive implications from a formal model of crisis bar-
gaining paying particular attention to the role of competence in conflict escalation
yet do not define why some leaders are more competent or test the extent to which
this theory applies to observational data. Under the assumption that communica-
tion is minimal or uninformative (babbling) leaders with more competence are more
likely to attack, retaliate, and intervene as a result of their self-perceived ability.
While these theories are not empirically tested and the author does not focus on
how leaders become competent or develop reputations for competence, this research
argues that voters want to retain competent leaders, that competent leaders expect
to perform better increasing their likelihood of intervention, and that this provides
incentives for less competent leaders to intervene in order to signal their incompe-
tence creating a dangerous “bias for violent behavior" practice by the least prepared
of leaders (Smith, 1998). The implications of this formal model indicate that leaders
strategically condition their conflict actions on their own perceived competence.
4Foster and Keller (2014)
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1.4 A proposal for studying backgrounds and conflict
This section outlines a proposal for contributing to the field of literature reviewed
above. First, it specifies a general research agenda, then discusses specific questions
that are of priority within this agenda.
First, there is a gap in international conflict literature as no project explores the
relationship between backgrounds and public perceptions of ability as they pertain
to conflict performance. For as much as political candidates discuss their experience
and educational backgrounds on the campaign trail, it is surprising that there is no
systematic investigation of the relationship between these characteristics and conflict
performance. On a conceptual level, there is a scarce amount of research examin-
ing the relationship between perceived competence and accountability. Herein lies
the broadest ranging impact of this dissertation. Fields like sociology, psychology,
organizational management, economics, and others could benefit from an improved
understanding of the extent to which experience and education improve decision-
making. Additionally, understanding how individuals assign accountability in situ-
ations where performance is observed through outcomes, yet direct responsibility is
debated or obscured could reveal interesting patterns in human decision making.
To my knowledge, there is no study in the field of international relations that
investigates how people assign accountability in situations where they are uncertain
over whether a given outcome is the product of some other actor’s behavior. I argue
that individuals will look to signals in an effort to heuristically (i.e. use of mental
shortcuts) analyze the competence of the actor being evaluated. When outcomes are
good, individuals are tasked with determining the extent to which the other person’s
behaviors resulted in the positive outcome. When outcomes are poor, individuals are
similarly tasked in determining whether the other person’s behavior is responsible for
the negative outcomes reached.
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It could be the case that individuals hold more competent people at higher rates
believing they should have known better and giving the benefit of the doubt to lead-
ers who are less competent. Alternatively, believing that less competent people are
responsible for mistakes (or the inverse where more competent people are responsible
for less mistakes) could be all too easy. While I limit my investigation to blame for
international conflict, findings could have implications for a variety of settings where
performance evaluations occur.
To provide an example relevant to everyday life, imagine splitting the task of
cooking with a new friend who has a culinary arts degree. As you eat the dish they
provided, you notice that the dish has a horribly bitter taste. Your embarrassed
friend argues that it must not have kept well or that the ingredients could have been
tainted at the time of purchase but that is was not a product of their recipe or actions
during preparation. Since you have never had their cooking before, you remember
their background as a trained cook and easily agree the fault lies outside of their
control. In this situation, the individual’s background shielded them from blame by
supporting the logic that they not be responsible for the poor outcome. Likewise,
if your friend had a reputation for only eating fast food and rarely cooking dishes
requiring complex preparation, you might be more willing to blame them rather than
chalking up the bad taste to elements beyond their control.5 In this sense, this
dissertation is about who gets the benefit of the doubt and who does not.
In respect to international conflicts, leaders are evaluated for their performance
in disputes and war. One only needs to think of the contested legacy of Neville
Chamberlain after his policy of appeasement allowed the Third Reich to expand
into the Sudentenland (Laybourn, 2001). In the mildest sense, he was seen as too
attached to peace or too ‘dovish’ to apply the forceful counter to Hitler’s aggression
early on (Doyle, 1997). In the most extreme, he was painted as incompetent and
5Perhaps they are writing a dissertation.
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unprepared to deal with the realities of German expansionism. This sentiment likely
fueled the Winston Churchill’s rise to power, labeled a "bull dog" due to a reputation
for resolve and toughness. Although Churchill also struggled to contain the spread of
Nazi Germany, the stark contrast in their political legacies reflects the effect of failed
foreign policy on leaders beyond survival.
Once outcomes of conflicts generated (i.e. who won, at what costs, etc.), individ-
uals that care about holding leaders accountable for their foreign policy actions must
evaluate their leader to determine the extent to which they are responsible. When
leaders lose wars, individuals must determine whether success was unobtainable or
whether the leader should be blamed. In a similar spirit to a person evaluating a
person’s competence in the kitchen, I argue individuals evaluate their leader’s com-
petence of international affairs by looking at their professional background character-
istics (what a leader did prior to gaining power). When outcomes and backgrounds
are intuitively compatible (war loss with weak background or war win with strong
background) leaders are soft targets for the respective sentiments of blame and praise
public ascribes to them post-conflict. When outcomes and backgrounds are logically
incompatible (war win with weak background and war loss with strong background), I
theorize that leaders will be hard targets for blame and praise levied towards them by
their domestic audience. These theoretical arguments also imply that, when holding
outcome fixed, leaders with stronger backgrounds will be rated higher than leaders
with weaker backgrounds.
It is not enough to know whether these backgrounds matter for the way leaders
are perceived. Although discerning patterns among public reactions to conflict car-
ries important implications for what leaders do, it is also important to examine the
extent to which these heuristics are effective shortcuts for audiences attempting to
assign accountability. To fully grasp the importance of leader backgrounds and pub-
lic opinion for international conflict, we must determine if leader behavior in conflict
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varies systematically with backgrounds. It is important to understand whether these
backgrounds do more than modify the way the public views their behavior. It is also
possible that public audiences are occasionally correct in their use of backgrounds as
heuristic devices for assigning blame and praise. That is, the backgrounds leaders
have that signal competence actually generate it. While a combination of studies
suggest backgrounds like education and military experience matter for how a leader
governs, we are unable to determine if this matters for the ultimate cost a state pays
for war: soldiers killed in action.
How much attention do individuals pay to conflict outcomes like casualties com-
pared to other political outcomes more commonly thought to matter for measuring
performance like tax policy? Initial analysis of public internet search data reveals
that conflict outcomes are comparable, if not more popular on average than often
highly salient topics like tax cuts. This shows one of the ways individuals find infor-
mation related to conflict outcome and suggests that many are even willing to seek
these type of data out if popular media fail to cover the costs of war.
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Figure 1.1: Search engine data on keywords Numbers represent search popularity
relative to the highest point on the chart for the given region and time. A value of
100 is the peak popularity. A value of 50 means that the term is half as popular. A
score of 0 means there was not enough data for this term.
The dotted line represents search popularity on google for war casualties over
time where the solid one shows the search popularity for tax cuts from 2004-2019.
This graph shows a noisy but steady interest in a search term related to the study,
‘war casualties’, yet also shows the potential of economic policy, via ‘tax cuts’ to
captivate audiences as the time surrounding the expiration of the George W. Bush’s
extensive tax cuts from approximately 2010-2011 represents a significant outlier for
search popularity.6 This suggests that people utilize search engines to learn about
6In addition to this, scholarly research focused upon the relationship between for-
eign policy and domestic political behavior has demonstrated that conflict outcomes
at least matter for wartime approval (Gartner, 2008a; Aldrich et al., 2006).
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the costs of war at a relatively steady rate and that the casualties wars produce are
salient enough to motivate individuals to seek out information. Once one has googled
or searched for information related to conflict, newspaper articles like Azadzoi and
Nordland (2018) represent a prominent way individual members of the public gain
information about soldiers killed in action yet individuals can get this through leaked
governmental reports and other sources. This demonstrates that individuals are both
motivated and able to gather information relevant to wartime casualties.
I argue that accountability is a key mechanism underlying the relationship be-
tween leader characteristics and conflict behavior. Accountability represents a state
of the world where people are held responsible for their actions whether they produce
good or bad outcomes. When leaders lose wars or wage relatively costly ones and
receive blame for it, this can be damaging to their political prospects (Croco, 2011).
When leaders win wars and are praised for it, this is a key mechanism for increasing
the likelihood that a leader will be retained or rewarded for their actions. While I
argue that leaders should attempt to minimize blame and behave more freely when
expecting less blame, individuals are often faced with multiple outlets to place blame.
I extend the work performed in the first two chapters by examining why individu-
als choose to blame policymakers instead of intelligence organizations after surprise
attacks.
1.4.1 Paper 1: Blame for Battle
How does the public evaluate the conflict performance of political leaders (e.g. prime
ministers, presidents) when outcomes are observed (e.g. casualties, victory/loss) yet
direct responsibility is debatable or unknown? Findings indicate that individuals
are more likely to blame leaders for conflicts they initiate and that leaders are more
likely to exert effort to winning a conflict when they are perceived as culpable (Croco,
2011). This implies that leaders strategically condition their effort in conflict to
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mitigate public backlash. However, determining whether a given leader is responsible
for the initiation of conflict can be difficult when leaders commonly frame any conflict
as a last resort option that the other side forced them to choose. Historical cases,
from Churchill’s reputation as a bulldog to George W. Bush’s fighter jet landing
on an aircraft carrier to the unveiling of a “mission accomplished banner", reveal
that individuals pay attention to more than just the outcomes of conflict.7 Framing
matters. Yet it isn’t clear what types of contextual information the public uses when
interested in evaluating their leader’s performance in conflict.
I theorize that individuals heuristically analyze the competence of their leaders
to make these evaluations. If leaders are competent, they are deemed as less likely
to be a fault for any negative outcome and more likely responsible for positive out-
comes (e.g. war win, low costs). Conversely, leaders deemed incompetent are more
likely to evaluated poorly for unfavorable outcomes (e.g. war loss, high costs) and
less likely to be evaluated positively for good outcomes. by reviewing their profes-
sional experience prior to office to determine if they are responsible for the outcomes
generated from conflict. This still leaves a critical question unanswered in respect
to what information the public uses to determine whether a leader is competent. I
argue that individuals look to the backgrounds of leaders or what they do before
gaining power. When backgrounds convey competence over conflict, leaders bene-
fit from both a shield and magnet effect during performance evaluations. Perceived
competence shields or protects from blame whereas it attracts or invites praise. I
argue that military experience and educational backgrounds are important indicators
of competence. As such, we should expect leaders with stronger backgrounds (e.g.
higher education level, military experience) to fare better in performance evaluations
for conflict when holding costs and outcomes equal.
7For a discussion of this announcement, see: Lucey (2018)
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If backgrounds matter, leaders with high levels of experience in politics, military
affairs, and educational attainment prior to reaching office should be treated differ-
ently than those without traits that generate perceived competence over conflict even
when these leaders generate similar gains/losses from fighting. Initial results from an
original survey utilizing an embedded natural experiment indicate that a leader’s pro-
fessional background affects the evaluation of leaders during conflict.8 Specifically,
respondents rank leaders (i.e. respondents are asked to asked to rate the leader’s
performance in the conflict on a 0-10 scale with stronger backgrounds higher for all
three outcomes included in the experiment (win, stalemate, loss). However, analysis
of sub-groups in the study reveal that these effects are heterogeneous. With respect
to partisan identification, democrats penalized the leader with a weak background
much more than republicans although the mean for the leader with a weak back-
ground was never higher than the stronger one. This research offers an experimental
framework for analyzing the effect of leader traits upon public opinion of foreign pol-
icy outcomes and provides a preliminary examination of how leaders with varying
backgrounds prosecute conflicts.
1.4.2 Paper 2: Less Lethal Leaders
The deadliness of international conflict is a persistent feature of international relations
despite a wide array of studies examining the causes of conflict intensity. The issues
at stake, parties involved, geographical terrain, and more have been leveraged to
explain why some conflicts are more costly to human life. While these studies possess
important implications for policymakers attempting to forecast the costs of a given
conflict, they imply that there is little those outside of elite circles can do to reduce
these costs even though members of the public are usually the ones sacrificing their
8Embedded natural experiments or ENE utilize vignettes that make the realization
of the treatment condition appear as if it were arrived at through a random process.
See Dafoe, Zhang and Caughey (N.d.) for an extensive explanation of this approach.
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lives for state security. Research shows that the public is sensitive to conflicts that
incur relatively high costs to human life yet we do not know what makes leaders
effective at reducing these costs (Gartner and Segura, 1998; Gartner, 2008a).
Multiple studies demonstrate that leaders who initiate conflicts are more likely to
dedicate prolonged efforts towards victories and that leaders avoid crises when their
reelection prospects are at risk (Croco, 2011; Chiozza and Goemans, 2003). These
studies provide a context conditional explanation for why leaders become politically
sensitive to battlefield casualties yet assume that any leader in these context would
behave similarly. Much like selectorate theory, all leaders share an interest in political
survival and are sensitive to what those who put them in power want (Bueno de
Mesquita et al., 2005). These projects are also similar in that they implicitly make
a simplifying assumption: all leaders are equipped with equivalent skill sets. This
work implies that changing characteristics of leaders would not alter the outcome or
costs of a given conflict. That is, they would imply that a leader like Kaiser Wilhelm
II would produce similar foreign policy outcomes to his predecessor, Chancellor Otto
Von Bismarck. While one could argue that the large scale conflict was inevitable,
few argue that Wilhelm’s rise represented anything but a substantial turn towards
risky and aggressive foreign policy leading Germany into a devastating war (Stam,
Horowitz and Ellis, 2015). 9
In line with historical cases that point to the importance of individual leader char-
acteristics, recent studies suggest that the leader characteristics matter for how risk
adverse they are in respect to initiating disputes, minimizing budget deficits, and
whether the public defers to their decisions over military affairs (Besley, Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol, 2011; Carreri, 2017; Stam, Horowitz and Ellis, 2015; Krebs, Ral-
9A less cited example might be the replacement of Lord Aberdeen with the for-
eign policy expertise of Lord Palmerston during the Crimean War from 1853-1856.
Palmerston’s expertise was cited as a reason for his rise to power during the costly
conflict and he was able to resolve the conflict expediently once taking power (Lay-
bourn, 2001).
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ston and Rapport, 2018). I theoretically link the casualties suffered in international
conflict to the amount of blame leaders expect to receive for the conflict itself, their
educational background, and domain-specific expertise over military affairs. Criti-
cally, I argue that educated leaders are better at minimizing casualties where military
leaders are expected to be more aggressive, expect deference to their decisions, and
used to accepting the costs of war. Utilizing time-series cross-sectional data on leader
backgrounds from LEAD and casualty counts from the Militarized Interstate Dispute
data, I use a variety of statistical techniques to test the relationship between casualties
and blame in a cross-national setting with leader-conflict-year units of observation
(Ellis, Horowitz and Stam, 2015; Jones, Bremer and Singer, 1996).
My findings suggest that the relationship between the educational level of a leader
and MID casualties is robust and, as expected, higher levels of education negatively
correlate with MID casualties. As approximately 60 percent of the statistical models
used were negative and significant at the .05 level, the relationship is only moderately
robust. This was not the case for combat experience. One one out of 12 models
reported a negative and statistically significant coefficient. This suggests that the
effect of combat experience on conflict behavior is isolated to the decision to initiate
conflict and not how a leader behaves during conflict.
1.4.3 Paper 3: Bang them Blame
Why do some international crises get labeled as intelligence failures while others
result in high levels of blame directed at policymakers? Historical events like 9/11,
Benghazi, and Pearl Harbor have all been labeled as ‘intelligence failures’ and failures
of policymakers. This could be due to the effectiveness of the leader at shifting blame
to bureaucrats, crisis level attributes, or individual level characteristics relating to
how preventable one thinks international crises are. Recent findings suggest that
media outlets are more likely to blame intelligence communities (Davies, Schulzke
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and Almond, 2018). Although there is little reason to believe the public cannot find
both actors culpable, leaders interested in political survival should prefer situations
where intelligence communities are blamed more if it results in smaller decreases to
their levels of support. Understanding why leaders avoid blame and how audiences
will react to seemingly random shocks is crucial to understanding the implications of
international crises for domestic politics.
Using original survey data, I examine how individuals assign culpability under
a variety of crisis scenarios. I utilize vignettes to tell respondents a story about a
country that experienced a surprise attack from another country resulting in casual-
ties. I vary the extent to which the intelligence community gave policymakers time to
prevent the attack by randomizing the amount of time between an intelligence report
indicating the threat and the attack. Next, I randomize the way the president of
the country that was attacked frames subsequent investigations by varying whether
the leader directs investigations at the intelligence or the congressional committee
responsible for reviewing the intelligence.
Centrally, I argue that the public looks to informational cues concerning how
aware and certain policymakers should have been over a given threat to determine
if intelligence communities gave adequate warnings. The amount of reports provided
to policymakers, the number of agencies in agreement over the report’s findings, and
the amount of time policymakers had to act between the report and attack are all
theorized to positively correlate with more blame for politicians and less blame for
bureaucrats. Findings from an an initial pilot suggest that timing may only shelter
intelligence agencies from blame and matter little for the level of blame policymakers
receive. The pilot also suggests that a president’s attempt to frame attack as an
intelligence or policymaking failure may have an adverse effect where individuals
assign more blame to policymakers when the president attempts to shift blame to the
intelligence community.
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1.5 Conclusion
This dissertation includes three separate chapters designed for submission as journal
articles. The first two papers are presented with full analyses sections where the third
paper only presents a smaller pilot study designed to test the most critical parts of a
theory concerning surprise attacks. In order to strengthen the impact of these studies,
a few things should be considered before they are submitted.
First, the chapter concerning leader backgrounds and blame for conflict would
benefit from a follow up study in a location outside of the U.S. as it appears partisan-
ship and characteristics particular to the 2016 election might have influenced some of
the results. It would also be beneficial to show that leaders with weaker backgrounds
are rated lower regardless of the way this treatment is realized. In the survey exper-
iment presented, a short biographical section is included in the vignettes. It would
help to show that the results this approach produced hold even when respondents are
given bullet point lists of biographical information before learning about the conflict.
In respect to the second paper, more work is needed to establish the causal con-
nection between leader backgrounds and conflict casualties. Additionally, it would
strengthen the credibility of the argument to show that other types of conflict reveal
similar patterns. For instance, if one could show that the effectiveness of conflict
groups in civil war are also more effective in respect to casualty avoidance when led
by educated leaders, it would be more difficult to argue these results were produced
by factors isolated to the dispute setting or that irregularities inherent in the MID
data led to these findings.
With that said, all of these projects represent standalone contributions to on-
going/active discussions in the conflict literature. They employ multiple models of
human decision making, explore social phenomena relevant to discipline beyond po-
litical science, and utilize a variety of empirical strategies. This work has relevance to
discussions about the psychological/cognitive states of leaders, conflict severity, fram-
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ing, and public opinion. The next chapter represents the beginning of this project and
seeks to explain how a leader’s professional and educational background influences
public evaluations of their performance in international conflicts.
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Chapter 2
Blame for Battle
2.1 Introduction
Following United States President George W. Bush’s decision to declare a war on
terrorism and invade Iraq, thousands of soldiers died and a controversy of culpability
ensued. Debate over the conflict focused on whether Iraq had connections to the
9/11 terrorist attacker and whether the Iraqi state posed an existential threat via
weapons of mass destruction (Miller, 2005; Kessler, 2019). As the war incurred more
costs, critics centered upon Bush’s competence as an explanation for why the U.S.
became involved. Defenders argued that Bush’s background in the military and elite
educational achievement meant it was unlikely Bush was at fault while critics argued
his military experience was limited, citing controversies surrounding his service in
addition to his reputation as a "C-level" student (Glass, 2013). In an attempt to
assign blame, opposing sides utilized differing interpretations of the President’s life
before politics to provide opposing evidence related to his ability to make competent
decisions in respect to international conflict.
As more time passes, Bush’s decision is only more widely condemned and even
those who voted for the resolution to use force in 2002 are still suffering political
consequences long after the conflict’s end (Gompert, Binnendijk and Lin, 2014; Cole,
2019). President Bush’s life prior to executive office (his background) harmed him
while other parts like educational pedigree allowed supporters to bolster positive
judgments of his performance as commander-in-chief during conflict. While this story
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elucidates the potential importance of a leader’s background in attracting/repelling
blame for costly battle, it puzzles one trying to determine which backgrounds help
leaders and which ones make them all too easy targets for blame after conflicts.
In line with studies showing voters frequently use cognitive short-cuts to ana-
lyze complex choices, I argue that individuals heuristically use the professional back-
grounds (i.e. military/political experience, education) of their agents or leaders to de-
termine if they are responsible for a winning, losing, or needlessly prolonging a conflict
(Lau and Redlawsk, 2001). This is perhaps one manifestation of the screening pro-
cess discussed by Ashworth and Bueno De Mesquita (2014), Ashworth, de Mesquita
and Friedenberg (2017) and Wagner (2010) where voters develop ways to remove in-
competent leadership in effort to hold leaders accountable. This paper synthesizes
literature demonstrating that a leader’s educational background varies systematically
with economic outcomes and literature examining why the public holds a leader cul-
pable for conflict outcomes (Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2011; Croco, 2011).
It contributes to existing work on leader backgrounds by assessing how the relation-
ship between blame and conflict outcomes is conditional on public perception of a
leader’s competence with a novel survey experiment.
Research on leader culpability demonstrates that a leader is culpable if they are
in office when the conflict begins or politically connected to the leader who was
(Croco, 2011). These individual assignments of blame and praise represent the micro-
foundations of the public’s general level of support important for whether branches
of government decide to remove the executive, attempt to stop the conflict, and in-
vestigate the conflict retroactively. First, individual voters tend to ask if they applied
enough effort (e.g. budgeting for war effort, rallying allies abroad). Second, and most
importantly for this paper, if voters care about a leader’s performance decisions in
conflict, they need determine if the leader made the best decisions possible given avail-
able information. Since leaders are granted access to classified information over war
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and voters are not, attentive voters are at a disadvantage when trying to determine
the appropriate political response to their state becoming involved in costly conflicts.
The complexity of international conflicts often requires a high level of attention by
voters to determine the proper locus to assign accountability. This is a difficult task
for voters as leader actions are often hidden, they possess informational disadvantages
over the conflict, and studies suggest media outlets generally direct blame towards
other actors like intelligence organizations (Davies, Schulzke and Almond, 2018).
It is not clear whether individuals blame competent leaders more or less when
outcomes are poor compared to competent leaders. Individuals could believe that
competent leaders should know better meaning individuals assign more blame to
leaders with extensive backgrounds. While this alternative theory is attractive, I ar-
gue that individuals prefer simple heuristics and that a congruence pairing of outcome
and background (negative outcome, weak background/positive outcome and strong
background) is more simple than cases where leaders with high levels of perceived
competence fail or incompetent ones succeed. In this setting, audience members de-
termine that the failure could not be the direct fault of the leader because they are
an ‘expert’ who would never make such mistakes. In this sense, leaders are given the
‘benefit of the doubt’ and audience members may shift blame to those executing the
response or assume that a good outcome was not possible. This is similar to assum-
ing an elite surgeon who looses a patient did everything in their power to save the
patient whereas more scrutiny might be applied to a recent medical school graduate’s
failures. To investigate how these relationships work, I classify rivaling narratives of
culpability in terms of whether they deal with a soft or hard target for blame/praise.
Leaders with less experience could be held more culpable as they are ‘soft targets’ for
criticism and ‘hard targets’ for praise.
I adopt a theoretical framework viewing leaders as potential targets of blame.
As individuals search for information related to the leader to determine the extent to
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which they should be blamed, they analyze the extent to which a leader’s professional
background prepared them for the complex challenges of foreign policymaking. When
leaders possess weak backgrounds, leaders become easy or ‘soft’ targets for blame as it
makes intuitive sense to voters that an incompetent leader produced poor outcomes.
When leaders possess strong backgrounds, they become hard targets for blame or soft
targets for praise where outcomes are positive (i.e. low casualties, victory in conflict).
I theorize that the most prominent relationship is described by the“soft target" effect
where leaders receive higher levels of credit for winning conflicts when viewed as
highly competent and higher levels of blame when losing if they are perceived as
incompetent.1 Hard-targets are leaders who possess qualities that run counter-type
to expected outcomes. That is, leaders with reputations for competence are harder to
blame for poor outcomes where leaders with reputations for incompetence are harder
to praise when conflicts end in success.
While existing research identifies the contextual attributes of conflict that matter
for leader behavior, we still know very little about the conditions under which leaders
receive more or less support for their actions (Croco, 2011). Additionally, leaders
with backgrounds conveying competence could be insulated from initiation culpability
and able to act more aggressively once in office. In order to fill this gap, I conduct
a novel survey experiment leveraging vignettes to describe a leader’s background,
conflict attributes, and capture levels of perceived culpability and competence. First,
I describe an extremely close election between a leader with a strong background (e.g
military experience, extensive education) and a leader with an weak background to
1It is possible that respondents who perceive either high levels of similarity or
difference in ideological disposition between themselves and the leader will simply
find a narrative suitable to rewarding those like them and punishing those who are
not. I expect that those with more ideologically extreme views will be less responsive
to the individual traits of the leader in respect to forming views of competence as
they might attempt to filter all information about a leader in respect to whether they
are in agreement over certain policies.
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avoid priming respondents to think that the leader in power also had other attributes
related to competence that helped them rise to power. I then randomize which leader
wins the election and tell the story of that leader getting attacked by another country
a year later. Finally, I randomize the outcome of the conflict to see how backgrounds
and outcomes interact. After these vignettes, I ask each respondent to evaluate the
performance of the leader in the conflict. To field the experiment, I use Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk platform to conduct a series of online experiments providing an N
of 1,109. Individuals are randomly assigned to vignettes that vary the background
strength of the leader and the outcome of the conflict. To avoid confounding due
to confusion over who started a conflict, I fix the vignettes to a scenario where the
leader is attacked by another country resulting in war. This allows me to isolate
scenarios where soft/hard target effects should apply. Results indicate that leaders
with stronger backgrounds receive higher performance ratings for every outcome but
the difference between leader types is most significant where leaders produce victories.
This advances the way we currently think about public support for war by creating a
model of support conditional on both a leader’s background and the outcome reached.
In order to understand how it benefits existing projects, it is important to review the
most relevant literature to this study.
2.2 Relevant Literature
Do these backgrounds matter to voters if we usually assume that they care about ide-
ological or distributional concerns? That is, do voters really care about competence
when assigning culpability if they are so focused on what leaders do rather than how
well they do it? Chiefly, there is little reason to expect that leaders will deliver on the
promises they make to their voters if they lack the necessary skills to deliver. The
commitments made by political actors only become credible when a “suitable set” of
candidates are available to “carry them through once elected" (Besley, 2005). Qual-
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ities important for determining credibility can be divided between those that make
candidates appear more honest and competent as found in Besley (2005). Instead
of focusing on the qualities that individuals use to determine honesty, this paper ex-
tends a growing field of literature focusing on traits and backgrounds related to the
competence leaders possess over conflict.
Leaders and Conflict
Leader-centric analyses are important for problems where the issue at hand revolves
around outcomes that are largely determined by single actors. In times of conflict,
individual leaders play extensive roles in determining acceptable risks and costs. In
perhaps the most cited theoretical advancement on leaders, Bueno de Mesquita et al.
(2005) provides a framework for analyzing the behavior of leaders based off of their
domestic political context. This perspective argues that all leaders rely on some
group to survive politically, or their winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al.,
2005). To survive, leaders must maintain enough control over their winning coalition
relative to a challenger by modifying the distribution of public and private goods.
This model’s wide applicability to the nexus between leader decision-making and
domestic politics has been applied to coups, revolutions, purges, and more (Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith, 2017). While this project does not offer a direct extension of
this theory, it does focus upon how audiences (e.g. members of the winning coalition)
measure their leader’s performance during conflict. When security is conceptualized
as a public good, it resembles territory where “expansion not only enriches the ruler;
it also enriches the follower” (Wagner, 2010). This perspective classifies coalition
members as principals where leaders are their agents attempting to provide security
from interactions with foreign rulers (Miller, 2005; Wagner, 2010; Downs and Rocke,
1994). If conflicts end poorly for a leader and they are deemed culpable for the
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initiation/costs/outcomes, coalition members, attempting to induce future agents to
behave differently, might choose challengers in order to screen out incompetence.
Generally, the conflict literature classifies leaders and challengers as hawks and
doves. Carter and Smith (2018) uses latent variable models to analyze the extent to
which leaders are hawkish (roughly equivalent to war-prone or aggression) or doves
(roughly equivalent to war adverse or peace-seeking). Carter (2018b) finds that pop-
ulations prefer hawkish leaders when neighboring countries select hawkish leaders of
their own. This could be explained by a possible deterrent effect where the public
wants to increase their perceived war-proneness to deter neighbors from trying to
gain leverage with a new bargaining agent (e.g. renegotiating economic deals, secu-
rity alliances). Alternatively, audiences may conflate hawkish leaders from parties or
backgrounds that indicate competence over military affairs where they desire a leader
able to defend the country from a nearby hawk, not necessarily one that is more war
prone. I contribute to this discussion by examining whether individuals pay atten-
tion to characteristics commonly thought of as competency forming, while testing the
extent to which military leaders correlate with perceptions of hawkishness.
Horowitz and Stam (2012) finds evidence that a leader’s professional background
in the military (specifically rank) can impact the way they fight wars. Leaders with
the rank of officer are more experienced in making tough decisions that result in
casualties where those who enlisted are more combat experienced and risk-adverse
concerning casualties. This implies that different types of professional experience in
a similar domain can result in distinct foreign policy approaches yet it does not show
whether leaders, attempting to avoid casualties, are better as a result of said expe-
rience. Additionally, other research suggests that the effect of military/professional
experience may be isolated to risk aversion during conflict Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer and
Renshon (2018) examine the impact of leader traits upon how credible they perceive
signaling surrounding conflicts to be “leaders vary significantly in how credible they
37
perceive signals to be, depending on their foreign policy dispositions, rather than their
levels of military or political experience.” It is not clear whether leaders fare better in
conflicts who perceive signals as credible but nonetheless represents a potential limit
to the ability of military experience alone to explain foreign policy choices related
to conflict. If leader backgrounds matter for other social outcomes prominently re-
lated to executive performance, one can more comfortably believe leader backgrounds
matter for the way international conflicts play out.
Multiple studies indicate that a leader’s educational background affects the eco-
nomic outcomes (budget deficits, GDP growth, inflation rates) of political systems
at executive and local levels (Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2011; Carreri,
2017). However, historical analyses of the relationship between experience type and
economic success cast doubt. For instance, recent presidential candidates in the U.S.
touted their business experience as a cue for their inevitable success at improving
economic conditions. Yet, at least in the context of historical US presidential poli-
tics, Harry Truman, whose haberdashery went bankrupt in two years, was the only
president with business experience since Herbert Hoover to improve economic welfare
(McElvaine, 2012). I argue that characteristics like professional background matter
to the extent they contribute to a public perception of competence. Individuals can
differ over their approval of the outcome and over whether they believe the outcome
is the product of their leader’s actions. This implies that individuals may not ap-
prove of any casualties for a war they never approved of but still could analyze leader
characteristics to determine if the leader receives punishments/rewards for that out-
come. Individual characteristics formative of perceived competence could determine
the extent to which individuals believe leaders are responsible for the failure to win
a war or the number of casualties suffered while fighting.
Although I argue later that competence is important for determining culpability
for conflict, this paper is predominantly concerned with perceptions of culpability.
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As such, it is most closely related to work examining the causes and consequences of
leader’s being blamed or praised for conflicts (Croco, 2015). Croco (2011) shows that
U.S. presidents systematically differ in their conflict performance when one accounts
for whether they initiated the conflict. Her work shows that prospective calculations
of blame compel leaders to fight costly conflicts to positive outcomes where they or
a closely linked predecessor started to war. This implies that leaders condition their
behavior on how they expect the public to react in the future. This assumption is
bolstered by the findings of Chiozza and Goemans (2003) demonstrating leaders are
less likely to initiate crises when their risk of losing office is higher and that risk of
losing office is higher when they initiate a crisis.
It is also helpful to think of the problem of incompetent leadership at war as a
relationship between principal and agent in a canonical sense (Miller, 2005; Wagner,
2010; Downs and Rocke, 1994). Principal-agent theory is best described as a “flexible
family of models" rather than an overarching theory with consistent assumptions
(Gailmard, 2012). While issues of international security can be characterized as
principal-agent problems with moral hazard (e.g. voters not wanting particular tactics
used in battle) or adverse selection, the problem focused on here is that of hidden
actions and information. When political leaders at the executive level (e.g. presidents,
prime ministers) act on the behalf of their state in foreign affairs, they are hired by
citizens to provide them public goods like security. When leaders engage other states
in violent conflict, they can take extremely covert actions to pursue their interests
and attempt to conceal or classify information that might harm their political careers.
Since modern leaders rarely own the country they rule like traditional monarchs, they
can often promote their ultimate interest of political survival at risk to the principal’s
interest in security (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). As a result, the principal must
find a way of inducing the leader to behave as they would if they were governing.
However, the problem lies in that the principal is not fully informed on the agent’s
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preferences and, most importantly, over what the leader does exactly during a given
conflict as the leader has informational advantages due to the classified nature of
military intelligence (Wagner, 2010; Downs and Rocke, 1994).
Since leaders have an incentive to conceal information damaging their prospects
of retaining power, knowing the outcome is not enough to determine the leader’s
performance. Wagner (2010) compares this to the professions of medical doctors
and lawyers where extremely competent practitioners inevitably lose patients and
cases. To determine whether they acted in your best interests as you would have, you
would have to know as much about the law or medicine as them which is unlikely
considering you requested their expertise. The simplest way to resolve this problem
include paying the agent for performance (e.g. perhaps figuratively by increasing
your support or how expressed it is) yet providing incentives for winning conflicts
may provide a leader with too much incentive to initiate conflicts. Other ways of
resolving this problem include legislative oversight (found to increase a state’s foreign
policy ability), protocols for removing the leader, and separation of war powers across
divisions of government (Downs and Rocke, 1994; Colaresi, 2012). This paper is not
interesting in examining the extent to which principals are able to induce agents to
take their most preferred action by screening for incompetence. As such, it should
not be seen as a test of principal-agent theory but as an empirical test of a theory
operating within the context of principal agent problem. Rather than examining
leader behavior as a result of these inducements, it first examines the extent to
which principals employ heuristics to determine whether they should punish or reward
their agents, conditional on the outcomes reached. Specifically, I examine whether
individuals employ a shortcut that utilizes a leader’s background and the outcome of
the conflict to determine whether a leader should be blamed or praised, resulting in
systematic changes in their support for the leader. While the study is novel in many
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ways, it is not the first study to examine the role of a leader characteristics and public
opinion more broadly.
Leader Backgrounds and Public Opinion
There is a growing amount of research demonstrating that the individual backgrounds
(i.g. training, education, experience) of leaders matter for their abilities once in a
position of leadership. Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) use cross-national analysis
to determine that democracies are 20 percent more likely to select highly educated
leaders. This implies that populations, when given the opportunity, prefer leaders
with traits broadly associated with competence. In line with these findings, Gift
and Lastra-Anadón (2018) finds that voters prefer highly educated voters on aver-
age but that conservatives find politicians harder to relate to if they attended elite
schools. This could imply that individuals desire competent leadership but are wary
of politicians with lives dissimilar to their own.
Additionally, research outside the field of political science on the determinants of
effective leadership is abundant and well-received. Most prominently, the fields of
applied psychology and leadership studies offer insights as to how a leader’s char-
acteristics could create both perceived and actual competency(Judge, 2002; Kaiser
and Craig, 2008; Zaccaro et al., 1991). Most importantly, Hoffman et al. (2011) find
evidence that “state-like individual differences (e.g. knowledge and skills)” can be a
consistent predictor of effective leadership indicating that what background qualities
like education and experience could matter for the ability of political leaders.
In line with the logic that intelligence can determine the quality of leadership,
Judge, Colbert and Ilies (2004) find that indicators commonly associated with cog-
nitive ability have a moderate impact on organizational outcomes. More specifically,
House and Aditya (1997) perform a wide-ranging review of trends in leadership stud-
ies arguing that the literature finds a pattern where experienced leaders do poor in low
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stress environments as compared to intelligent ones with low experience (as well as the
inverse that experience is preferred to intelligence in high stress situations). If these
findings map onto political organizations, we would expect a president with a great
deal of experience to fare better in time-sensitive, high-stress situations and leaders
with higher intelligence to perform better where there is less stress and more time to
critically analyze relevant information. Both concepts, experience and intelligence,
are frequently associated with competence. It is not clear from this strain of research
that the combination of these two, a situation where a leader would be predicted to
possess high levels of competence, result in better outcomes for the organization they
lead.
This field also pays attention to the psychological traits that characterize one’s
perceived ability to lead and one’s willingness to serve as a leader. Rubin, Bartels
and Bommer (2002) show that intellectual competency is a key prerequisite for those
attempting to find effective leadership. Similarly, Spisak (2012) find support for their
theory that masculine leaders are selected in times of conflict and feminine leaders
are selected in times of peace. This provides evidence that individuals are using the
traits of leaders to determine whether they possess an underlying attribute desirable
for resolving a particular problem. It could be the case that individuals believe
that masculine leaders are more hawkish or defensive in conflict, or that feminine
leaders are more equipped to deal with challenges not related to conflict. The critical
connection is that individuals look to leader characteristics to determine whether a
given leader is in possession of a characteristic they believe has consequences for their
effectiveness as a leader.
Studies demonstrate that the expectation of blame matters for how leaders behave
during conflicts. Leaders are deemed more culpable (deserving of blame) for a conflict
they start, as they preside over it longer, and the more they were connected to
the prior elite who initiated the conflict if they inherited it (Croco, 2015). This
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implies that the public uses widely available information to determine who to blame
and how much. When expecting a high level of blame if conflict generates poor
outcomes (e.g. loss of territory, civilian casualties, etc.), leaders should put more effort
towards designing military operations that prevent these outcomes. Confirming these
implications, (Croco, 2011) shows that leaders who expect to be held accountable
achieve more favorable outcomes. However, there is evidence that individuals employ
heuristics or mental shortcuts about their leaders and that these judgments affect
the way audiences evaluate the specific actions of that leader (Hehman, Gaertner and
Dovidio, 2011).
If fixed traits like race and gender are analogous to professional characteristics,
recent findings demonstrating public attentiveness to physical characteristics should
bolster our expectations that individuals also rely upon narratives surrounding profes-
sional backgrounds with varying rates of accuracy to determine latent qualities of the
politicians they evaluate when deciding how to assign blame after conflict outcomes
are generated (Hehman, Gaertner and Dovidio, 2011). In a recent article, Krebs,
Ralston and Rapport (2018) found that Americans are willing to defer to military
leaders on decisions over both when and how to use force abroad. If the public is
willing to defer to military experts on military affairs, they could be more willing
to defer to political leaders that have military expertise as to whether the particular
outcomes of conflict were avoidable. Leaders frequently champion their professional
experience to convince populations that they are not only competent, but experts in
comparison to their challengers (Panic, 2016). It is possible that these reputations for
competence, often promulgated by the leader, are ‘sticky’—meaning they persist over
time. The reputations for competence formed by leader background traits serve as
shortcuts for audiences attempting to determine how competent their leaders are over
particular domains once in office. To investigate the merit of this theory, I use an ex-
perimental design to recover the directional nature of the relationship between leader
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characteristics, (education, military experience, political experience, etc.), perceived
conflict competency, and culpability.
There is also strong evidence that the public defers to military leaders more gen-
erally. Krebs, Ralston and Rapport (2018) surveyed nearly 2,500 Americans asking
them two rate their agreement with two prompts: (1) “When considering the use
of military force abroad, we should first and foremost trust the judgment of U.S.
military leaders regarding whether to deploy U.S. forces” and (2) “When considering
the use of military force abroad, we should first and foremost trust the judgment of
U.S. military leaders regarding how to use U.S. forces on the battlefield”. The first
question relates to the appropriate conditions under which force is necessary and the
second relates to the tactical decisions made over how to prosecute the conflict. It is
not clear whether this applies to political leaders with perceived competence over mil-
itary affairs due to their experience prior to holding power. It could be the case that
leaders with these traits are held less culpable for poor conflict outcomes. Research
on leader culpability demonstrates that a leaders are perceived as more culpable for
a conflict if they start it, are politically connected to the leader who was, or preside
over the conflict for a longer period of time (Croco, 2011, 2015).
In a growing field of literature focused on leadership backgrounds, attributes,
traits, and characteristics there is a significant amount of literature possessing some
but not extreme relevance to the work performed in this study. While there is ev-
idence that these backgrounds matter for actual competence, there is little to no
evidence that those paying attention to international conflicts attempt to identify
leader competence by using leader backgrounds. Finally, and most importantly for
this study, there is no single study examining blame for international conflict in rela-
tion to the most prominent types of backgrounds politicians possess to prepare them
for governing.
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2.3 Theory
The following sections contain my theoretical expectations for why leaders receive
more blame or praise relative to others conditional on their professional background
and the outcome of the conflict. I opt to retain blame and praise in my conceptual
framework instead of reducing these to changes in support to be clear which senti-
ments related to conflict matter for varying levels of support. Blame refers to assigned
culpability for poor conflict performance related to casualties, outcome, and extent
of concessions made. Praise is the symmetric positive sentiment individuals assign
to leaders who manage to win conflicts. Blame is a sentiment that could manifest
into lower approval ratings, less willingness to support financially, and vote share if
the consequences of the conflict are extensive to the people the leader relies on to
maintain power.
2.3.1 Overview
My theory captures a setting where a leader is tasked by an audience to provide se-
curity as a public good through their interactions with foreign leaders. This audience
acts as a principal over the leader where the leader represents the principal as an agent
in foreign affairs (Wagner, 2000; Downs and Rocke, 1994). Specifically, I focus on the
process by which audiences review their leader’s performance in an international con-
flict after outcomes are generated and costs are known. While the outcome and costs
of conflict are known to the principal, the extent to which the leader or agent acted on
their behalf (as audiences would act if they were not represented) is unknown. Specif-
ically due to the covert nature of modern warfare, voters cannot be entirely sure of
the actions taken by the agent. Additionally, the operational intelligence surrounding
warfare is often classified obscuring key details over the effectiveness of the attack,
motivations for conflict, and other options available to the leader when deciding how
to engage. This should not matter if leaders and voters consistently share preferences
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over time. However, individuals also gain information about the actions leaders take
and the outcomes these actions produce through ‘leaks’, investigative journalism, and
information gathered from FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) requests.
I adopt a common assumption in political science that leaders prefer to remain in
power or survive politically and do so by providing goods to those deciding whether
they stay in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). However, what benefits do
audience members in a leader’s winning coalition want from an international crisis or
conflict? Audience members desire candidates with the abilities to deliver on policy
promises once in office. To do this, they select on a combinations of observable
leader traits (education, professional expertise, experience) that signal their latent
ability to govern. During conflicts where the potential for loss is high, individuals
prefer leaders that minimize losses (casualties, territorial concessions) and maximize
gains (economic growth, territorial gains, enhanced security).2 It is possible, that a
leader’s interest in pleasing their winning coalition for the purpose of survival could
run counter to the security interests of the state they control. As such, leaders have
an interest in minimizing loss when in war, but may go to wars costly to those outside
of their winning coalition if the distributive gains of war can be redirected to their
base.
However, the losses and gains of conflict are often hard to measure for individuals
saturated with partisan interpretations of each individual outcome from battle. After
Sadaam Hussein’s regime fell in Iraq, Republican leadership in the United States
utilized this to claim that the war was a success yet the war is now hardly viewed as
beneficial or successful (Lucey, 2018; Gompert, Binnendijk and Lin, 2014). I argue
that conflict often generates noisy outcomes but most importantly, that individuals
are tasked with assigning a particular amount of culpability for conflict outcomes.
2See Smith (1998) for formal models with similar assumptions treating security as
a public good.
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When conflicts go well, individuals must determine if gains directly resulted from the
decision-making of their leader or agent.
There are two prominent theoretical possibilities I explain with a theory of leader
target types. Under this perspective, leaders become the targets of two sentiments
voters hold in response to conflicts: blame and praise. Soft targets are leaders that are
easy to blame or praise because their background is logically coherent with a narrative
of them being responsible. Hard targets are leaders that are hard to blame or praise
because their backgrounds are logically coherent with a narrative of responsibility.
For example, a leader with a weak background is a hard target for praise because it
is unlikely they were responsible for positive outcomes with no expertise or relevant
experience. Likewise, a leader with with a strong background is a hard target for
blame when conflicts are lost because it makes less sense that an extremely competent
leader is responsible for making mistakes critical to the outcome realized.
Leaders as Targets of Blame and Praise
First, my theory concerning soft targets posits that individuals use background traits
to identify leaders who are easy targets of credit/praise due to a perception of high
competence or blame because of low levels of perceived competence. When leaders
are blamed, their overall support decreases where praise is symmetrically beneficial
for a leader’s support. Since individuals are left to determine how competent a leader
is through observable characteristics like professional background, perceived compe-
tence can be thought of as relying upon indicators that are crude proxies for actual
competence. As a result, the critical claim of this theory is leaders can be helped
or harmed by their background as voters attempt to remove incompetent leaders af-
ter war and retain competent ones. Under canonical assumptions of principal-agent
theory, as voters value sending signals to future leaders more, the more likely they
will be to remove any leader that loses and retain any leader that wins (Miller, 2005;
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Downs and Rocke, 1994). This means that PAT implies that leaders with extensive
military/political experience and high educational achievement would become soft
targets for praise if a military operation yields positive gains but that voters should
treat a competent loser and incompetent loser in a equivalent manner. I diverge from
this perspective by focusing on changes in support as a function of two sentiments
related to accountability: blame and praise. Blame represents a negative sentiment
where leaders are deemed culpable. Praise represents a positive sentiment held by
the public where leaders are deemed responsible for positive outcomes.
A target becomes harder to apply criticism/easier to assign praise to when they
accumulate perceived competence or gain more experience along three key traits com-
monly associated with the competence or expertise of political leaders: educational
achievement, political experience, and military experience. One alternative theoreti-
cal argument is easy to think of as ’they should have known better’ where leaders with
more competence are blamed at higher levels. I argue that blame attribution rhetoric
is similar to absolving someone of blame because they couldn’t have known better
and only more likely to be adopted by those with highly fixed beliefs surrounding
the leader and or conflict. As such, this theory could be limited in its application to
political systems possessing extreme partisanship or highly polarizing leadership.
My theory of target types implies a logic of blame where the leader couldn’t
be responsible for the specific outcomes of a given conflict because they have such
a high level of expertise. Under this logic, the individual measuring performance
assumes the fault must be elsewhere. Additionally, a target becomes harder to praise
for successful conflicts when they possess a reputation of relatively less competence.
These two narratives or component parts of this theory are not in contradiction with
one another but are two distinct ways of justifying blame or credit in relation to
perceived competence due to a leader’s background strength. Leader backgrounds
are stronger when a leader has more experience in multiple areas.
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If a leader is perceived to have high competence over conflict, they will associate
positive outcomes with their actions as they are soft targets for praise. Conversely,
when conflict outcomes are poor and leaders possess background traits that produce
perceptions of incompetence, individuals will be more likely to blame a leader for
outcomes when the other factors of culpability (initiation of conflict, conflict duration
under current leader) are held equal.3 As such, the central expectation of this paper
is that leaders with stronger backgrounds will receive higher performance ratings for
conflicts for all possible outcomes (win/lose/stalemate).
2.4 Experimental Design
In order to understand the benefit of an experimental approach, it is important
discuss alternative approaches and their respective limitations. First, a researcher
could approach analyzing the relationship between a leader’s background and the
public’s opinion of their actions during conflict by comparing a leader’s change in
approval ratings after conflicts conditional on the leaders background. Data exist for
leader characteristics (e.g. LEAD, Archigos) and cross-national ratings of approval
are available. However, this approach involves arguing that observed changes in
approval ratings are products of a leader’s backgrounds and not the myriad of other
elements that affect the aggregate approval rating of a leader. For instance, it could
be the case that decreases coincide with other bad news related to the leader, the
impact of the conflict upon the economy, the leader/media’s ability to justify the
conflict and frame outcomes as beneficial. These factors, along with too many others
3The survey experiment will control for these potential confounders by examining
a setting where the leader is attacked and the duration is not specified. Additionally,
It is likely that audiences would increase support if a leader was able to fight a very
strong opponent to a stalemate or decrease it if they were only able to fight a weak
opponent to a stalemate. I leave the strength of the opponent out of this theoretical
framework assuming that the parties were relatively comparable in capabilities to
initiate armed conflict.
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to discuss here, result in a sprawling statistical model with a long list of control
variables that can be difficult to interpret in a manner that isolates a causal effect
of a leader’s backgrounds. Additionally, since a leader develops these backgrounds
prior to entering office and fighting conflicts, controlling for the costs and outcomes
of conflicts could induce a form of post-treatment bias over the regression estimates
obtained (King, 2010).
In order to isolate the causal direction of the affect of competence upon culpability
related to conflict management, I designed an instrument that isolates varying leader
traits associated with competence from other causes of perceived culpability (e.g.
initiation of conflict and duration of conflict). In order to do this, one needs a scenario
where the leader is not responsible for the start of a conflict and has only presided
over the conflict for a relatively short period of time. In order to isolate the extent
to which varying backgrounds relates to performance ratings, I also need a treatment
that can vary the background traits of leaders while minimizing potential confounding
related to the approval of a leader’s management of conflict (e.g. casualties, financial
costs, issue type).
Considering the theoretical argument at hand is not concerned with the sensitivity
of evaluations to a wide array of factors, developing a simple survey experiment
that varies the leader’s background and places them within a realistic scenario for
international conflict is likely to the most effective and efficient way to determine the
directional effect of the explanatory variables upon public evaluations, conditional
upon outcomes.
Experimental Treatments
This section describes the treatments used in the experimental survey to capture a re-
spondents support, Y , conditional on a variety of treatments. Technically, the survey
is 2 × 3 where all treatment conditions are realized resulting in 6 possible vignettes
50
where each respondent will only see one possible realization they are randomly as-
signed to. Respondents are assigned randomly into groups with both the background
(strong/weak) and the outcome of the conflict (win/loss/stalemate).
It is possible that individuals may confound any given treatment including highly
experienced or tenured leaders with autocratic rule or other potential confounders
for one’s approval of a state’s foreign policy. If seeing a highly competent leader or
a leader with military experience (the treatment) is not seen as a random or event
exogenous to the context, than there is no reason to worry. However, it is possible
that respondents who see leaders with extensive military and political experience
might form the belief that the state in question is autocratic since these regimes
more often possess leaders with longer tenure and military rulers. This is seen as
potential confounder since an individual might rate their performance of the leader
based off of their disapproval of non-democratic principles rather than the intended
treatment.
Most recently discussed in Dafoe and Caughey (2016), embedded natural experi-
ments offer the researcher the ability to isolate the treatment affect from the respon-
dents background beliefs about the randomness of the treatment occurring in reality.
Most centrally, ENEs involve a treatment assignment mechanism “that is at least
approximately independent of background attributes" (Dafoe and Caughey, 2016). If
the treatment has an embedded lottery function, this is easily captured. As such, to
control for the potential confounders surrounding military conflict, I employ a logic
similar to that found in Jones and Olken 2009 and Dafoe and Caughey (2016) where
they use an assassination attempt that ‘just happened to miss’ to instill the belief in
the respondents that the experience of the leader occurred by random chance. Instead
of an assassination that might prime respondents to think the state the leader rules is
violent, I employ a scenario where a term-limited leader steps down resulting in a his-
torically close election to avoid respondents believing leaders are competent because
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they easily gained power. This approach attempts to balance the unseen indicators
of competence not explicitly used as treatment conditions in the experiment.
The vignette is similar to a scenario where individuals read news reports related to
conflict yet is not presented in long form mock news format. Recent research shows
that the choice between vignettes and mock news reports is not consequential for
individual responses to manipulation checks and credibility questions finding little to
no trade-off between internal and external validity (Kreps and Roblin, 2019).
Vignette Manipulations
First, respondents see a vignette designed to set up a close election that resulted from
an event that is unrelated to the eventual type of leader in power and the context of
the conflict. To do this, I utilize term limits to stage an election between two leaders.
A little over two years ago, the president of a country left office due to term
limits. Two candidates from different parties than the deceased president
emerged as front-runners and engaged in the one of the closest elections
in history.
The election is described as historically close to capture a situation where either leader
could have won but just ‘happened to come out victorious’ to prevent respondents
from believing that leaders are competent as a result of their campaign skills rather
than their background characteristics.
Next, respondents will see a description of the winner where some filler irrelevant
to conflict and expertise has been added to make the vignettes read more naturally.
4
The newly elected leader had never pursued executive office before win-
ning. Prior to running, they: (Low Competence)[attended college and
4(Treatment)[Conditions] Words in parentheses not shown to respondents.
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worked outside of politics for the entirety of their career.], (High Com-
petence)[graduated college with an advanced degree, served as an elected
representative for their home state, and served in the military overseas.]
After this, information about the conflict is presented to the reader. Each vignette
will also vary the outcome of the conflict to allow for an examination of how these
backgrounds intersect with the prominent outcomes reached in conflict.
Recently, a foreign country initiated a conflict resulting in armed violence.
The leader fought back and the conflict resulted in a (Outcome)[victory
where the other side made significant concessions/loss where Leader B
made significant concessions/stalemate where neither side made signifi-
cant concessions].
In order to isolate the conflict from the previous leader and the election itself, the
conflict begins as a result of a foreign state attacking the newly elected leader. While
it might seem unnatural to have a new leader get attacked, this setting is justified
by research investigating how tenure impacts the challenges leaders receive from the
international community (Chiozza and Choi, 2003; Spaniel and Smith, 2015).5
Finally, more information is presented to the reader. I paint a picture of mixed
expert opinion on the need for conflict and state that the cost was non-trivial in
terms of casualties to remind the reader of the the additional costs of conflict beyond
concessions.
5Chiozza and Choi (2003) demonstrates that democratic leaders are more likely
experience conflicts as their tenure increases but that autocratic leaders experience
the reverse—as time passes they are less likely to experience conflicts. The aggregated
results suggest that the effect of tenure is small (coefficient value is .004) but indicates
that challengers resort to violent means to resolve disputes at earlier points in their
tenure. Spaniel and Smith (2015) suggests that newer leaders are more likely to
become the target of sanctioning efforts as challengers expect more recently elected
targets to have less consolidated power in their regimes compared to other leaders.
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Some expert opinions argue that the conflict was avoidable while others
argue that it was inevitable. All agree that the conflict resulted in a
non-trivial amount of casualties for both sides.
After this, I will ask readers to rate the leader’s performance in the conflict on an
interval level scale from 0-10 (0 representing extremely poor performance, 10 repre-
senting excellent performance):
So, how did the leader do? Please rate the leader’s performance in the
conflict.
Limitations
While I attempt to abstract from partisanship by not identifying the leader’s party
affiliation in the survey experiment, it is likely that extreme partisans will be largely
focused on whether the outcome is approved by their respective political ideology.
In the context of US politics, conservatives might possess hawkish foreign policy
views and approve of any outcome involving conflict more than Democrats finding
the leader’s actions acceptable regardless of their characteristics. Partisans will likely
adopt the narrative of culpability appropriate to their preexisting level of support
for a particular candidate. I examine the effect of partisanship upon approval with
the use of demographic question over party affiliation but am hesitant to fully fea-
ture partisanship in the instrumental design via another treatment as the number of
treatment categories is already high relative to available resources.
In order to strengthen the belief of randomness overall, I also use abstract encour-
agement found in Tomz and Weeks (2013) where the respondents are literally encour-
aged to think abstractly with a prompt. Abstract encouragement is most commonly
applied with the following statement “For scientific validity the situation is general
and is not about a specific leader in the news today". However, the results in Dafoe
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and Caughey (2016) suggest that this technique is ineffective at reducing confound-
ing as implemented above. Specifically, respondents could confound the treatment of
military leader types as something that is more likely to appear in autocracies, gener-
ating lower levels of approval from democratic populations. Additionally, one might
assume background characteristics about the leader (gender, age, ethnicity, etc.) as
a result of them being in a high level of authority or being involved in a conflict. As
such, I use a more direct and explicit encouragement.
For scientific validity, the following scenario is completely abstract and
does intend the reader to attach the descriptions stated here to any par-
ticular state or leader currently in or seeking office.
Regardless of this encouragement, it is possible that individual behavior in the
experimental setting is not comparable to the ways audience members analyze news
content with discussions of conflicts with realized consequences for the reader. Addi-
tionally, individuals might be able to infer or determine what the experimental design
is meant to capture creating demand effects. However, research examining the ex-
tent to which respondents are able to do this in experimental settings casts doubt
on the ability of the average respondent to interpret which parts of the survey are
manipulated (Mummolo and Peterson, 2019).6
Finally, it could be the case that individuals care less about these background as
they learn about a leader through their actions in office. This means that individuals
might not find backgrounds as important if the leader has longer tenure meaning that
this approach might have difficulty creating results that generalize to settings where
the public is evaluating leaders with increased levels of tenure.
6The survey also includes fixed information on casualties and other context sur-
rounding the conflict that respondents might expect to vary instead of the leader’s
background.
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Sampling/Randomization
After developing the corresponding surveys to each treatment online, I utilize Ama-
zon’s Mechanical Turk (hereafter MTurk) platform to collect a sample (n=1,109) of
adults in the United States. MTurk samples are generally younger and more educated
in respect to population characteristics. While these differences exist, recent research
finds samples from MTurk are able to replicate the magnitudes of known benchmark
effects and generally replicate the qualitative result in respect to the expected direc-
tion of effects (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz, 2012; Mullinix et al., 2015). Additionally,
I restrict the sample to MTurk workers that are regarded as reliable and effective on
the platform by only allowing workers with a 90 percent task success rate or higher
to participate in the study. This keeps users that fail more than 10 percent of their
tasks from participating in an effort to recruit attentive and effective survey takers.
While this limit could have been set higher (i.e. 95 or 99 percent), the survey does
not require any complex tasks or thought as it only asks respondents to read and an-
swer questions. Doing this mitigates the risk of selecting workers that rush through
tasks in a manner that compromises effectiveness from seeing the task. Finally, I also
require users to manually enter a code generated after taking the survey that only
generates if users complete the entire survey. 7
7In order to randomize across the six treatment groups, I ask each user to choose
the group in which their mother’s birth month falls and assign two months to each
treatment groups. This strategy is simple yet effective as the outcome of interest
is completely unrelated to this item and we have no reason to expect that respon-
dent’s with differing parental birth months would substantively differ. In general,
this method is preferred for its simplicity and results generally indicate that the re-
alization of particular treatment groups are not strongly correlated with any of the
background characteristics. Males were positively correlated with experiencing the
‘strong’ treatment group yet we have no reason to believe males judge backgrounds
differently (the leader in the vignette did not have an assigned gender) and being
male does not correlate with performance ratings. Being a strong republican had a
negative correlation with experiencing the ’strong’ background. At first glance this
may seem problematic. However, strong republicans are positively correlated with
performance ratings meaning their increased propensity to rate leaders higher would
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The sample broadly reflects the characteristics of the population yet is slightly
younger, male-dominant, and more educated as expected. In order to account for
these slight imbalances, I utilize a simple survey weighting technique that weights
observations based off of their prevalence in the sample in respect to what national
averages are. After gathering population-level statistics from the CCES (Cooperative
Congressional Election Study), I use sample weighting across the most imbalanced
aspects (gender and level of education) to construct a sample that is reflective of the
U.S. population (Ansolabehere and Schaffner, 2014). The results from the weighted
sample are nearly equivalent to the results from the non-weighted version suggesting
that the small differences generated from online sampling are not consequential for
the results appearing in the primary analysis.
2.5 Results
In general, results support the theory that leaders with weak backgrounds are easy
targets of criticism. After viewing the vignettes discussed in the previous section,
respondents are asked to rate the leader’s performance in the conflict on a 0-10 scale
with 0 being“Poor" and 10 being “Excellent”.8. I then calculate the mean of each
drive up the ratings of weak leaders working against the expected effects. If anything,
this extremely small imbalance would make finding differences between ‘strong’ and
’weak’ treatment groups more difficult. Please see the appendix for tables containing
information on the exact correlations between demographic variables and treatment
groups.
84.78 percent of the observations rated leaders at 0 where 4.69 percent rated
them at 10. Cumulatively, the extremes of 0 and 10 composed 105 of 1108 of the
observations in the study (9.47 percent). The third section of the appendix examines
the extent to which assuming ratings are distributed normally is safe and implements
a double-censored tobit regression model producing results consistent with the main
findings when accounting for censoring. For a discussion of double censored tobit
regression models, see Long (1997)
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treatment group’s ratings and their respective standard errors.9 The following table
provides the descriptive statistics from these calculations:
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of Performance Ratings by Treatment:
Number of observation, mean performance rating, standard deviation, standard er-
ror, and confidence interval for each group.
Background Outcome N Mean of Ratings SD SE (95%) CI +/-
Strong Loss 201.00 4.63 2.55 0.18 0.30
Strong Stalemate 186.00 4.85 2.51 0.18 0.30
Strong Win 211.00 6.73 2.20 0.15 0.25
Weak Loss 211.00 4.29 2.82 0.19 0.32
Weak Stalemate 134.00 4.72 2.48 0.21 0.35
Weak Win 165.00 6.23 2.47 0.19 0.32
This table reveals the expected differences between leaders with backgrounds that
strongly signal competence and those whose backgrounds do not. Leaders with a
strong background who win conflict have a mean rating of 6.73 where leaders who
reach the same outcome but possess weak backgrounds have a mean rating 6.23 rep-
resenting a half point decrease. Since the the standard errors and confidence intervals
(at the 95 percent level) are both smaller than these differences, the level of uncer-
tainty around these results is small enough to conclude that they are statistically
significant. To visualize these findings, I generate Figure 1 comparing treatment
group means. This reveals a pattern where respondents rate leaders with stronger
backgrounds higher regardless of outcomes. Most prominently, leaders with a strong
background are rated approximately one point higher (statistically significant at the
.05 level) when leaders win wars. Additionally, leaders with weak backgrounds are
rated significantly lower than leaders with strong backgrounds when they lose con-
flicts.
9Reporting confidence intervals reveals a similar relationship. Please see the ap-
pendix for a visualization of treatment effects with CIs.
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Figure 2.1: Mean Performance Ratings Treatment group means with standard
errors.
Although the difference is not statistically significant, a slight difference also ex-
ists when the conflict outcome is a stalemate. Surprisingly, leaders who fight to
stalemates rather than losses are not rated that much differently suggesting domestic
audiences view stalemates as more similar to losing a conflict than winning one and
that backgrounds only matter where a clear narrative of culpability can be generated
by the respondent. When the outcome is unclear in terms of whether it is good or
bad, respondents rate leaders with varying backgrounds at similar levels.
It is important to address how these findings hold across different subsets. Al-
though these results hold when controlling for party identification (either by calcu-
lating sub-group effects or controlling for party identification in the linear regression
models) but do not when interacting a leader’s background with the respondent’s
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political identification. The following graph displays sub-group means for ratings
including outcome, background, and party identification of respondent.
Figure 2.2: Performance Ratings by Party Group means with standard errors
across partisan identification.
This graphs shows that backgrounds interact with partisanship. Generally speak-
ing, democrats tend to punish leaders with weak backgrounds at higher rates where
republicans tend to favor all leaders more on average. This is potentially a result
of conservative voters possessing more hawkish foreign policy views and interpreting
the leader’s decision to fight as a good one. Conversely, if democrats possess dovish
views or prefer peace, this could explain why they punish any leader who enters a
conflict.
Additionally, the weak background is coincidentally similar to the background of
the President Trump (business experience, no military experience, no graduate ed-
ucation). It could be that respondents attached their positive/negative sentiments
of the president in office when the survey was conducted to the leader discussed in
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the scenario. Even with explicit statements encouraging abstract thought and analy-
sis, respondents could have rated these leaders based off of preexisting beliefs about
leaders with weak backgrounds. Future research should field a similar instrument
internationally in addition to varying the types of signals that convey incompetence.
Please see the appendix for additional robustness checks, the effect of implement-
ing multiple strategies to achieve a representative sample, and a discussion of other
patterns of leader evaluation revealed by the study.
2.6 Conclusion
The professional backgrounds and educational achievement are important to consider
when forming theories concerning how the public evaluates leadership. These back-
grounds serve as informational cues or signals to voters utilizing a heuristic process to
determine whether a given leader is competent and therefore responsible for a given
political outcome. This study breaks new ground by testing this theory in a setting
where voters evaluate a leader’s performance in conflict. It demonstrates that leaders
with weak backgrounds are strongly associated with lower performance ratings even
when holding the outcome and partisanship of the respondent fixed.
This is, perhaps, why political leaders so frequently champion their experience and
expertise to their voters: they are attempt to isolate themselves from blame if the
outcomes reached are poor and attract praise if the outcomes reached are negative.
Alternative theories arguing leaders discuss themselves so frequently due to narcis-
sistic personality disorder merit investigation as well. This study casts new light on
various areas of social science attempting to uncover the ways people make decisions
when they know very little concerning the ability of the person being evaluated and
are only able to perceive the outcome. Additionally, the study implies that scholars
of conflict interested in how the public reacts to their leader’s foreign policies should
consider the leader’s the effect of the leader’s background characteristics. It’s possible
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that leaders with weak backgrounds are more likely to pay audience costs and/or less
able to justify their inconsistent behaviors in the international arena.
Outside of conflict, scholars of political economy could examine the role that
backgrounds in business, trade, finance, and the like have in generating accountability
for changes in the economy. Much like conflict, individual leaders are rarely directly
responsible for larger changes in the economy. However, voters attempting to decide
how responsible they are may isolate leaders failing to signal competence as targets for
blame—resulting in lower ratings of their performance as “managers of the economy”.
Additionally, those interested in policy making could study the impact a leader’s
background in politics and law (e.g. law school, time as an attorney/judge) matters
for the way voters evaluate their domestic policy proposals. Indeed, there are too
many potential applications to this argument to list effectively here. Perhaps most
salient to an academic audience, one could use this framework to continue analyzing
bias in teaching evaluations. Where recent research has indicated a strong bias against
women, one could also examine the impact of a teacher’s background characteristics
upon subsequent student evaluations.
Finally, it is not clear whether this relationship is isolated to Western democracy
after conducting this study alone. An important next step could involve comparing
the extent to which domestic audiences resort to these heuristics conditional on regime
type, internet access, educational infrastructure, and the like. This could eventually
reveal the set of institutions that provide the incentive and ability for audiences to
seek more reliable and specific information on a leader’s performance.
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Chapter 3
Less Lethal Leaders
3.1 Introduction
The lives leaders live before holding political office matters for the way they govern.
When political leaders at the highest level (e.g. presidents, dictators, prime minis-
ters, etc.) face international crises or threats, society often focuses upon the extent
to which their leader’s decisions mattered for the outcomes reached (Hermann and
Hagan, 1998).1 However, the role of individual leadership in foreign policy outcomes
or international relations more broadly has only recently started to gain prominence
in the field. Specific to the focus of this project, a growing amount of literature
focuses on how the individual characteristics (i.e. education and professional expe-
rience) of leaders affects their policy choices and outcomes (Besley, Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol, 2011; Carreri, 2017; Stam, Horowitz and Ellis, 2015). These projects
all demonstrate that the experiences of leaders prior to holding office can affect the
way leaders weigh or value particular outcomes and the extent to which leaders can
apply information to effectively accomplish foreign policy objectives. Crucially, they
suggest that leaders with educational experience are more effective at reaching objec-
1Hermann and Hagan (1998) uses Clinton’s performance in negotiating peace in
the middles east, Netanyahu’s role in prolonging regional conflict, debating the actual
intentions of Mohammed Khatami’s regime in Iranian-American relations, or debates
over what will happen when prolific leaders like Nelson Mandela or Boris Yeltsin leave
office as key examples that support the idea that individual leadership matters for
international politics.
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tives commonly held by leaders and that leaders with direct combat experience are
more risk adverse when it comes to initiating international disputes.
If leader backgrounds matter for dispute initiation and other foreign policy deci-
sions, it is possible that these backgrounds continue to affect leader behavior during
conflicts. I extend work on leader characteristics and foreign policy decision mak-
ing by examining the effect of leader backgrounds on conflict behavior. Specifically, I
test the effect of a leader’s education and combat experience on casualties conditional
on who started the conflict and other contextual factors that are largely believed to
influence the intensity of violence. In line with former studies demonstrating educa-
tion benefits leaders attempting to minimize economic deficits, I argue that educated
leaders are better at minimizing casualties during war (Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol, 2011; Carreri, 2017). I theorize this is due to three factors: the impact of
education on critical thinking ability, educational institutions largely promoting the
preservation of life, and that educated leaders are more aware that casualties are
salient indicators of their performance to the public. Two key examples demonstrate
why educated leaders are more effective at reducing casualties.. Reagan attended Eu-
reka College over a six year period graduating with a degree and less than impressive
grades (National, 2012). This is likely why Reagan had a reputation for relying less
on analysis and more on stories and anecdotes to comprehend reality, a potentially
costly technique for developing military strategy (Stam, Horowitz and Ellis, 2015).
Reagan drew attention to the question of what president’s need to know to effectively
govern as he was “notoriously lacking” in respect to specific over government affairs
(Quirk, 2010).
Similarly, Isreali Prime Minister Golda Meir, represents a leader who never pro-
ceeded to an advanced degree after her activist efforts required her to drop out of
teacher’s college in Palestine. This experience led her to form a style that led peo-
ple to say the “very word analysis provoked irritability” as she thought those with
64
advanced training were too polished, susceptible to diverse perspectives, and lacked
simplicity in their thinking (Stam, Horowitz and Ellis, 2015). She chose to share
information with a very select group potentially leading to an investigation into her
actions during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 ultimately causing her resignation (Stam,
Horowitz and Ellis, 2015). In extreme contrast, President Woodrow Wilson received
his Ph.D. in history and political science from Johns Hopkins University and went on
the serve as Princeton’s and the American Political Science Association’s president.
Wilson was known for applying theories from his time in academia to help grasp
foreign policy challenges early on in his presidential career. Most importantly, he was
acutely aware of the best possible outcome in war: winning it while taking as few
casualties as possible. Wilson was responsible for launching a committee dedicated
to waging psychological warfare on the axis powers in attempt to persuade them to
end the conflict (Stam, Horowitz and Ellis, 2015).
In line with former studies examining the role of military experience in crises initi-
ation, I argue that leaders with combat experience, will be associated with less deadly
conflicts (Stam, Horowitz and Ellis, 2015). The reasoning is twofold: (1) leaders with
combat experience are more likely to understand the traumatizing effects of battle
increasing their willingness to search for less risky alternatives (2) they are more ef-
fective at identifying potential costs to lives as a result of direct experience in battle.
Historical accounts of leaders with military service and no combat experience bolster
a theory claiming the former wages more deadly wars. Although these leaders never
rise above 15 percent of all leaders in any given decade, there are many cases exem-
plifying their deadliness (Stam, Horowitz and Ellis, 2015). Classical examples include
Kaiser Wilhelm II’s militarism and theatrical attempts to feign military competence
by producing one aggressive policy after another leading to Germany’s devastating
involvement in World War I (Stam, Horowitz and Ellis, 2015). A modern example can
be found in Reagan’s experience as an interpreter rather than soldier in World War II.
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He was largely responsible for promoting the war effort abroad and never participated
in combat. As president, Reagan initiated many conflicts yet focused a great deal on
selling conflicts abroad to his domestic audience and believed these communication
efforts could counter decreases in support from the costs of war (Stam, Horowitz and
Ellis, 2015). Anecdotal evidence for the importance of education is, perhaps, even
stronger in the face of mixed empirical findings.
Initial attempts at transferring the implications of research showing education im-
proves economic performance show that educated leaders do not systematically differ
in respect to the probability they initiate a crisis (Stam, Horowitz and Ellis, 2015).
This is puzzling if one assumes that leaders have no interest in starting conflicts.
However, it is possible that leaders in advanced democracies are those who have the
highest levels of education. If this is the case, then studies showing that democra-
cies are more likely win conflicts resolve this finding because highly educated leaders
should be aware of this advantage and more confident of their prospects of winning a
war. I shed light on this topic by theoretically linking the costs of war to the blame
one receives for the war arguing that leaders have an interest in minimizing the salient
costs (i.e. casualties, loss of territory) of war to preserve their political survival. I de-
velop an empirical model of casualties of war including multiple interactions of three
leader backgrounds: education, military service, and political experience.
Even if the prior experiences of leaders do not substantially affect the nature of the
policy outcomes they produce, it is still possible that leaders condition their policy
responses upon the perceptions audiences have of their involvement with the conflict.
Critically, a particular leader who experience combat or possessed a high level of
education may be unable to overcome the structural constraints of the international
system (e.g. geography, power asymmetry, alliances, etc.) in order to solely alter the
outcome of a conflict. Although scholarly attention to the characteristics of leaders
has been revived in the international relations literature, there is no comprehensive
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theory of how multiple traits being discussed as consequential for competence and
blame fit together or how this matters for the ways in which leaders behave.2
In order to examine how these traits affect foreign policy choices made by the
leader rather than only how they affect public opinion, it is important to ask whether
these perceptions affect the ways in which leaders prosecute wars. Specifically, do
leaders with varying backgrounds produce different body counts from the battle field?
I collect a sample of all available leaders from the LEAD data and merge this with
information on crises from the MID (Militarized Interstate Dispute) and COW (Cor-
relates of War) data to generate leader-year observations containing information on
a leader’s background traits and conflict episodes. Before discussing the specifics of
this design, It is important to discuss the contribution of this dissertation alongside
the various bodies of literature it speaks to. I argue that this study is the next logical
step for those interested in wartime casualties, decision-making of political leaders,
and international conflict more broadly.
My analysis produces mixed results. First, combat experience does not consis-
tently correlate with less battlefield casualties. As expected, increased levels of edu-
cation consistently correlate with less battlefield casualties yet these results are not
robust across every statistical estimation procedure and are only obtained via an
analysis of MIDs. This suggests that professional characteristics are too crude of
proxies for multidimensional concepts like risk aversion, trauma, and competence.
Furthermore, the results imply that characteristics matter little, if at all, in large-
scale conflicts like interstate war where structural/systemic and state-level attributes
do. While more work is needed to ascertain the extent to which the underlying the-
oretical concepts of interest (i.e. competence, values, etc.) matter for MID fatalities,
this paper reveals breaks important ground by examining the extent to which profes-
2For instance, the Journal of Conflict Resolution recently released a special issue
on leader-centric studies of international conflict (October 2018).
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sional characteristics commonly thought to be associated with these concepts explain
the extent to which leaders are less lethal in battle.
3.2 Literature Review
This section reviews literature critical to bolstering to claims this paper makes: (1)
public support for conflict and the leaders responsible for them is sensitive to the
costs of war (i.e. casualties) and (2) leader backgrounds play a significant role in
shaping the way politicians behave once elected.
Conflict Casualties, Severity, and Public Opinion
A wealth of literature suggests public opinion is sensitive to wartime casualties (Gart-
ner, Segura and Wilkening, 1997; Gartner and Segura, 1998, 2000; Gartner, Segura
and Barratt, 2004; Gartner, 2008a; Kriner and Shen, 2007, 2012; Gartner, 2008c).
Boettcher III and Cobb (2006) examines the impact of using casualty ratios upon
perceptions of war success finding that the rate of domestic casualties to enemy casu-
alties as an important predictor of conflict success and support. In support, Gartner
(2008b) finds that respondent’s disapproval of domestic casualties is mitigated by
casualties from the other side and responsive to the certainty that recent reports of
casualties represent a pattern. This suggests that members of the public pay atten-
tion to particular aspects of battle related deaths in order to determine the extent to
which a given conflict is going poorly.
Gartner and Segura (1998) , Gartner (2008a) and Gartner, Segura and Wilkening
(1997) suggest that the public opinion is most sensitive to reports of recent accelerat-
ing casualty rates where Kriner and Shen (2007) shows (at the state and county level)
that populations can be sensitive to casualties more generally, especially when their
community has paid a disproportionate cost in terms of soldiers killed. Similarly,
Gartner (2008c) finds that individuals who know the casualties of 9/11 or the Iraq
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War are are more likely to disapprove of President Bush. Also researching the impact
of casualties on support for Bush, Karol and Miguel (2007) estimates that 10,000 sol-
diers killed and wounded prior to the 2004 election resulted in a 2 percent decrease in
his popular vote share. This suggests that awareness of the actual number of deaths
can modify the way individuals think about the costs of war and their willingness to
assign those costs if they blame their political leaders.3
Should public opinion over war matter for a study of leader behavior if there are
no observable consequences for policymakers? Thankfully, multiple studies suggest
that leaders pay casualty costs at the voting booth (Gartner, Segura and Barratt,
2004; Karol and Miguel, 2007; Kriner and Shen, 2014). This implies that casualties
are salient enough to drive down public opinion and that this effect is important
enough to drive legislators to act. When leaders wage deadly wars, this can decrease
public and elite support for the conflicts they might need to fight at later time period.
These studies help us understand why leaders seek to minimize casualties where
possible (a key assumption made in the theoretical portion of this paper). They do
not tell us why some conflicts are more deadly than others. Studies of the latter type
are commonly referred to as probing the concept of conflict severity. It is surprisingly
difficult to find recent studies of conflict severity. This could be due to recent con-
cerns over the accuracy of battle related death estimates that have arguably led to
scholars underestimating the severity and prevalence of future conflicts (Fazal, 2014).
However, a handful of studies in the literature pinpoint a variety of historical and
contextual factors that explain the deadliness of conflict.
These studies can be broken down by the level of analysis they employ. Stud-
ies that attempt to examine why particular periods of time or the long-term trends
and patterns of severity can be seen as macro-level projects (Cederman, Warren and
3Researchers also focus on the role individual characteristics play in casualty sen-
sitivity (Gartner and Segura, 2000; Kriner and Shen, 2012).
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Sornette, 2011; Melander, Öberg and Hall, 2009; Clauset, 2018). Studies like Me-
lander, Öberg and Hall (2009) could lead conflict scholars to infer that the prevalence
and severity of conflict will continue to diminish over time—casting doubt on the
continued valuing of studying interstate conflict. If we are believe the findings of a
collection of studies examining this exact question, this prediction is a faulty one.
Fazal (2014) and Fazal and Poast (2019) suggest that inaccurate estimates of battle-
field casualties would only lead us to underestimate the severity of future conflicts
and that interstate war is not experiencing a discernible decrease in prevalence. One
study estimates that it would take another 100 to 140 years of similar levels of peace
for the current state of international conflict to represent a statistically significant
pattern (Clauset, 2018). This suggests that conflict scholars should be careful before
ignoring interstate conflict as an important object of study.
In respect to smaller scale conflicts or international disputes, Gochman and Maoz
(1984) and Sweeney (2003) demonstrate that the material capabilities of a state affect
the severity of conflicts only under conditions where the states are both minor powers
are preponderances coalesce with dyads that lack interest similarity. In respect to
how conflict severity relates to the behavior and preferences of leaders, researchers
have found that domestic drivers like the composition of constituencies and electoral
proximity affect the willingness to enter conflict and accept casualties (Downs and
Rocke, 1994; Koch and Gartner, 2005). Koch and Gartner (2005) finds that systems
with more diffuse political accountability are less likely to enter conflicts, but more
likely to sustain higher rates of casualties once in conflict. This is due, perhaps, to the
fact that each individual in settings with multiple accountable actors has less control
over entering their respective state in war. The second finding is extremely critical
to bolstering a claim made in this paper. It implies that leaders expect blame from
casualties and are more willing to accept casualties when the blame assigned would
be shared across multiple actors. This implies that any analysis of the relationship
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between a leader’s background characteristics and conflict behavior must examine the
institutional setting for decision-making. However, this project is distinct from studies
of casualty sensitivity or conflict severity as it does not seek to produce a theory that
could ultimately offer extremely accurate predictions over these outcomes. Instead,
it seeks to understand the effect of individual leader characteristics upon conflict
severity and relies upon studies of casualty sensitivity to bolster the theoretical claim
that leaders possess a common interest in minimizing conflict casualties.
Leader Characteristics, Foreign Policy Decision Making, and Conflict
Behavior
The approach adopted in this paper is supported by a recent push towards individual-
level analysis of leaders in the international setting (Wolford, 2012, 2014; Besley,
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2011; Gift and Krcmaric, 2017; Diaz-Serrano and Pérez,
2013; Barceló, 2018; Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2011; Carreri, 2017; Bueno de Mesquita
et al., 2005; Croco, 2011; Dafoe and Caughey, 2016; Saunders, 2011). However, the
development of the approach adopted in this project is also found in more dated works
related to foreign policy decision making. In order to understand how leader charac-
teristics affect the decision-making of leaders, we also need to develop a theory of how
leaders make decisions. Scholars often distinguish these approaches between analytic
(i.e. rational choice, prospect theory) and heuristic (i.e. mental shortcuts or rules of
thumb) decision strategies (Renshon and Renshon, 2008). Most importantly for this
study, Herek, Janis and Huth (1987) indicates that high quality decision-making pro-
cesses lead to more non-negative outcomes during international crisis. However, the
small sample size (n=8) used in the study, sole focus on U.S. foreign policy, and hand
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coded procedures suggest more work is needed before scholars can safely conclude
that process matters.4
Scholars disagree over which model most accurately reflects the cognitive processes
of all leaders or why some leaders use one approach rather than others. However,
a consensus emerges in this literature surrounding a common assumption about the
way leaders think—that leaders, much like all people, face a complex world with
limited processes of gathering and processing information (Renshon and Renshon,
2008). Simply put, making decisions is difficult. Geva, Mayhar and Skorick (2000)
describe the complexity of decision making by discussing the dynamics of processing
information. They argue that leaders must determine the amount of information
available, the valence of information (what choice it implies should be made), the
relevance of information to the situation, the reliability of the information, and the
redundancy of new information (Geva, Mayhar and Skorick, 2000). All of these
challenges constrain leaders in their attempts to determine how the best way to act.
As a result of these constraints, foreign policy analysis as a framework posits that
leaders must use models or be ‘theory-driven’ in their attempt to make decisions.
This implies that a given leaders approach or model of decision-making matters for
outcomes their decisions produce as some leaders could use theories or models that
are insufficiently specified for the complexity of a given situation. In scenarios where
individual leaders possess centralized authority over a given decision (i.e. foreign
policy, international disputes), the biases and shortcomings of their decision-making
processes are thought to have stronger adverse effects on the outcome of any given
decision (Renshon and Renshon, 2008). Scholars have developed a wide range of
4Low quality decision making is defined in Herek, Janis and Huth (1987) as
processes that possess the following traits: gross omissions in surveying alterna-
tives/objectives, failure to examine costs/risks or preferred choice, poor information
collection/search, selective bias in information processing, failure to reconsider origi-
nally rejected options, failure to work out specific details for monitoring/enforcement
of plan of action, and failure to develop a contingency plan.
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models to capture how leaders think including: rational choice, cybernetic, prospect
theory, poliheuristic theory, organizational/bureaucratic models, group/poly-think,
and analogical reasoning (Redd and Mintz, 2013; Mintz, 2005; Shimko, 1994; Dyson
and Preston, 2006; Foster and Keller, 2014). Several of these studies demonstrate
that leaders adopt more complex and effective forms of decision-making when they
possess more experience, expertise, and nuance in the way they differentiate among
concepts (e.g. conceptual complexity).
This implies that leaders vary in terms of how they apply a given model to make
decisions and that this variance can be explained, in some part, by a leaders expertise
or prior knowledge over a given context for decision-making. If it is the case that
the backgrounds of leaders alter the way they approach governing, then it could be
true that some backgrounds motivate leaders to think of conflict in ways that reduce
the amount of casualties their state suffers in battle. Multiple studies suggest that
more educated leaders are better at reducing economic deficits and creating economic
growth (Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2011; Carreri, 2017; Jochimsen and
Thomasius, 2014). These studies lack detail on exactly how education relates to
effectiveness yet imply that the ability of leaders to develop and implement policies
creating growth varies from leader to leader.
Findings identifying consistent effects for leader backgrounds extend well beyond
the realm of executive and local political leadership into other organizational settings
including but not limited to banking, foreign aid provisions, finance, and monetary
policy (Jochimsen and Thomasius, 2014; Moessinger, 2014; Fuchs and Richert, 2018;
Farvaque, Hammadou and Stanek, 2009). This research points towards the impor-
tance of experiences related to challenges a leader eventually encounters once in power.
Researchers also pay attention to the policy choices leaders make when they have par-
ticular demographic traits like socio-economic status showing that leaders from lower
classes increase public spending and those with entrepreneurial backgrounds increase
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market liberalization (Hayo and Neumeier, 2014; Dreher et al., 2009). This shows
that leaders may be motivated to dedicate effort towards specific policies based off of
their own life experiences prior to entering office. It suggests that, regardless of one’s
success as an entrepreneur, this experience at least represents a signal for a leader’s
willingness to prioritize removing constraints on businesses.
In respect to conflict, research on leader characteristics is still thin but growing.
Scholars have studies leaders in respect to how much direct experience they have
holding power, often equivalent to a leader’s tenure (Potter, 2007; Chiozza and Choi,
2003). Research like Caprioli and Boyer (2001) and Horowitz, McDermott and Stam
(2005)—finds that traits like gender identity and age of individual leaders can affect
the severity of conflicts. This suggests that the individual characteristics of leaders
than the attributes of the leadership (i.e. tenure, turnover, institutional constraints)
can also play a role determining how severe a given conflict is.
Providing nuance to these findings, Horowitz and Stam (2012) finds evidence
that a leader’s professional background in the military (specifically rank) can impact
the way they approach foreign policy crises where military leaders without combat
experience are more likely to initiate deadly disputes. This implies that different types
of professional experience in a similar domain can result in distinct foreign policy
approaches yet it does not show whether leaders, attempting to avoid casualties, are
better as a result of said experience. Additionally, other research suggests that the
effect of military/professional experience may be mitigated by the type of educational
background a leader has (Gift and Krcmaric, 2017; Barceló, 2018; Diaz-Serrano and
Pérez, 2013; Dafoe, Renshon and Huth, 2014).
The most prominent study investigating this relationship is Dafoe, Renshon and
Huth (2014), which investigates why the culture of honor in southern states instills
certain leaders to be more likely to fight for reputation and status. Their framework
posits that leaders from the southern region of the United States, emigrating from
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predominantly Scot-Irish regions, are more culturally conditioned to fight for status
and honor. Other studies examine the interaction between education and geographical
effects by looking at how ’western-educated’ leaders (i.e. those attending college in
Western Europe or Northern America) behave in contrast to leaders without this
background finding that leaders with Western educations possess more cosmopolitan
views leading them to spend effort on avoiding risky conflicts, promoting democratic
institutions, and spend more on education (Gift and Krcmaric, 2017; Barceló, 2018;
Diaz-Serrano and Pérez, 2013). This suggests that a leader’s background can strongly
condition the values and preferences a given leader possesses. Other studies attempt
to look at the role backgrounds play in determining the approach a leader takes to
realizing goals common to all leaders (Fuhrmann and Horowitz, 2014; Fuhrmann,
2017).
Bolstering arguments that a leader’s foreign policy decisions are based in concerns
over political survival, Fuhrmann and Horowitz (2014) show that leaders with rebel
experience are more willing to develop nuclear weapons programs as they are more
aware of the contingent nature of their power. Fuhrmann (2017) examines another
background, business experience, and finds that leaders with business experience are
less likely to contribute to collective defense agreements due to their focus on self-
utility maximization. This implies that a leader’s experience may alter the way they
calculate their underlying propensity to be removed from office and the extent to
which their survival relies upon the actions of other states. Recent research focusing
on whether leaders are hawks or doves demonstrates that leader types also diffuse
across regions due to individuals viewing nearby hawks as a security threat and
desiring their own hawkish leader to respond (Carter, 2018b,a; Carter and Smith,
2018). This finding is plausible yet is entirely consistent with a theory arguing that
the traits individuals deem ‘hawkish’ (e.g. military experience, aggressive statements
of resolve) signal competence.
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Is it the case that an individual wants another hawk if this only increases the
overall propensity of violence? Or is it more likely that individuals want a leader who
is able or competent enough to provide security from the threat of an external hawk?
Horowitz et al. (2018) find that leaders with military experience are indeed observably
different in respect to how they approach coercion surrounding conflict where “leaders
with combat experience and careers in the military are relatively better judges of their
own military power.” As a result, their threats are taken more seriously. They also find
that leaders with military careers lacking combat experience are less selective in their
demands and “correspondingly less successful when they make threats” (Horowitz
et al., 2018). If leaders with experience are better at measuring the capabilities of
states, it is possible that they are better at determining the appropriate amount of
risk to take and effort required in order to secure conflict related objectives (e.g.
territorial gain/retention, casualty avoidance, collateral damage). However, if leaders
with military experience are more socialized to use aggressive tactics and accept costs
to preserve the reputation of the state and military, they might suffer more casualties
when they engage in violent conflicts.
Although French leader Georges Clemenceau claimed that “war is too important
to be left to generals”, individual members of the public may not agree (Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith, 2011). The claim that voters often defer to military expertise
is supported by evidence that the public defers to military leaders on critical issues
over whether to use force and the intensity of military actions. Krebs, Ralston and
Rapport (2018) surveyed nearly 2,500 Americans and found that the public generally
defers to military experts and elites over the decision to use force and how to use it.
If leaders with military expertise expect deference to their policy positions during
conflict, they might expect less backlash for when wars incur high costs. Research
on leader culpability demonstrates that a leaders are perceived as more culpable for
a conflict if they start it, are politically connected to the leader who was, or preside
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over the conflict for a longer (Croco, 2011; Croco and Weeks, 2016). Additionally,
findings suggest leaders pay costs at the ballot box for initiating conflicts and suf-
fering high costs during conflict (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003; Gartner, Segura and
Barratt, 2004; Karol and Miguel, 2007). This implies that leaders could decide how
much effort to place in conflict management based off of how they expect to be eval-
uated by the public. When expecting a high level of blame if conflict generates poor
outcomes (e.g. loss of territory, civilian casualties, etc.), leaders should put more ef-
fort towards designing military operations that prevent these outcomes, constrained
by their ability to think critically and evaluate the potential costs of international
conflicts. In the next section, I provide a theory explaining the relationship between
a leader’s experiences prior to office and the severity of the disputes and conflicts
they experience once in power.
3.3 Theory
In this section, I outline my theoretical argument concerning leader backgrounds and
conflict behavior. Most importantly, I intend to convince the reader that, ceteris
paribus, education and combat experience should decrease the amount of casualties
for a leader. I argue that educational organizations increase the ability of leaders to
think critically, potentially raise the leader’s awareness of casualties as a salient indi-
cator of leader performance in conflict, and promote the value of individual rights/life.
All of these factors decrease the expected amount of casualties a given leader should
take. It is important to understand the timing and process that these effects are
expected to follow.
The primary argument of this paper is twofold: (1) that a leader’s background
affects the overall cognitive state of a leader by determining their critical thinking
capacities and conditioning them to value particular outcomes (i.e. less deadly con-
flicts), (2) that a leader’s cognitive state directly affects the level of casualties a state
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experiences in a given conflict. However, literature on dispute and conflict sever-
ity strongly suggests that state-level attributes/characteristics affect casualty counts.
There are likely a variety of factors that could also be taken into consideration if one
were ultimately concerned with generating accurate predictions of casualty counts.
Rather, I am only interested in the extent to which backgrounds increase or decrease
the casualties a given state can expect to incur.
Relevant Actors and Concepts
The term ‘leader’ is used interchangeably for any political executive with relatively
minimal constraints on their authority over foreign policy. Leaders are assumed to
have an interest in political survival, served most effectively in conflict by winning and
minimizing casualties. I adopt a commonplace assumption in political science about
political leaders: they want to retain office. If all leaders desire staying in power, their
underlying ability to govern should affect whether they retain it yet the blame they
receive for conflict casualties threatens their ability to do so if audience members
are able/willing to punish them by attempting removal. Although my theoretical
argument does not rest upon exactly how leaders make decisions, it is important
to discuss this process to identify points at which leaders with particular levels of
education and experience might diverge from leaders with different backgrounds.
I utilize poliheurstic theory (PH) to provide a model how leaders make foreign
policy decisions.5 PH theory posits that leaders participate in a two stage process.
First, leaders eliminate alternatives that carry too high of a domestic political risk.
PH theory argues that leaders eliminate crisis responses that are too personally costly
(e.g. that threaten their political survival or violate a core principle) from the outset
of the decision-making process. Next, leader make a decision from the set of remaining
5Mintz (2005) and Redd and Mintz (2013) provide an extensive discussion of PH
theory for further reading.
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alternatives after the first stage. PH theory posits that leader decision-making during
this stage is best described as a bounded ration-choice or cybernetic (e.g. rational
decision making where assumptions about complete information are relaxed) process
where leaders attempt to maximize their utility. The second stage of decision-making
will still possess objectives that bear domestic political risks/costs for the leader, but
the maximum amount is at least predicted to be something they can endure, given
the expected benefits of that decision. Since my theory is about how prior experiences
and educational attainment alter the way leaders attempt to minimize casualties, we
do not need a model that simplifies or increases our ability to predict what leaders
do, only one that allows us to model potential hurdles within the decision making
process during international crises.
International crises and disputes represent events where a nation-state’s interests
are threatened by some external actor. These events range from the threat of force
to the outright use of force to resolve and usually imply that a given leader has to
make a decision that is consequential for how the conflict develops. Although leaders
adopt different approaches to simplifying decision-making during crises, they all face
similar challenges in respect to how to deal with information. My theories centers
on the argument that leaders with different experiences will be conditioned to value
particular things (i.e. minimizing loss of life) and better at avoiding the pitfalls
of complex settings for decision making. Commonly identified hurdles to decision
making include but are not limited to: determining how much information should
and can be gathered on a given threat, determining whether new information is
relevant, determining how relevant information should be interpreted with respect to
which action to take, determining the reliability of new information, and whether new
information is redundant (Geva, Mayhar and Skorick, 2000). Once a crisis begins,
leaders must decide how to gather information, which parts of the policy formulation
process to delegate, the extent to which they can trust advisers, if the advice of
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subordinates can be combined, and finally how to act. When leaders are tasked with
resolving crises, they can choose whether to respond with force and to what extent
to they utilize force. I argue that leaders with superior cognitive abilities in respect
to political decision-making are better at identifying responses that avoid the use of
force when expected casualties are too high (e.g. these options would be eliminated
in the first stage of PH theory) and identifying ways to use force that minimize the
casualties their state suffers battle.
We should not expect leader characteristics to matter much at all if the decisions
are relatively easy to make or crises are generally simple types of events to deal with.
I argue that leaders face extremely complex decision-making environments during
crises. They must engage in a two-level game where they assess what policies within
a given resolution their foes and domestic audiences will commonly accept (Putnam,
1988). Additionally, in order to be able to predict what other leaders will do, they
must consider the internal dynamics of other states with potentially different insti-
tutional settings than their own (Hermann and Hagan, 1998). This, along with the
challenges to information processing inherent to crisis decision making, imply that
leaders benefit from high levels of cognitive ability and critical thinking. The pri-
mary experience or background characteristic that varies with respect to leaders that
attempts to enhance a leader’s cognitive and critical thinking abilities is education.
Education and Conflict Casualties
I examine how leader characteristics convey narratives of perceived expertise and
contribute to leader competence while also considering the impact being socialized
or conditioned into/by a professional environment has on leader behavior. These
backgrounds produce nuances in the ways leaders pursue goals by exacting a psycho-
logical impact on the leaders who possess them but they also increase the ability of
the leader by increasing critical thinking skills and direct knowledge of international
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conflict. I argue that leaders with education are more willing and able to reduce
casualties due to three primary reasons: (1) an increase to critical thinking abilities,
(2) educational institutions predominantly promoting the value of individual life, and
(3) an increased awareness of indicators public uses to measure their success.
When leaders face foreign opponents, they must decide the state’s grand strategy
in conflict and make specific decisions about the timing, location, and force of the
strike. Classical contributions to the theoretical understanding of foreign policy for-
mulation in the presidential setting support the claim that producing effective foreign
policy is a complex task (Preston, 2017; Geva, Mayhar and Skorick, 2000).6 Leaders
are not left entirely alone in their efforts to manage crises as autocratic and demo-
cratic leaders often rely on expert advice to inform their decisions. However, this is
only more of a reason why a leader’s ability matters as it increases the information a
leader needs to take into account before acting.7 Even one decision during a crisis can
have massive implications for the type of conflict that ensues. For example, Neville
Chamberlain’s choice to appease Hitler after he expanded Germany’s influence into
the Sudetenland is viewed as a critical failure that allowed the Third Reich time to
develop military might and signaled to Hitler that European powers were hesitant to
use force (Laybourn, 2001). This led many people to challenge Chamberlain’s foreign
policy experience and toughness aiding Winston Churchill’s rise to power.
A leader’s ability to respond to a threat and avoid negative outcomes (casualties,
economic loss) should also be the result of analyzing and synthesizing subordinate
6The most prominently displayed setting for crisis scenarios is the White House
Situation Room where advisers from the NSC and CIA interact with leadership to
formulate responses.
7Saunders explains this effect while discussing the importance of domain-specific
experience: “Experienced leaders provide better oversight of foreign policy decision-
making because they are more likely to ask hard questions, spot poor planning, or
recognize unrealistic proposals... Experienced presidents are also better able to draw
on diverse sources of advice (Saunders, 2019).
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proposals. 8 Leaders are tasked with consuming a large amount of information in
a short amount of time when threats arise. Information or intelligence prepared by
subordinates is never perfectly reliable so leaders must utilize reading comprehension,
historical knowledge of similar contexts, and skill at identifying accurate sources to
synthesize a foreign policy response. A prominent example where a leader paid a
penalty for failing to accurately interpret intelligence is George W. Bush’s largely
unsuccessful attempt to shift blame for finding very little evidence of weapons of
mass destruction in Iraq post-response. The conflict escalated resulting in a current
total of approximately 5,000 casualties (Crawford, 2018).
The less informed the leader is about a given crisis, the more reliable they become
on their subordinates or advisers. However, considering the leader chose the subordi-
nates from which to solicit advice from, the ability of the leader to read through and
listen to their proposals is paramount to them identifying responses to complex sce-
narios. Once again George Bush’s choice to invade Iraq is useful as people frequently
argue that his Vice President, Dick Cheney, was responsible for encouraging the use
of force. 9 Leaders could face subordinates who have different motives than their own
yet might have to rely on them during crises if they have less expertise over foreign
policy. When these scenarios occur, leaders with weak critical thinking capacities are
more likely to defer to experience and subordinates rather than carefully identifying
potential pitfalls in their proposals.
To exemplify further: a competent leader with better critical thinking capabili-
ties might be more aware of the difficulty of fighting in particular types of terrain
enhancing their ability to consider the potential casualties of any response. Educated
8Greenstein (1988) discussed the relationship between leader and adviser writing,
“Leadership in the modern presidency is not carried out by the president alone, but
rather by presidents with their associates. It depends therefore on both the president’s
strengths and weaknesses and on the quality of the aides’ support” (Greenstein, 1988).
9See : https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/how-dick-cheney-became-
most-powerful-vice-president-history/
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leaders are more likely to encounter explicit training in strategy, intelligence analysis,
and critical thinking skills allowing them to identify risks and predict the outcomes of
their subordinate’s policy proposals more effectively. Throughout the history of the
U.S., one leader with an extensive educational background became a wartime presi-
dent. Woodrow Wilson received a doctorate in political science in 1886 from Johns
Hopkins University and later became the president of Princeton. After Germany
sank the USS Lusitania, Wilson showed initial restraint and avoided war against the
wishes of his Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan leading to Bryan’s resigna-
tion (Peifer, 2016). In respect to the theoretical framework of this paper, it is possible
Wilson viewed war with Germany as violating the non-compensatory principle of PH
theory or that it was simply too politically costly of an option to escalate the conflict
until he could argue he had no other choice.10 However, after Germany’s continued
attacks on American and European ships, Wilson committed to building arms and
eventually entered the conflict. During the war, he conveyed his understanding of the
complexities of international politics through his release of the Fourteen Points—a
multifaceted plan that would later aid in his receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize. Bi-
ographers of Wilson have noted that he applied some of the same skills and theories
he employed as a professor (Stam, Horowitz and Ellis, 2015). He also was keen in
adopting lessons from British intelligence by utilizing ‘psychological warfare’ near the
end of the war where he established the Committee on Public Information worked
with France to distribute leaflets containing his plan for peace throughout Germany
in an effort to convince soldiers and citizens to oust Wilhelm II (Stam, Horowitz
and Ellis, 2015). Although this war was extremely costly for every party involved, it
is possible that Wilson’s relatively high level of critical thinking ability reduced the
duration and deadliness of the conflict.
10Wilson ran for reelection using the slogan “he kept us out of war” (Stam, Horowitz
and Ellis, 2015).
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Leaders with high levels of education could reduce casualties because of their in-
tellectual prowess, socialization in a university environment promoting the value of
individual life, or awareness of how the public assesses the performance of leaders
in conflicts. Educated leaders might be more likely to be aware of the historical
relationship between war casualties and decreasing public support.11 The story of
Woodrow Wilson is again helpful to elucidate this mechanism. Wilson’s first use of
force to occupy the Mexican seaport at Veracruz was ideologically motivated by Wil-
son’s intolerance for Victoriano Huerta’s illegitimate dictatorship. However, Wilson
was forced to reconsider this position after significant U.S. casualties and eventually
reversed it (Stam, Horowitz and Ellis, 2015; McDermott, 2007) If educated leaders
possess an equivalent interest in political survival than other leaders, we should ex-
pect them to use this knowledge to serve that purpose by applying their efforts to
casualty reduction.
Education does more than increase general competency or ability, it also plays a
role in shaping a leader’s willingness to accept the loss of life. Leaders are routinely
provided with estimated casualties for all relevant parties to a conflict. In line with
studies demonstrating educated leaders are more likely to adopt liberal policies of
democratization, pacifism via dispute avoidance, and value individual rights like ed-
ucation itself, I argue that education socializes leaders to adopt a more cosmopolitan
and liberal worldview making the preservation of human life particularly important
in the effectiveness of any military action (Gift and Krcmaric, 2017; Barceló, 2018;
Diaz-Serrano and Pérez, 2013). This, along with the increased ability and awareness
of casualty salience imply that highly educated leaders should be the least deadly.
11See Gartner, Segura and Wilkening (1997)
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Combat Experience and Conflict Casualties
If findings concerning the willingness of leaders to enter disputes are easily general-
ized, leaders with backgrounds in military affairs differ in terms of their risk-aversion
over casualties in conflict (Stam, Horowitz and Ellis, 2015). Combat experience is
traumatizing. Even if soldiers avoid suffering serious physical harm, it exacts a psy-
chological costs that soldiers pay for the rest of their lives. At the elite level, prospec-
tive U.S. presidential candidates like John McCain often cite their combat experience
as a reason they can be trusted to care fully consider the use of force in any dispute.
Leaders with combat experience might see any option that is predicted to result in
high casualties as unacceptable an therefore eliminated from contention. In respect
to poliheuristic theory, leaders are theorized to eliminate any proposal that violates a
non-compensatory principle. Usually this is theorized to be actions that carry great
domestic political costs for the leader. However, it could be the case that leaders
with combat experience also rule out any proposal that is too risky to the lives of
soldiers in this first stage of decision making. In respect to a leader’s attempt to
maximize utility in the second stage of decision making discussed in PH theory, lead-
ers who have a stronger emotional or psychological attachment to protecting their
troops might perceive less utility in options that produce equivalent odds of success
yet carry high costs to human life. In these cases, leaders might approach disputes
with uses of force that require little ‘boots on the ground’. Additionally, leaders with
combat experience might be more attuned to the types of uses of force that are risky
in respect to life. Combat experience might provide leaders increased insight over
the conditions that make a given mission risky (i.e. weather, geographical conditions,
uncertainty, ability to identify hard/soft targets). If leaders with combat experience
care more about casualty avoidance and possess informational advantages over how
to do so, they should be less deadly in disputes. However, it might not be the case
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that all forms of military experience should be treated in a similar manner to direct
combat experience.
In respect to the converse of combat experienced leaders being less deadly, there
are multiple reasons a leader without combat experience might be more deadly.
Leaders with extensive military experience, but not direct combat experience, are
socialized to accept the costs of war without experiencing the traumatic and often
life-changing consequences of battle. Limited experience in the military from an ad-
ministrative or authoritative standpoint (e.g. commander-in-chief) could affect the
way a leader views their role. The most prominently cited leader with little military
experience and no combat experience is Kaiser Wilhelm II. Wilhelm was fascinated
with military affairs at a young age yet thrown into power without extensive military
experience and no direct combat experience. Once in control of the German military,
Wilhelm sought the need to compensate for his lack of combat experience by be-
coming a battle tested leader ultimately producing an overly aggressive approach to
foreign policy that would lead Germany into WWI (Stam, Horowitz and Ellis, 2015).
It is possible that these leaders also feel entrenched during conflicts in a manner that
motivates them to linger in deadly costs or ignore situation that have sunk costs. 12
Fighting for your country is the ultimate sacrifice one can make for their nation.
Each member risks their life in order to provide collective security and most military
forces operate under a ‘leave no soldier behind’ whenever possible. I expect these
ideals to be highly ’sticky’ in that they do not disappear after service. Even if leaders
do not experience traumatizing engagements during their combat experience, first-
hand experience of the dangers of combat might make leaders think twice about any
option that might unnecessarily risk lives.
12Other prominent examples leaders with military experience but no combat expe-
rience are identified in the LEAD dataset from Stam, Horowitz and Ellis (2015). They
include “Francisco Lopez of Paraguay, Mobutu Seko of the DRC, Saddam Hussein of
Iraq, Muammar Qaddafi of Libya, and Hafez al-Assad of Syria."
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Other Influences and Limitations
As education and military experience simultaneously change a leader’s willingness
and ability to reduce casualties, it is hard to determine whether the backgrounds
matter or if the latent qualities like competence and aggression are actually driving
changes in casualties suffered. To address these concerns, I develop a measurement
capturing whether leader’s have strong backgrounds in terms of having multiple types
of experience prior to leading. If the backgrounds matter less than the extent to which
they contribute to a leader’s preparedness or general competence, we should see pro-
nounced effects for a measure of competence and reduced effects of the backgrounds
when including the measure as a control. Additionally, studies like Caprioli and
Boyer (2001) and Horowitz, McDermott and Stam (2005) suggest that a leader’s gen-
der and age matters for the severity of the crisis at hand. Other limits pertain to the
institutional setting for decision-making a leader operates within.
The more institutionalized any given political setting for foreign policy decision-
making, the less impact an individual leader should be able to have.13 As a result,
we might expect this argument to generalize to settings only where the leader has
extensive control over foreign policy and is not strongly constrained by other elites
in the decision making process. As such, we might expect that leader backgrounds
matter more in presidential systems where the head of state possesses extensive foreign
policy authority. However, presidential systems differ in their adoption of democratic
institutions. When a leader decides to attack another state they must consider their
likelihood of success and the extent to which poor outcomes would contribute to their
removal of office. This implies that this theory might not possess as much leverage in
explaining conflict behavior for leaders that see little likelihood of being removed or for
13If one accepts the argument that political systems have become more institution-
alized throughout time, we should expect to see the impact of individual leaders fall
as this process occurs.
87
leaders that are term limited. There are other considerations related to the context
and characteristics of states involved that could limit the strength of this theory.
Autocracies might possess leaders that do not care about minimizing casualties if
their domestic audiences are unable to constrain their executives. Leaders, regardless
of characteristics are unlikely to fight against a state they are much more powerful
than in terms of military capability. Additionally, a particular state will not fight a
state with much greater capabilities than itself very often. However, as the capabilities
of a state increases, they may be better able to cover for their mistakes.
In a similar manner to blame, some leaders are easier targets than others to attack.
If leaders with backgrounds conveying competence are simultaneously more likely
to receive blame and less likely to receive criticism during conflict, their ability to
maintain support and fight costly wars should be perceived as high by other leaders in
the international system representing potential foes. While this paper focuses on the
conflict outcomes rather than initiation, it is possible that certain types of leaders
(possibly less educated/experienced) are more likely to get attacked or experience
intense conflict. This suggests that looking at disputes, that range from no use of
force to extensive uses of force, is a better scenario to apply this theory to as interstate
wars, by definition, represent highly costly (over 1000 battle related deaths) forms of
conflict.
Observable Implications
The following table summarizes the implications of the theory laid out above. The
first column represents the two primary independent variables where the second col-
umn represents the outcome or dependent variable (conflict casualties). In summary,
leaders with higher levels of education and combat experience are expected to cut
casualties.
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Table 3.1: Central Expectations Hypotheses for affect of education and combat
experience on conflict casualties.
Independent Variable DV : Casualties Hypothesis
Highly Educated Lower H1
Combat Experience Lower H2
H1 : Leaders with Leaders with higher levels of education will incur less casualties in
comparison to similar leaders with lower levels of education.
H2 : Leaders with combat experience will accept lower amounts of casualties in com-
parison to a leader without combat experience.
3.4 Research Design
This section discusses the portion of the dissertation designed to examine the effects of
leader competence on conflict management. After collecting data on leaders (LEAD
contains data on 2,965 leaders from 1875 to 2004), I aggregate their characteristics
and merge this with MID data containing information on over 6,000 disptutes to
create a dataset with leader-conflict-year episode as the unit of analysis where con-
flicts with multiple leaders have additional observations for each year a new leader
was in power. I utilize the most recent version of the MID data from the Correlates
of War project discussed prominently in Jones, Bremer and Singer (1996) yet also
use MID data with different coding procedures from Gibler, Miller and Little (2016)
for the purposes of robustness. I proceed by discussing operationalization for leader
backgrounds, conflict casualties, and important controls for properly testing the the-
oretical argument. I conclude by discussing the statistical models employed to test
three hypotheses related to conflict casualties.
IVs : Education and Military Experience
I utilize the LEAD data produced primarily for Stam, Horowitz and Ellis (2015). The
data contains variables measuring a leader’s possession of a variety of characteristics.
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Most importantly, it has data for every political executive’s military experience and
educational achievement. To capture a leader’s combat experience, I utilize ‘combat’,
a binary variable with 1 indicating combat experience. For the combat variable,
leaders are judged to experience battle where credible sources detail “deployment
as part of a national military” in a war zone “absent evidence of nonparticipation”
(Stam, Horowitz and Ellis, 2015). This does not require a leader to fire a weapon.
Instead, it requires a leader to be a combat zone where the loss of life is at risk.
This is logically compatible with the theoretical interest in combat experience as I
do not argue that killing or using a weapon matters—only the experience of combat.
The codebook indicates that cases without affirmative evidence of combat experience
were coded as 0. Approximately 20 percent of leaders in the LEAD data have combat
experience suggesting this is rare.
Next, I take advantage of the richness of LEAD by utilizing indicators related to
educational experience. I capture education more generally with an ordinal variable
measuring the leader’s level of education, ‘leveledu’. This variable rates a leaders high-
est level of education. As treating an ordinal level variable like a continuous variable
can mask the non-linear effects of educational level, I create two key dummy variables
to capture my theoretical argument. The ’leveledu’ variable codes primary school as
0, secondary as 1, 2 as university or college, and 3 for graduate school/advanced
degree students. I create a dummy variable ‘college’ indicating whether a leader
obtained a college degree. Finally, I create a dummy variable ‘gradschool’ that mea-
sures whether a leader obtained a graduate degree. My theoretical argument relates
to critical thinking and socialization into cosmopolitan values that are likely obtained
and enhanced most during college. Approximately 40 percent of leaders had college
as their highest level of education achieved.
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DV : Conflict Behavior
Next, I gather data capturing the number of casualties a given state suffers in mili-
tarized interstate disputes (MIDs) from Jones, Bremer and Singer (1996) and Gibler,
Miller and Little (2016) to test for robustness across different approaches to classi-
fying MIDs. To see if the theoretical argument concerning disputes generalizes to
large scale war, I also collect data on international conflicts considered ‘war’ with the
Correlates of War (COW) data (Stinnett et al., 2002). To capture casualties suffered
at war, I use ‘BatDeaths’ indicating the level of battle-related combatant fatalities
suffered by the state. Similar to the COW data, MID data contains estimates for
the precise amount of fatalities with ‘FataPre’. This variable represents a count of
the amount of casualties a state suffers as a result of a given MID. Since MIDs do
not a minimum amount of casualties (or any casualties), there are a large number
of zeros for the amount of fatalities. Approximately 70 percent of the observations
have zero casualties. I proceed by discussing control variables that are of theoretical
importance and the statistical modeling techniques used to model the relationship
between the variables introduced.
Controls
I differentiate controls between those that are leader characteristics and state charac-
teristics. First, it is important to state that I am not interested in creating a powerful
model in terms of prediction. I only include variables as controls where there is strong
evidence to suggest they could confound the relationship between leader characteris-
tics and casualties. Confounders are variables that affect both the dependent variable
(conflict casualties) and the independent variables of interest, combat and educational
attainment.
In respect to leader attributes that could matter for conflict severity yet also
relate to education and combat experience, I include two control variables indicating
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the leader’s gender. Caprioli and Boyer (2001) and Horowitz, McDermott and Stam
(2005) provide thorough discussions of how gender and age relate to casualties. One
could also argue that historical data would reflect biases against women obtaining
college agrees and serving in the military meaning gender could be correlated with
both IVs. As such, gender becomes an extremely important control for examining
the relationship between education, military experience, and conflict casualties.
Next, I include controls for state level confounders. First, I control for factors
related to institutions. Democracies are known for being more successful in conflicts
(perhaps because they are more constrained) and democratic countries are more likely
to select educated leaders as demonstrated in (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2011). I
include a state’s polity score where completely autocratic states receive a -10 and
democratic states receive a 10. The institutional constraints placed on the leader
might result from the type of leader or executive one is. As such, I also include a
control for whether a leader is in a presidential system. Semi-presidential systems
where presidents possess no direct authority over foreign policy are coded as 0.
Second, I included a control meant to capture the societal values of a state. It
is hard to distinguish the effect of education upon casualties if that leader came to
power due to what the people they govern value. If a leader’s domestic audience
holds highly cosmopolitan worldviews valuing individual life regardless of geographic
origin, they might have been selected to reflect these values and these values could
impact the extent to which a leader thinks casualties are politically costly. I aggregate
responses from the World Values Survey longitudinal data to assign a score reflecting
the prevalence of cosmopolitan values for each country (Inglehart et al., 2014). I take
the percentage of responses for each country that agree with the statement (slightly
agree, agree, strongly agree) “I see myself with a world citizen". As a result, values
range from 0 to 1 where higher values represent increased levels of cosmopolitanism
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in a state. This control is not included in every model as including it drastically
reduces the amount of observations in the MID data.
Nearly every study of conflict severity attempts to capture a state’s material capa-
bilities in some way. As a state increases in capabilities, it might be better equipped
to avoid casualties during conflict. Additionally, states with high levels of power
might be more willing to elect military leaders or the same capital endowments gen-
erating state-level capabilities important for conflict could reduce funding for public
institutions like schools meaning states with more material capabilities could produce
less educated leaders on average (Collier, 2006). I use the National Material Capabil-
ities data to gather a state’s CINC (Composite Index of National Capabilities) score
described in the codebook for Singer et al. (1972).14
Since these scores are system dependent, they capture a state’s capabilities relative
to other capabilities in the system. This is important for capturing relative power in
a non-dyadic analysis. Finally, it is important to capture who initiated the conflict
with the variable ‘orig’ from the MID data. If leaders are willing to initiate a dispute,
they might be more willing to fight and drive up casualties if they think they are going
to be held culpable as demonstrated by Croco (2011). Additionally, Stam, Horowitz
and Ellis (2015) provides strong evidence suggesting that military experience affects
the probability a leader initiates a dispute. As such, it is critical that any model
of education, military experience, and conflict casualties at least include a control
variable for whether they started it.
14Singer et al. (1972) describes CINC scores in detail: “CINC scores utilize the
six individual measured components [iron/steel production, military expenditures,
military personnel, energy, total population, urban population] of national material
capabilities into a single value per state-year. The CINC reflects an average of a
state’s share of the system total of each element of capabilities in each year, weighting
each component equally. In doing so, the CINC will always range between 0 and 1.
“0.0” would indicate that a state had 0 percent of the total capabilities present in
the system in that year, while “1.0” would indicate that the state had 100 percent of
the capabilities in a given year (and by definition that every other state had exactly
0 percent capabilities in that year."
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The following table summarizes the role confounders play in respect to the inde-
pendent and dependent variables providing references where available:
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Table 3.2: Confounders This table summarizes groupings of the literature suggest-
ing the presence of confounding. The first column describes the relationship between
the potential confounder and conflict behavior and whereas the second relates the con-
founder to leader characteristics.
Confounder Conflict Education/Combat Exp.
Gender Women theorized to be less deadly
in conflicts: Caprioli and Boyer
(2001), Koch and Fulton (2011)
State-level discrimination against
women reducing access to educa-
tional and military institutions
Age Older leaders more likely to
initiate and escalate disputes:
Horowitz, McDermott and Stam
(2005)
Older leaders more time to at-
tain education/experience combat
prior to ruling
Mil. Service Serving could make leaders more
likely to initiate disputes: Stam,
Horowitz and Ellis (2015).
Leaders with military service
could use payment to attend
college, more likely to experience
combat although they can gain
this experience as rebel
Democracy Democracies less likely experience
war, more likely to achieve victory:
Benoit (1996), Mitchell, Gates and
Hegre (1999), Gelpi and Griesdorf
(2001)
Democracies more likely to se-
lect educated leaders: Besley and
Reynal-Querol (2011)
Initiator Leaders responsible for starting
conflict more likely to continue
fighting, achieve victory: Croco
(2011), Croco (2015)
Leaders with combat experience
less likely to initiate conflicts:
Stam, Horowitz and Ellis (2015)
Pres. Sys-
tem
Leaders w/direct authority over
foreign policy held more culpable
for conflict, less constrained in ini-
tiating conflict: Reiter and Till-
man (2002), Horowitz (1990)
If pres. systems more likely
to initiate conflict, populations
from which future leaders selected
should possess higher rates of com-
bat exper.
Capabilities Increase chances of winning con-
flict, preponderances affect sever-
ity: Sweeney (2003)
State’s with low capabilities less
likely to fight prolonged wars de-
creasing share of potential leaders
who have combat exper.
Soc. Values Cosmopolitan/liberal values de-
crease aggressiveness of states and
leaders (analysis in appendix):
Caprioli and Boyer (2001), Barceló
(2018), Gift and Krcmaric (2017),
Mousseau (2003)
Liberal/democratic states select
more educated leaders, affects
educational spending: Besley
and Reynal-Querol (2011), Diaz-
Serrano and Pérez (2013)
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Statistical Analysis
Considering linear models often have trouble modeling dependent variables that are
counts rather than truly continuous numbers potentially taking on negative numbers,
I specify a count model with equivalent covariates to the linear model to obtain
predicted casualties counts for each background. Each model has the outcome Di
for battle-related deaths and independent variables capturing the leaders level of
education (Ei) and combat experience (Ci) Additionally, each model contains a vector
of control variables, Λi, containing the variables discussed in the previous section.
Finally, each model includes a random error term, εi.
This implies the following for the OLS model:
Di = α0 + β1Ei + β2Ci + Λi + εi (3.1)
Next, the poisson model can be expressed as:
E(Di | xi,Λi) = exp(B1Ei1 +B2Ci1 + Λi) (3.2)
This expresses the expected count of casualties, Di as the function of covariates
and a vector of control variables. The exponential function guarantees that the right
side in the equation remains positive as we would expect in a variable of counts. I test
the sensitivity of my findings by running a series of models. Casualties have a very
low mean (.09) and relatively high variance (1.7) indicating overdispersion. I utilize
a zero-inflated, negative binomial, and a zero-inflated negative binomial count model
to account for overdispersion. Finally, to account for the right censoring discussed
during introduction of the MID data on precise fatalities, I run a Tobit regression
with 1000 as the upper bound.
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Rejected Instruments
Future work could identify an instrumental variable that reduces confounding be-
tween background characteristics and appearing in the MID data. Researchers often
turn to instrumental variables to identify causal relationships where the presence of
confounding is undeniable. Instruments are related to the independent variable, none
of the confounders, and only related to the dependent variable through their relation-
ship with the independent variable (that is they cannot directly affect the outcome
of interest) (Sovey and Green, 2011; Dunning, 2008). If an instrument meets these
standards (i.e. does not fail the exclusion principle), then any relationship found be-
tween the instrument and dependent variable represents the effect of the independent
variable upon the outcome. Due to the presence of multiple confounders between
leader backgrounds and conflict behavior, I could not find a suitable instrument for
the relationship between leader backgrounds and conflict behavior. However, it is
important to review two potential instruments to clarify why this approach was not
taken. There were two instruments considered in respect to educational attainment
and conflict behavior.
First, I considered utilizing educational spending of a state. At first glance, it
might seem like educational spending might only relate to a leader’s background
meeting. However, if a state spends more on education, this should affect the average
level of educational training an individual soldier has, not just leaders. If we can
credibly claim that intelligent decisions during battle do not reduce casualties, then
this would work. However, due to some of the arguments put forth in this paper
concerning the affect of competency on battle-related casualties, this is an impossible
argument to make as the average level of education for each soldier produced by
spending will likely increase military effectiveness. Educational spending is also likely
strongly correlated with democracies and other confounders like national capabilities.
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Second, I considered using the economic and marriage status of a leader’s parents.
Both of these variables are strongly correlated with a leader’s level of education in
the LEAD data but this correlation disappears once the LEAD data is merged with
data on disputes. Leaders from wealthier backgrounds are likely to have higher levels
of educational attainment and leaders with divorced parents are negatively correlated
with educational attainment suggesting that these leaders have less financial support
during the earlier parts of their lives. However, there is no clear theoretical connection
between the economic/marriage status of a leader’s parents and the amount of casu-
alties a state suffer once that leader takes power. It could be the case that states with
more people from wealthy backgrounds are also states with high levels of industrial
capacity, something would affect the material capabilities of a state and casualties
suffered. While these instruments may be effective for the biographical angle, they
would not address the societal level factors that lead a given country to select an
educated leader in the first place. Chiefly, if societies possess more cosmopolitan or
liberal values that place heavy weight on preserving life or electing educated leaders,
it could be the case that this, rather than the educational attributes of the leader,
produces a selection effect where a particular type of leader is in power as a result of
societal attributes.
Due to the difficulty inherent in identifying a strong instrument, I opted to demon-
strate the strength of my correlative findings by examining the connection between
backgrounds and casualties with a focus on robustness across modeling techniques.
3.5 Results
This section describes the results of the study. First, I provide basic descriptive statis-
tics to identify general trends and patterns in the data. Next, I discuss the results of
several statistical models capturing the relationship between conflict casualties and
leader backgrounds.
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Descriptive Statistics
First, let’s explore the data descriptively. The original MID data with missingness
removed via listwise deletion shows us that not a single leader with combat experience
in the data suffered a MID casualty.
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics for Original MID Data Number of observa-
tions, mean of fatalities, standard deviation, standard error, and 95 percent confidence
interval.
College Combat N Mean Fatalities SD SE (95%) CI +/-
No No 58 0.59 4.33 0.57 0.95
No Yes 31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Yes No 510 0.09 1.05 0.05 0.08
Yes Yes 110 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
As expected the most frequent leader type is one with a college degree and no
combat experience. However, if we look at the corrected MID data from Gibler, Miller
and Little (2016), we can see that this is due to missingess in the original dataset.
There are no fatal MIDs for leaders with the lowest level of education suggesting the
existence of cases that directly counter the theory presented. However, we do see
that the mean decreases as the level of education rises and that leaders with combat
have low casualty MIDs for all levels of education.
Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics for Corrected MID Data Number of observa-
tions, mean of fatalities, standard deviation, standard error, and 95 percent confidence
interval.
Level of education Combat N Mean Fatalities SD SE (95%) CI +/-
Less than high school No 13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Less than high school Yes 5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
High school No 35 0.94 5.58 0.94 1.59
High school Yes 23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
College degree No 185 0.10 1.00 0.07 0.12
College degree Yes 67 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.02
Graduate school No 258 0.31 2.50 0.16 0.26
Graduate school Yes 31 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.05
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If we take these statistics and display them graphically, it demonstrates the dif-
ference in casualties between leaders with college and combat experience.
Descriptive Statistics of MID Casualties
Figure 3.1: Descriptive statistics of MID casualties Corrected MID data with
standard errors.
Since these data suggest that there are large numbers of zeros in the data and
there is strong reason to believe the relationship between backgrounds and casualties
is confounded by a number of factors, a comparison of means might not be the most
appropriate form of analysis. The next section displays and discusses the results of six
different models (poisson/count, OLS, negative binomial, zero inflated, zero-inflated
negative binomial, tobit) across two different data sets (MID, Gibler et al. MID
data,).
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Inferential Statistics
The results imply that leaders with military experience and no combat experience are
no more deadly in MIDs offering consistent evidence against H2. However, leaders
with combat experience are robustly correlated with less MID casualties supporting
H3. In respect to H1, the analysis of MIDs reveals a negative correlation for casualties
offering support towards the argument that increased levels of education result in
lower casualties (remember this finding is not robust to interstate wars).
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Table 3.5: Results for Poisson/OLS Regression Models Results for poisson
regression model of MID casualties.
Poisson Model OLS Model
(Intercept) −1.27 0.55
(0.88) (0.45)
College degree −2.07∗∗∗ −0.35∗
(0.26) (0.16)
Grad. school −0.44 −0.05
(0.28) (0.11)
Mil. service −2.34∗∗ −0.17
(0.72) (0.17)
Combat exp. 0.20 −0.02
(0.82) (0.19)
Polity 0.02 0.00
(0.02) (0.01)
Initiator −1.76∗∗∗ −0.33
(0.23) (0.17)
log(CINC) 0.04 0.00
(0.06) (0.03)
Pres. system 1.28∗∗∗ 0.13
(0.23) (0.11)
Gender 0.59 0.08
(0.59) (0.28)
Age 0.03∗∗ 0.00
(0.01) (0.00)
AIC 812.31
BIC 864.87
Log Likelihood -395.16
Deviance 746.23
Num. obs. 878 878
R2 0.01
Adj. R2 0.00
RMSE 1.42
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Multiple modeling strategies (OLS, poisson, negative binomial, zero inflated, zero
inflated negative binomial, and tobit) were utilized to examine the robustness of the
hypothesized relationships. The following table shows the direction of the coefficient
for each IV (the first set of parentheses and a ’X’ or ’x’ indicating statistical signif-
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icance at the .05 level) for every model across both the original MID and corrected
MID data.
Table 3.6: Combined results (direction of coefficient value),(significant at .05?)
tabular summary of regression output from multiple statistical estimation procedures
across MID and Gibler et al. MID data
MID GMLMID
College Combat Exp. College Combat Exp.
Count (-),(X) (+),(X) (-),(X) (-),(X)
OLS (-),(X) (-),(X) (-),(X) (-),(X)
NB (-),(X) (-),(X) (-),(X) (+),(X)
Zero-Inf (+),(X) (+),(X) (-),(X) (-),(X)
NB Zero-Inf (+),(X) (+),(X) (-),(X) (+),(X)
Tobit (-),(X)* (-),(X) (-),(X) (-),(X)
This shows that 10 out of 12 of the approaches to modeling the relationship be-
tween education and casualties produce a negative coefficient value as expected. 7
of these results are statistically significant at the .05 level. The results from the to-
bit model from the original mid data are very close to being significant (p-value of
.057). This suggests moderate support for H1. However, if we look at the robustness
of the relationship between combat experience and MID fatalities, support is much
weaker. Only 7 out 12 approaches produce coefficients with the negative value ex-
pected. However, only one of these coefficient values (the negative binomial model)
is statistically significant at the .05 level. This suggests that there is little to no
support for our finding over combat experience. It is possible that issues related to
missingness and variance of the dependent variable (there are very few fatal MIDs for
leaders w/combat experience) should not be ignored when drawing conclusions about
the relationship at hand. To further illustrate the relationship between education and
MID casualties, I generate predicted casualty counts from the poisson model for each
level of education.
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MID Casualties and Educated Leaders
Figure 3.2: Predicted counts of fatalities during MID To generate predictions,
all continuous covariates are held at their means. Predictions are generated for pres-
idential systems and for leaders without combat.
This shows that leaders who do not possess college degrees are expected to produce
approximately 11 more casualties per MID. It also shows that once leaders have
a college degree, obtaining a graduate degree does not correlate with a significant
decrease in casualties. This suggests that the difference between leaders with and
without college degrees is the most important for determining which backgrounds
correlate with decreased MID casualties.
Dyadic Analysis
Although descriptive results of leader-dispute-year data reveal a moderately strong
relationship between education and decreased fatalities, there are at least two sides
to every conflict. Dyadic analysis represents another way to approach analyzing the
relationship between education and conflict casualties without ignoring the strategic
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nature of conflict. We should not expect leaders with high levels of education to adopt
strategies that are effective in battle if the leader of the other state has a relatively
equal or greater amount of educational attainment. This suggests that non-dyadic
analyses more accurately reveal a leader’s casualty aversion where dyadic analysis
are needed to examine the link between critical thinking and competence to conflict
casualties.
In order to provide more insight over the mechanisms at play, I perform ex-
ploratory dyadic analysis to examine whether a leader with an educational advantage
(i.e. holding a higher level of education than the other leader) is associated with
negative casualty differentials (i.e. when state A suffers less casualties than state B).
In short, extending the theoretical framework in this paper with respect to a compe-
tency advantage is straightforward. Leaders with educational advantages should be
more likely to experience negative casualty differentials where they suffer less loss of
life than the other state involved.
To test this, I utilize the dyadic version of the MID data, merge this with the
LEAD data resulting in 840 dyad-dispute-year observations, and create two variables.
First, I create a casualty differential variable by subtracting the fatalities of State B
from State A. Next, I create a binary variable to indicate whether the leader of State
A possesses an educational advantage where a 0 indicates the leader of State A had
equal or less education than the other leader and a 1 indicates State A had a higher
level of education. The following graph provides the mean of the casualty differential
with standard errors on the Y axis and the two categories with respect to educational
attainment on the X axis.
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MID Casualty Differentials and Educational Advantages
Figure 3.3: Casualty differentials and educational differences Y axis shows the
mean of the casualty differential for dyad-conflict-year data where the X axis displays
the dummy capturing an educational advantage for the leader of State A.
This suggests that the differential for leaders with educational attainment is nega-
tive and statistically distinguishable from zero. However, a simple bivariate regression
model of the same two variables only reveals a small negative correlations that is not
significant at the .05 level. Once again, support is moderate but most importantly
limited with respect to the effect of education upon dispute performance.
3.6 Conclusion
The results indicate a consistent negative relationship between MID casualties and
a leader’s level of education. While the results combat experience are largely null
(H2), available data used provided little information over how leaders with combat
experience behave in fatal MIDs as very few of these observations had any fatalities
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whatsoever. It also provides an important limit to the argument outlined in Stam,
Horowitz and Ellis (2015). Leaders with combat experience may be less willing to
initiate conflicts, but might not be less deadly in disputes. This implies that voters
preferring less soldiers killed in action should choose the leader with more education
all else equal. Education enhances a leader’s critical thinking skills and higher edu-
cation socializes leaders in a cosmopolitan environment where individuals value the
preservation of all life.
It is important to again remind the reader that these effects were not robust to
interstate wars. This suggests that once the gears of war start churning, leader level
characteristics matter less in comparison to state and system level characteristics. It
could also be the case that interstate wars, by definition, are already very deadly
conflicts and states have usually bought into the idea of accepting casualties to win
a given war.
Additionally, this analysis was unable to identify an effective strategy to account
for the existence of potential selection effects mentioned in the theoretical portions
of the paper. As a result, I attempted to demonstrate the strength of my findings by
showing how the results differ across different versions of the data and a variety of
statistical modeling techniques. For a variety of statistical models on two separate
version of dispute data, that educated leaders negatively correlate with MID casu-
alties. This approach reveals that leader’s with combat experience are not robustly
associated with decreased casualty counts. Future work could utilize finer level con-
flict data to calculate differentials in conflict casualties when leaders with different
levels of education replace leaders in the middle of conflict. This results of this study
strongly imply that ignoring the educational background of leaders when analyzing
dispute severity is a mistake. While education is a crude proxy for critical thinking
ability, even this approach reveals that societies who place educated leaders in power
stand to suffer less casualties in militarized disputes.
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Chapter 4
Bang then Blame
4.1 Introduction
Why do some international crises get labeled as intelligence failures while others result
in high levels of blame directed at policymakers? Historical events like the attacks on
September 11th and Pearl Harbor have all been labeled as ‘intelligence failures’ and
failures of policymakers. This could be due to the effectiveness of the leader at shifting
blame to bureaucrats, crisis level attributes, or individual level characteristics relating
to how preventable one thinks international crises are. Recent findings suggest that
media outlets are more likely to blame intelligence communities (Davies, Schulzke
and Almond, 2018). Although there is little reason to believe the public cannot find
both actors culpable, leaders interested in political survival should prefer situations
where intelligence communities are blamed more if it results in smaller decreases to
their levels of support. Understanding why leaders avoid blame and how audiences
will react to seemingly random shocks is crucial to understanding the implications of
international crises for domestic politics.
Using original survey data, I examine how individuals assign culpability under a
variety of crisis scenarios. Centrally, I argue that the public looks to informational
cues concerning how aware and certain policymakers should have been over a given
threat to determine if intelligence communities gave adequate warnings. The amount
of reports provided to policymakers and the way in which the leader frames the fail-
ure are theorized to affect the way individuals assign blame. Specifically, I expect
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individuals to assign more blame to policymakers and less blame to intelligence agen-
cies when intelligence warnings gave policymakers more time to act. I also expect
that individuals will blame policymakers and intelligence communities more when
elites direct blame towards these actors by framing the subsequent investigation of
the attack around these actors.
When international disputes and crises result in observable costs (e.g. loss of
resources/life), voters interested in preventing similar failures in the future must de-
termine the extent to which policymakers should be held accountable for these costs.
Often, reports are leaked to the media indicating policymakers were warned by intel-
ligence agencies and had a particular amount of time to act.1 When voters observe
their state’s suffer a costly attack from a foreign enemy, they are tasked with deter-
mining how aware the policymaker was of the impending attack and how certain they
were that related intelligence was accurate. I argue that as voters perceive increases
to policymaker awareness and certainty, they will blame intelligence communities at
higher rates. Inversely, policymakers become softer targets of blame when they have
had a stronger warning (e.g. more reports on the threat exist). Additionally, I theo-
rize that these effects are conditional on the way elites choose to frame the response
to a given failure to prevent an attack. In order to test this theory, I collect data
from a simple experimental survey to isolate the effect of each contextual factor upon
an individual’s willingness to blame two key actors: policymakers and intelligence
producers. I vary the time the intelligence agencies give policymakers and the way
leaders frame the attempt to uncover blame after the attack to examine the relation-
ship between context, framing, and blame for political actors. The results suggest
that leaders interested in shifting blame away from political allies can shift blame to-
wards the intelligence community. The ability to shift blame could affect the extent
that leaders and other political actors can garner support for war.
1See Mak (2020) for an example with respect to COVID-19.
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The surprise terrorist attacks targeting the World Trade Center and Pentagon on
September 11th resulted in thousands of people dead and helped lead the U.S. into
an extensive war on terrorism (Porch and Wirtz, 2002; Garicano and Posner, 2005;
Zegart, 2005). After the attacks, many wondered how such a tragedy could occur
considering the limited capacity of the enemy and intelligence gathering capabilities
of the United States. Much like the attacks on Pearl Harbor pulling the U.S. into
WWII, the passing of time has slowly revealed the extent to which intelligence agen-
cies warned policymakers was originally underestimated (Rovner, 2005; Pillar, 2006;
Phythian, 2006). In both cases, surprise attacks resulted in varying levels of blame
between actors as more contextual information concerning the event was revealed.
However, it is not clear what types of information lead voters to shift blame from one
actor to another.
When protesters raided the U.S. embassy in Benghazi in 2012, blame largely fell
on United States’ Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The attack became a focal point
for her critics as they campaigned against her for the presidency. Secretary Clinton’s
front-runner status undoubtedly contributed to why she was targeted. However, it is
possible that the contextual factors surrounding the attack contributed to the effec-
tiveness of these attacks as voters attempted to determine who deserved blame. This
choice is not isolated to surprise attacks but is also similar to a situation where voters
determine whether conflict should occur in the first place. When the U.S. entered Iraq
after the 9/11 attacks, it justified the intervention by citing reports of WMDs and
connections to terrorist cells responsible for the attack (Jervis, 2006; Garicano and
Posner, 2005; Fitzgerald and Lebow, 2006). As time has passed, unclassified reports
indicate intelligence agencies provided very weak support for these claims shifting
blame directly upon policymakers. The high costs of the war and information con-
cerning what policymakers were told by the intelligence community have resulted in
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voters and political challengers questioning their support of the war over a decade
later.
International relations research demonstrates that media outlets tend to shift
blame away from leaders towards intelligence communities (Davies, Schulzke and
Almond, 2018). This has important implications for how leaders behave considering
results indicate leaders condition their efforts at conflict upon the extent to which
they think they will be held accountable (Croco, 2011; Chiozza and Goemans, 2003).
If political leaders are easily able to avoid blame for these types of events, we should
expect very little effort on their behalf to prevent them—especially when they are
not facing reelection. It is possible that many of the most salient events just happen
to feature the contextual factors related to higher levels of blame for the intelligence
community.
It is important to know where voters will direct blame because crises, when costly
enough in terms of casualties, can result in non-trivial decreases in public support for
a leader, decreasing their odds of remaining in office (Gartner, Segura and Barratt,
2004; Karol and Miguel, 2007). Additionally, if we can determine the level of blame
a leader will receive for a developing crisis, we should have a strong foundation for
predicting the magnitude of their response. Specifically, crises resulting in low levels
of blame for policymakers could result in a leader becoming less risk adverse in terms
of how they handle it. Additionally, it could force a leader to remain inactive in an
effort to maintain distance from public backlash related to conflict. It could be the
case that political elites at the highest level (i.e. presidents, prime ministers, etc.)
have an incentive to protect policymakers that they require support from motivating
them to attempt to shift blame towards the intelligence community. If this incentive
exists, future work could demonstrate this pattern by analyzing the speech of heads-
of-state after surprise attacks. However, it is important to understand if a leader’s
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attempt to shift blame towards one actor or another matters for how individuals
assign blame.
Insights into how voters assign blame after explosive international crises should
shed light on how voters assign blame to their representatives more generally in
relation to uncertainty and awareness of a given threat. In order to develop a theory
of why voters assign blame to varying actors for crises, it is important to review
literature establishing what key actors desire, how they act to reach these goals, and
what information they have at their disposal when making decisions.
4.2 Literature Review
Several studies imply domestic political opinion matters for how a president applies
force during international crises and that the public monitors the outcomes and costs
of salient conflicts (James and Oneal, 1991; Berinsky, 2009). However, support for
diversionary war theory (e.g. where domestically vulnerable leaders are more aggres-
sive) is limited and leaders often attempt to avoid conflicts they would responsible
for altogether (Leeds and Davis, 1997). Studies suggest that leaders can pay com-
petency costs for commitment inconsistency, suffering casualties, and aggressiveness
(Nomikos and Sambanis, 2019; Croco, 2011; Gartner and Segura, 1998). This implies
that voters pay attention to salient indicators (e.g. casualties, public pronouncements
like threats/assurances) of government performance in conflict.
Studies demonstrate that leaders are held at higher levels of accountability for wars
they initiate and that reelection prospects influences a leader’s willingness to initiate
conflict (Croco, 2011; Chiozza and Goemans, 2003). However, historical analyses
suggest that it is often in the interest of smaller powers to levy surprise attacks against
stronger states suggesting that leaders from powerful states might be subject to blame
over failure to prevent attacks/reduce the damages of surprise attacks (Brodin, 1978).
Although it is impossible to determine if a surprise attack was fully preventable,
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individuals could argue that more could have been done to minimize costs or that
political institutions/intelligence organizations are incapable of providing adequate
security. There is very little work providing explanation as to why one actor gets
blamed more than the other. However, there are several expert analyses of the events
commonly called intelligence failures that help reveal the characteristics of crises that
shift blame away from policymakers.
Reviews of prominent intelligence failures argue that policymakers and intelli-
gence producers lack the use of proper social science methods and are susceptible to
confirmation bias and forms of inefficiency inherent to all organizations (Jervis, 2006;
Garicano and Posner, 2005). Reports analyzing the 9/11 attacks point to a failure of
intelligence organizations to adapt and use new methods (Zegart, 2005). These argu-
ments contrast a growing rise of social science methodology in intelligence collection
method in place of traditional cloak and dagger methods (Knorr, 1964). Analyses
of methods reveal expert pessimism over the capabilities of intelligence organizations
to prevent crises, yet tell us little about why voters might shift blame away from
policymakers.
Regardless of method, the tendency for actors to place blame on the intelligence
community is high and, perhaps, magnified by the media’s tendency to shift blame
away from leaders during times of conflict (Davies, Schulzke and Almond, 2018).
This combined with the ability of leaders to strategically leak the intelligence that
supports their preferred policy position, gives leaders extraordinary power over how
intelligence communities change public opinion (Hastedt, 2005). This increases the
value of public opinion as it is unlikely that the media will challenge the behavior of
policymakers unless public opinion is strongly critical of them. If we are to believe
research concluding framing affects public opinion, it could be the case that elites
(i.e. media sources, political leaders) frame attacks in ways that affect the way the
public assigns blame (Nelson and Oxley, 1999). Druckman and Nelson (2003) shows
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that these frame matter under conditions where individuals are not expected to com-
municate with people that have different perspectives. Furthermore, research shows
that framing effects are limited where citizens deliberate, elites lack a reputation for
credibility, and individuals possess expertise over the event being framed (Druckman,
2004, 2001). However, it is also important to demonstrate that particular frames mat-
ter in an effort to explain a particular pattern that isn’t readily explainable otherwise.
Specifically, framing might help explain why individuals and media outlets levy blame
towards intelligence organizations if elite framing of the attack is a powerful predictor
over how individuals assign blame.
The importance of blame post attack can be stated in terms of how the govern-
ment responds to prevent future attacks. When people blame government actors for
institutions, it decreases their willingness to restrict civil liberties after surprise ter-
rorist attacks (Davis and Silver, 2004). Findings suggest that public opinion during
crises shifts towards the restriction of liberties, but that this relationship is contingent
upon faith in government. If individuals believe that the government is blameworthy
for a given crises, they might be less willing to increase state power in times of un-
certainty and fear. In order to explain why individuals blame one actor over another,
I develop a theory focusing on how the context makes policymakers easier or ’softer’
targets of blame (Christiansen 2019).
4.3 Theory
This section explains the theoretical reasoning for the paper. Centrally, I argue that
voters pay attention to the extent to which policymakers were made aware and certain
of an impending threat. Additionally, voters pay attention to the costs of the attack
and the strength of the opponent to determine aggregate levels of blame for both
policymakers and intelligence agencies.
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Actors, Concepts, Timing
Policymaker refers to an elected member of the government whose authority allows
them to contribute to the formulation of government policy. Under a broad classifi-
cation, legislators like senators and members of parliament qualify. However, leaders
or executives usually have the power to direct government resources to foreign policy
issues making them a potential destination for public blame when foreign enemies
levy costly attacks. A crisis is defined as a highly salient event where state resources
are threatened. Foreign attacks by terrorist groups and other states represent events
where the state is put in crisis.
The timing of the theoretical relationship is somewhat easy to explain. Intel-
ligence communities issue reports with a varying amount of certainty (number of
reports/agencies in agreement), then the attack occurs with a distance, t, from the
date of the report. The attack results in a cost, c, which voters observe alongside
contextual indicators over policymaker awareness and certainty. After these indica-
tors of performance are observed, voters choose what amounts of blame to place on
both policymakers and intelligence communities and decide the extent to which their
support for them will decrease as a function of blame.
Awareness/Certainty
I argue that voters direct blame towards intelligence communities when they fail to
make policymakers aware of a given threat. If policymakers are completely unaware of
a foreign threat, voters will believe that the politician could not prevent the attack,
given intelligence. The more aware intelligence communities make politicians of a
given threat, the more responsible a policymaker is for resolving that threat.
I argue that voters use informational cues to determine the extent to which pol-
icymakers were aware of the threat. Centrally, I argue that, t, the amount of time
between the first report and the attack is the most critical indicator of policymaker
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awareness. As this window increases in size, policymakers will be perceived to have
adequate time to assess the validity of the report and direct resources to prevent
the attack. As t decreases, it is expected that individuals will shift blame towards
the intelligence community for failing to provide adequate warnings. Where warn-
ings are provided to policymakers, individuals become aware of these by published
reports, leaks, and whistle blowers that notify the nation of the warnings provided to
policymakers. If people believe that the primary task of intelligence agencies is the
collection of intelligence rather than acting upon it, they will blame agencies when
intelligence is not produced enough time before the attack for policymakers to decide
how to act. If intelligence agencies provide an early warning that is not conclusive
over the interpretation of the threat, individuals will similarly shift blame away from
policymakers. If the intelligence community produces one report, from one agency,
this will be seen as a situation where policymakers could not be completely certain
over the accuracy of the intelligence. However, as the number of reports during t in-
creases, voters should believe that policymakers had more certainty over the validity
of the threat.
In line with awareness, as voters believe policymakers were more certain of a
threat, they will believe it was their responsibility to act and that intelligence agencies
provided adequate information for policymakers to at least minimize the costs of the
attack. In addition to these cues, I argue that two other factors should heavily
influence the amount of blame voters levy towards both actors.
Framing
I also theorize that base levels of blame leveled towards both actors is conditional
upon the costs of the attack and the perceived capabilities or strength of the opponent
yet do not explicitly test these claims in this paper. As the cost of the attack rises,
individuals will believe that the threat should have been prioritized by policymakers
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and intelligence communities. As such, I expect that blame for both actors will
increase when the costs are higher. Next, I classify the foreign attacker by level of
strength. As the opponent grows in capabilities, individuals should believe that the
threat is harder to detect, sheltering all actors from blame but protecting intelligence
communities (e.g. those assigned to threat detection duty) more.
Most importantly, I argue that political elites (e.g. presidents, prime ministers) are
more reliant upon other political elites (e.g. policy makers) to implement particular
policies than they are on the intelligence community. While presidents and heads
of state are usually able to directly appoint the directors of intelligence agencies,
policy makers (e.g. senators) are in a position to withdraw support for a given
leader’s policies if that leader frames the conflict in a way that places blame on
them. Leaders might also be worried that any attempt to blame policymakers could
legitimize the intelligence provided by the intelligence community to the extent that
the political leader is also blamed for inaction alongside the average politician. For
these arguments to possess explanatory power over why intelligence communities get
blamed, we must assume that political elites are able to affect the locus of blame by
how they blame the conflict. This might not be a safe assumption to make considering
the effects of framing are often context conditional. As such, I propose a theory of
a particular framing device leaders can use to direct blame by arguing that their
attempts to uncover the cause of inaction can possess particular framing devices
important for the eventual assignment of blame.
Most importantly, leaders affect blame by how they frame their administration’s
attempts to uncover why the attack was not prevented or stopped. When a leader
directs the investigation toward the intelligence agency or intelligence itself, they are
framing the attack as an intelligence failure. In contrast, leaders can also choose
to call for an investigation of the policymakers responsible for analyzing military
intelligence. The latter should serve to frame the intelligence as reliable/credible and
117
focus blame on the political process by which intelligence is reviewed. The former,
where leaders call for investigations into the intelligence itself, should bolster the
view that policymakers could not be sure that a given threat existed as a result of
intelligence that existed prior to the attack.
Central Expectations
The following table summarizes the expectations for blame for both policymakers and
intelligence agencies under different treatment conditions.
Table 4.1: Central Expectations Hypothesis for each treatment condition and each
actor (policymakers/intelligence agencies.
Indicator Effect on Blame
for Non-Executive
Politicians
Effect on Blame
for Int. Comm.
H(I)
time between
report and
attack
Positive Negative H1, H2
Elite frame (in-
tel)
Negative Positive H3, H4
Elite frames
(policymaker)
Positive Negative H5, H6
H1 : Individuals will blame non-executive politicians at higher rates when the time
between the report and attack is higher.
H2 : Individuals will blame intelligence communities at lower rates when the time
between the report and attack is lower.
H3 : Individuals will blame non-executive politicians at lower rates when political
executives frame subsequent investigations into the attack around the veracity of the
intelligence.
118
H4 : Individuals will blame intelligence communities at higher rates when political
executives frame subsequent investigations into the attack around the veracity of the
intelligence.
H5 : Individuals will blame non-executive politicians at higher rates when political
executives frame subsequent investigations into the congressional process/committee
responsible for reviewing the intelligence.
H6 : Individuals will blame intelligence communities at lower rates when political
executives frame subsequent investigations into the congressional process/committee
responsible for reviewing the intelligence.
4.4 Research Design
Isolating the relationship between the contextual factors surrounding foreign attacks,
intelligence agency/policymaker behavior, and public opinion would be a difficult, if
not insurmountable task. One could approach this by collecting data on public sup-
port for politicians before and after crises, while hand coding the variety of indicators
theoretically important for explaining patterns in blame. However, it would be very
hard to construct the perfect or ideal set of control variables to isolate changes in
support that occur for an infinite amount of reasons completely divorced from foreign
policy decision-making, much a single attack. It is possible that one could collect the
data similar to that found in Davies, Schulzke and Almond (2018) and use covariates
with information on the attack to predict the extent to which media outlets direct
blame at policymakers.
However, their research demonstrates that media outlets are biased in a way that
directs more blame towards intelligence communities. In order to overcome challenges
inherent to testing my theory with existing observational data, I construct a simple
survey experiment isolating the effect of each contextual informational cue upon the
amount of blame directed at each actor. The survey utilizes vignettes to construct a
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scenario where a state is attacked, the opponent is known, and the costs are known
to the public. This way, the outcome of interest (blame) is explicitly and directly
measured while allowing the researcher to freely manipulate the timing of the attack,
the opponent, the cost, and the certainty policymakers had prior to the strike. In the
following section, I explain how each treatment is realized and how this corresponds
to the empirical implications discussed in previous sections.
Treatments
The survey contains four treatment types and is 2×2 resulting in 4 possible vignettes
respondents have an equal chance of viewing. Table 2 provides a summary of the
concepts, variables, notation, related hypotheses, and portion of the vignette designed
to realized associated treatment conditions.
Table 4.2: Experimental Design Summary of vignettes with reference to related
concept in theoretical framework, and hypotheses.
Concept Variable H(#) Vignette
Certainty time between
report and
attack
H1:H2, Intelligence agencies issued
[one/multiple] reports on the
threat prior to the attack.
Framing by leader locus of investi-
gation
H3:H6 The president requested a for-
mal investigation of [the intel-
ligence/the congressional com-
mittee] associated with the at-
tack.
In order to capture the awareness of policymakers over the threat prior to an
attack, I include information on how much time policymakers had to act after a
report was issued but before the strike. I examine the role of certainty in assigning
blame. As the number of reports indicating a threat rise, voters should infer that
policymakers could be certain over the existence of the threat and therefore had
enough intelligence to act. In a scenario where only one report is issued, voters could
think policymakers were right not to waste resources over a potential threat when only
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one warning was issued. As voters try and understand whether a policymaker should
act, they should look to whether reports provided them with enough awareness and
certainty over the threat to determine if the politician is to blame. When intelligence
communities provide ample time and reports, individuals should be left wondering
what else policymakers needed to act.
Finally, I examine one of the more puzzling contextual cues voters could use to
determine where to place blame—how a leader decides to frame the investigation into
the attack. It could be the case that a leader’s decision to frame the state’s response
to the attack around determining why the intelligence was faulty, as opposed to why
a congressional committee failed to act, affects the way individuals assign blame over
the attack.
Vignettes
This section describes and contains the vignettes used to create a scenario where
voters analyze recent conflicts and decide both who and how much to blame. The
following vignettes are designed to reflect short and simple descriptions of recent
attacks. No specific locations, names, or other information is used in order to isolate
respondent’s views over the causal mechanisms of interest from a respondent’s prior
beliefs over who is to blame for surprise attacks.
First, respondents see a vignette designed to set up a random and surprising attack
that happened in the recent past. Information introduced beyond the treatment
conditions is presented passively and in a neutral manner to avoid framing effects not
related to the treatments of interest.
A little over a year ago, an average sized democratic country faced serious
foreign policy challenges. The following sections describe their experience
of being subjected to a surprise attack by a foreign country. Some experts
121
refer to the attack as a random act of violence where others argue the
country had adequate preparation for such a threat.
After respondents see information meant to capture a surprise attack where the
underlying controversy surrounds whether more could have been done by government
actors, I provide a vignette containing all four treatments.
Recent reports indicate that the country’s foreign intelligence agency is-
sued a warning [days/months] before the attack. Experts claim the at-
tacker had an average level of military capabilities and reports confirm
the attack resulted in casualties. In an effort to determine why no action
was taken, the president ordered a full review of the [intelligence pro-
vided concerning the attack/investigation of the congressional committee
responsible for reviewing military intelligence.].
The statements are past tense as this reflects a recent story for respondents to
learn about. After this, I ask individuals to rate the amount of blame each actor
(intelligence agency vs. policymakers) deserves.
Questions
I ask respondents demographic questions (age, gender, zip code, political affiliation,
military service, and whether they reside in the US for a majority of the year. All
questions have ’prefer not to say’ options to allow respondents to avoid forcing re-
spondents to answer questions they do not want to.
After the vignettes, I ask individuals to rate the amount of blame they think
policy makers and intelligence officials deserve.
After this, I will ask readers to rate both groups on an interval level scale from 0-10
(0 representing no blame, 10 representing all of the blame):
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How much blame do politicians (other than the president) in the attacked
country deserve?
And:
How much blame does the intelligence community deserve in the country
that was attacked?
A sample version of the entire form can be accessed at :
https://forms.gle/wqh6ZAW6bzGva7yZ8.
4.5 Findings
The results suggest that timing plays less of a role than theorized in this paper.
Furthermore, the president’s attempt to frame the investigation around congress or
the intelligence seems to have adverse effects where respondents blame policymakers
more when the president attempts to shift blame towards the intelligence community.
In order to discuss these findings in greater detail, I calculate treatment group means
and standard errors for each treatment condition and discuss how they relate to the
hypotheses put forth in this paper.
First, I analyze treatment conditions for policymaker blame. The following graph
shows the average amount of blame levied at policymakers under four different con-
ditions.
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Surprise Attacks and Blame for Policymakers
Figure 4.1: Average level of blame for policymakers Treatment group means
for blame levied at policymakers with timing of intelligence report and elite framing
varied.
This graph suggest that treatments related to time possess null effects failing to
provide support for H1. Additionally, it shows that blame for policymakers actually
increases when the president attempts to frame subsequent investigations around the
intelligence community. The increase in blame for both time related conditions when
the president frames the investigation around the intelligence community offers direct
evidence against H3 and H5. It is possible that these attempts are seen as “cover-
ups" or attempts to shift blame away from co-partisans in congress where respondents
blame politicians more when the president tries to place the locus of blame elsewhere.
This suggests that a leader’s attempt to shift blame during crises can produce adverse
effects or “backlash" towards policymakers. Next, I analyze timing and framing in
respect to blame assigned for intelligence communities.
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Surprise Attacks and Blame for Intelligence Communities
Figure 4.2: Average level of blame for intelligence community Treatment group
means for blame levied at intelligence community with timing of intelligence report
and elite framing varied.
In contrast to the findings concerning policymaker blame, we can see that the
president’s frame of investigations around intelligence does have the expected effect
under the temporal treatment condition ‘days’. This suggests that the adverse effect
of elite framing could be limited to presidential attempts to get policymakers off the
hook. However, this effect is not recovered under the temporal condition ‘months’
resulting in mixed support for H4 and H6. Examining the difference in blame for tem-
porally related treatments, it becomes clear that intelligence communities are blame
at lower levels when they give policymakers more time to act. While policymakers
do not receive more blame when given more time, intelligence communities receive
less when they produce reports indicating the threat of attack earlier on. This sug-
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gests that the data support H2 as both frames see decreases (intel frame decrease
significant at .05 level) in blame when going from days to months.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper examines the way individuals assign blame after surprise attacks. I theo-
rized that both the timing of intelligence reports and elite framing play critical roles
in how the public assigns blame after an attack occurs. Utilizing a simple survey
experiment, I find that timing only matters for how individuals assign blame to intel-
ligence communities but does not necessarily affect the level of policymakers receive
after an attack. Surprisingly, I find that a leader’s attempt to frame the attack as
the product of intelligence failure possesses adverse effects where policymakers are
blamed more. This suggests that a leader’s attempt to shift blame away from poli-
cymakers is not beneficial for the policymakers themselves and perhaps damaging to
the president. While I did not include a question capturing blame for the president’s
actions, future iterations of the survey should probe the extent to which any attempt
by the leader to assign blame increases the blame they receive themselves. Future
waves of this survey should examine blame for all three types of actors in addition to
thinking about how to capture the concept of certainty surrounding the knowledge
policymakers have over a given threat as a result of intelligence.
While I focus on the time between the report and attack, it is possible that respon-
dents are unwilling to assign blame for policymakers even when they had an ample
amount of time as the intelligence report could be inconclusive. Further iterations of
this survey should capture certainty by randomizing the extent to which agreement
exists among intelligence agencies over the the threat. Additionally, I could explic-
itly vary the language of the report itself by modifying the instrument to include a
story about an impending terrorist attack. Then, I could vary the extent to which
the report provided a specific means and location as opposed to general language
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detailing a potential attack in a public space. While this paper focuses on surprise
attacks and international conflict, it has important implications for a variety of types
of international crises. Recent discussions of the extent to which U.S. policymakers
and leadership should be accountable for the outbreak of disease have also focused
upon the extent to which intelligence agencies indicating the threat existed before
the outbreak was publicly known. Furthermore, the threat of economic collapse is
often signaled by economic branches of bureaucracy suggesting scholars interested
in economic crises could examine the extent to which early warnings over potential
recessions relate to the ways leaders and policymakers are held accountable.
4.7 Proposal for next instrument
First, I intend to modify the set up of the vignettes surrounding an impending terrorist
attack with the following paragraph:
A little over a year ago, an average sized democratic country faced a
threat from an international terrorist organization. The country’s foreign
intelligence agency issued a warning a couple of months beforehand but
this failed to prevent the attack that occurred at a government building
in the nation’s capital city. Now, the citizens are debating the extent
to which the intelligence agency and/or politicians deserve blame for the
attack. Sadly, the attack resulted in almost 100 casualties.
Then, I’ll ask them to review the details of the report where I vary the extent to
which the report identified the location of the threat:
The intelligence agency wrote this in their brief to the country’s leader
and congressional committee responsible for reviewing foreign intelligence:
“After a careful review of multiple forms and sources of intelligence, our
conclusion is that a foreign terrorist organization intends to [attack a
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metropolitan area on domestic soil/a government building in the nation’s
capital] within the [next two months/next year].
Finally, I’ll tell them about the leaders decision to launch federal investigations
into either the intelligence community or congressional committee responsible for
reviewing intelligence but vary whether the committee is controlled by members of
the opposite party.
In an effort to determine why no action was taken, the president ordered a
full review of the [intelligence provided concerning the attack/investigation
of the congressional committee responsible for reviewing military intelli-
gence.]. A majority of members in the congressional committee reviewing
foreign intelligence are members of the [same/opposite] party as the pres-
ident.
This will allow me to examine the theoretical argument with respect to certainty
in a more nuanced fashion than just the time between report and attack. I will be
able to investigate the extent to which the direction and level of blame is a function
of whether the intelligence itself made the time and location of the attack certain to
policymakers, Additionally, I can refine my examination of the leader’s attempt to
direct blame by examining how shifting blame towards and away from fellow/opposite
party members matters for the assignment of blame to the intelligence community
and policymakers. Finally, I will also include a question that asks respondents to rate
the blame that the leader deserves to see how these attempts to shift blame across
blame across partisan lines possess backlash effects.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
To my knowledge, this is the first project to examine the relationship between leader
characteristics, accountability, and policy outcomes simultaneously. Current theo-
ries within international relations attempting to predict conflict outcomes that do
not account for leader traits may underestimate the likelihood a state continues to
fight. Understanding the attributes of leaders that help states navigate international
conflicts is crucial for scholars and policy-makers attempting to develop more nu-
anced theories of why particular states remain in international conflicts. My primary
findings indicate that leader backgrounds matter for the way the public assigns ac-
countability after conflict and the way leaders behave during conflict. Specifically,
individuals rate leaders with strong backgrounds higher for all conflict outcomes.
This implies that individuals take a leader’s background into account when making
decisions related to accountability.
In order to understand how blame is assigned to leaders with different levels of
perceived competence, I developed a theory related to how individuals heuristically
analyze leader backgrounds in an effort to determine whether a leader is culpable
for conflict outcomes. In order to test this theory, I developed an embedded natu-
ral experiment utilizing an extremely close election that places one of two leaders in
power. Leaders with the stronger background theorized to generate more perceived
competence were rate significantly higher than their counterparts with weaker back-
grounds across all conflict outcomes (win, lose, stalemate) but the difference was most
pronounced for scenarios where leaders led their states to a win. This suggests that
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individual members of the public look to more than just outcomes to determine their
response to international conflict.
Citizens with an active interest in foreign affairs may believe that some conflict
outcomes are the product of randomness and matters outside of the leaders con-
trol. When leaders have backgrounds that convey competence, individuals rate them
higher for wins and losses. Leaders with weak backgrounds are rated lower for their
performance in conflicts when holding the outcomes and contextual factors surround-
ing the conflict constant. Leaders with stronger backgrounds are rated as performing
better in the very same conflicts. This implies that the public uses leader backgrounds
to determine the extent to which a given leader is responsible for conflict outcomes.
Next, my findings related to how background matter for conflict behavior imply
that increased levels of education correlate with decreased levels of casualties in MIDs.
Support for these arguments is moderate at best as this relationship is not recovered in
war is not robust to a few of the more conservative modeling techniques. Against my
expectations, I find that leaders with combat experience are no less deadly than their
counterparts. This is, perhaps, due to limitations inherent in the data analyzed,but
it could be the case that combat experienced leaders are more selective with disputes
but no more careful when attempting to resolve them with violence. However, this
suggests that not all leader characteristics that matter for how leaders select disputes
translate into different behavior once disputes start.
Implications for political science
Prominent conflict research indicates that conflict escalation cannot be studied with-
out first gaining an understanding of the reasons why conflict initiated (Reed, 2000).
If leaders are more willing to escalate conflicts as they are deemed more culpable,
it could be possible that leaders expecting low amounts of culpability due to their
perceived competence are more willing to fight long and deadly wars when attacked
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but very unlikely to provoke costly conflicts. This work improves our ability to em-
pirically capture complex concepts like blame and competence so that future scholars
can pay more attention to the extent to which these confound the effects of state and
issue-level indicators upon conflict escalation.
Identifying the traits of leaders that are more likely to resolve crises may provide
unique insights to discussions of how leaders learn about their expected win proba-
bilities during conflict or signal their resolve (Powell, 2004; McManus, 2016). Formal
models of conflict often involve the transfer of information between actors or a process
of learning. It may be dangerous to assume that two leaders, even when endowed
with similar state capacity, are similarly competent at analyzing and responding to
threats. If leaders learn while fighting, we should expect some are quicker learners
than others. This dissertation provides an initial discussion for the foundations of
competence over international conflict. Researchers could expand these measures
of perceived competence to create more concrete measures of predicted competence
to empirically capture the ability of leaders to perform tasks related to successful
bargaining.
Studies examining the distinction between hawks and doves could reexamine the
validity of their findings when considering the potential confounding effect of compe-
tence. Recent research demonstrates that hawks are more likely to be elected when
nearby states possess hawkish leadership (Carter, 2018b). However, it could be the
case that individuals only prefer the traits associated with hawkishness because they
also signal competence over military affairs. The instrument used in this dissertation
will provide insight into the extent to which traits associated with military compe-
tence correlate with perceptions of leader aggressiveness.
If leaders are perceived to be more competent by their domestic audiences as a
result of interacting leader traits, it is possible that international leaders (e.g. leaders
of allied states) should be more willing to provide higher levels of support from them
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in times of crises contributing to studies that assess how states leverage reputation for
diplomacy (Kinne, 2014). This logic could also apply to potential threats where inter-
national foes attempting to estimate the cost of a potential conflict may be dissuaded
by a leader’s perceived competence. One layer deeper, if a leader is perceived to be
competent by their base, potential threats could see this as mechanism that enhances
credibility in that they are not only willing to follow through on a given threat but
are also able. If a foreign leader believes that a leader is perceived incompetent by
their domestic audience, where they are blamed heavily for the first visible negative
outcome (e.g. losing a battle, high casualties), then the foreign threat may think
that the leader is unable to wage a long term costly war. Under this scenario, foreign
threats would attack leaders who are perceived as incompetent but may actually be
much more aggressive than their inexperienced counterparts (Smith, 1998). These
scenarios involve increasing the costs of conflict yet it might be unclear what research
focusing on fixed traits implies.
Implications for other areas of inquiry
This dissertation sheds light on the individual characteristics that matter for lead-
ership performance. As noted in the earlier reviews of relevant literature, a variety
of fields studying the impact of leaders and how leaders are evaluated can benefit
from this project. Many of the theories here relate to the psychological impact of cer-
tain experiences and individuals make decisions when leadership is framed in varying
ways. Those studying business/organizational management can use the insights pro-
duced here to better understand why particular organizations succeed at the tasks
they set out to accomplish when theories related to the structure and resources of
organizations appear inadequate.
Scholars of behavioral economics and financial investment might use the insights
concerning perceived competence to explain why particular companies or organiza-
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tions receive varied level of support when expected gains and other characteristics
relevant to why people invest in particular companies fail to explain different out-
comes. Findings relevant to perceived competence are relevant to the field of public
health and health care administration. Those interested in why particular types of
doctors are more likely to be sued for malpractice can use this project as a model
for understanding the types of biases that people hold towards doctors from less es-
teemed schools or with less experience. In short, any area where individuals review
the competence of some leader via an evaluation of their characteristics in an effort
to assign blame, trust, confidence, and concepts related to performance evaluation
will benefit from the lessons learned here.
Implications for policymakers and voters
What are the policy implications of a study that focuses on a trait that cannot be
changed once in office? That is, if leaders are unable to time travel and become
more educated or experienced in respect to their current foreign policy challenges,
what can we learn here? Is there something to be learned that would allow leaders,
policy-makers, or scholars to think or act differently in a way that resolves a negative
consequence of international conflict?
First, if the results of this work imply that leaders with particular backgrounds
and amounts of experience perform better in respect to conflict management, elec-
toral institutions and party leadership interesting in promoting national security can
develop a better understanding of the types of leaders that will perform better once
in office. Additionally, leaders without these traits interested in preserving life can
choose to develop stronger networks of experts to account for actual and perceived
deficits in competence. This project also contributes to our understanding of how in-
dividual people perceive expertise (being extremely knowledgeable about something),
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competence (being able to do something well), and culpability (being responsible for
a given outcome).
This dissertation focuses on how background traits, as proxies, capture a latent
concept, competency that has the potential to explain why leaders, regardless of ide-
ological disposition or aggressiveness, are better at avoiding costs related to conflict.
Activists seeking to play a role in the reduction of conflict related death could develop
protocol for analyzing the ability of leaders to manage conflicts or execute particular
policy proposals with the states and organizations they work with.
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Appendix A
Appendix: Blame for Battle
Instrument Implementation
This section discusses the implementation of the survey instrument in more detail.
Specifically, it discusses the online process respondents participated in via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is an online platform that allows people to post
request for short tasks, participation in surveys, and more. Once a job is posted,
millions of workers can view the task and select it from a list of all tasks they qualify
for. Additionally, the position was posted under broad keywords “survey” and “de-
mographics”. This study required workers to have greater than a 89 percent approval
rating for all of their previous tasks to mitigate the risk of unskilled/careless workers
participating.
When workers select the task titled “answer a survey about foreign policy", they
are then directed to a task description that describes the work: “Provide your opin-
ion for an academic study on foreign policy and international conflict." After they
choose to participate, they are presented with six different options representing the
six different versions of the survey vignettes. To randomize this process, I ask that
respondents use their mother’s birth month giving two months per vignette.1
After this, respondents read and choose whether they consent to be a participant.
When consent is provided, they are directed answer a series of demographic questions.
After this, they read the vignettes and answer questions in respect to the leader’s
1Please see the next section in the appendix for a discussion of whether this ap-
proach was successful.
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performance in conflict. To receive payment, workers then must take a password
they get after completion back to the original MTurk task page and enter it. The
survey takes approximately 5-7 minutes to complete and receive payment.
Randomization, Sample Features, Weighted Sample Analysis
The randomization was conducted by having respondents select their mother’s birth
month to provide six categories with two options each. The following table shows
that there is very little correlation between the demographic qualities of respondents
and the treatment group they were placed in.
Table A.1: Correlations between demographics and treatment group for
backgrounds Correlative analysis between backgrounds and demographic variables.
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(> | t |)
Lean Democrat -0.0397 0.0503 -0.79 0.4300
Lean Republican -0.0074 0.0558 -0.13 0.8945
Not very strong Democrat -0.0893 0.0540 -1.65 0.0983
Not very strong Republican -0.1017 0.0713 -1.43 0.1544
Strong Democrat -0.0808 0.0424 -1.90 0.0573
Strong Republican -0.1294 0.0559 -2.32 0.0207
Male 0.0639 0.0305 2.10 0.0363
Nonbinary -0.5988 0.5001 -1.20 0.2315
Prefer not to say -0.5243 0.5020 -1.04 0.2965
Bachelors degree 0.0208 0.0499 0.42 0.6763
High school 0.1096 0.0729 1.50 0.1331
No high school -0.2063 0.2913 -0.71 0.4790
Post graduate 0.0670 0.0614 1.09 0.2753
Some college 0.0049 0.0581 0.08 0.9329
Age -0.0000 0.0001 -0.52 0.6000
Finally, we can use a basic survey weighting technique to create a modified sample
that more closely captures the characteristics of the national population. In order
to account for these slight imbalances, I utilize a simple survey weighting technique
that weights observations based off of their prevalence in the sample in respect to
what national averages are. After gathering population-level statistics from the most
recent CCES (Cooperative Congressional Election Study), I use sample weighting
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across the most imbalanced aspects (gender and level of education) to construct a
sample that is reflective of the U.S. population. Observations with demographics
that have been over-sampled (e.g. male and highly educated) will receive smaller
where under-sampled demographics will be weighted higher. As our sample is most
skewed with gender and level of education, I recover population statistics from the
CCES, assign trimmed weights (between .3 and 3 to avoid instances where a few
observations dominate the weighting procedure), and run a generalized linear model
on the weighted sample to determine if the results are substantively different from
those obtained from the original sample.
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Table A.2: Regression Estimates of Ratings w/Weighted Sample Model of
ratings as a function of background, outcome, and party identification with standard
errors.
Dependent variable:
Rating
Strong Background 0.504∗∗∗
(0.179)
Win Conflict 1.865∗∗∗
(0.190)
Respondent Democrat −0.539∗∗
(0.259)
Respondent Lean Republican 0.024
(0.328)
Respondent Not very strong Democrat −0.542∗
(0.291)
Respondent Not very strong Republican 0.298
(0.414)
Respondent Strong Democrat −0.448∗
(0.270)
Respondent Strong Republican 0.905∗∗∗
(0.345)
Observations 1,108
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
After weighting the survey sample, we recover the exact same correlations that
the non-weighted sample produced. This suggests that the lack of a completely
representative sample was not responsible for producing the results in the original
model.
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Robustness checks
Censoring is possible where respondents wanted to rate a leader negatively or above
10 but did not have an option. We can visually represent the extent of censoring oc-
curring in the sample by graphing counts of observations at each value and overlaying
what an ideally normal distribution of responses would look like.
Figure A.1: Distribution Performance Ratings Counts of rating values compared
to normal distribution.
As we can see that the amount of observations at 0 and 10 is slightly higher
than what we might expect assuming normality, it is important to check the extent
to which censoring reflects these results by specifying an estimation procedure that
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accounts for left and right censoring. The following double censored Tobit model
reveals that our key IV is still significantly correlated with performance ratings when
censoring is accounted for:
Table A.3: Tobit regression model estimates Censored regression with 0 and 10
as the limits.
Model 1
(Intercept) 4.64∗∗∗
(0.19)
Strong background 0.39∗
(0.16)
Conflict win 1.96∗∗∗
(0.17)
Lean Democrat −0.77∗∗
(0.27)
Lean Republican −0.20
(0.30)
Not very strong Democrat −1.07∗∗∗
(0.29)
Not very strong Republican −0.21
(0.39)
Strong Democrat −0.56∗
(0.23)
Strong Republican 1.22∗∗∗
(0.31)
AIC 5110.76
BIC 5160.87
Log Likelihood -2545.38
Num. obs. 1108
Left-censored 53
Uncensored 1003
Right-censored 52
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
I also ran a simple linear model of performance ratings by simply including the
treatment groups as covariates. Results from a generalized linear model (preferable
where the dependent variable is bounded) are virtually identical.
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Figure A.2: Performance Ratings Model of ratings for leaders with weak back-
grounds, losses, and stalemates.
The relationship between backgrounds is apparent when examining the how vary-
ing a ’strong leader’ dummy in the linear model impacts the coefficient value. Leaders
with strong backgrounds clearly stand to do better in terms of public evaluations even
controlling for the outcome and partisanship of the respondent.
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Figure A.3: Performance Ratings Model of ratings for leaders with strong back-
grounds, wins, and stalemates.
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Appendix B
Appendix: Less Lethal Leaders
Descriptive Statistics
The following table displays a variety of descriptive statistics for the leader-dispute
level data used most prominently in the analysis.
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics Summary statistics for primary variables.
Combat Start Cas. Polity Age Gender Pres. Mil. CINC Coll. Grad.
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 -10.00 23.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max 1.00 1.00 33.00 10.00 91.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.25 1.00 1.00
Range 1.00 1.00 33.00 20.00 68.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.25 1.00 1.00
Median 0.00 1.00 0.00 8.00 60.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 1.00 0.00
Mean 0.17 0.91 0.21 4.93 60.39 0.96 0.36 0.08 0.06 0.85 0.48
SE 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.32 0.63 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03
CI +/- 0.04 0.03 0.22 0.62 1.23 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.05
Var 0.14 0.09 4.51 36.22 142.32 0.04 0.23 0.07 0.00 0.13 0.25
SD 0.38 0.29 2.12 6.02 11.93 0.20 0.48 0.27 0.06 0.36 0.50
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Additional Models
I test the robustness of my claims to an additional model specification including the
variable ‘cosmo’ that aggregates responses to the World Values Survey question “I
see myself as a world citizen" by taking the mean of respondents that agreed with
the statement in anyway. This is designed to capture the societal level attributes
of states that might lead a given country to select an educated leader or any leader
that seeks to minimize casualties. After controlling for this additional variable, the
size of the resulting data is greatly reduced to to the limited number of countries
the WVS takes place in. After merging this with the original MID data, we are left
with 86 crises with too little variance on either potential dependent variable (the
max amount of MID casualties is 1 where the third quartile is zero). As a result,
I collapse the ordered ordered category “Fatality" (possesses less missingness) to a
binary variable indicated whether a given MID produced any fatalities. Finally, I run
a binomial logistic regression to see if the effect of education holds after controlling
for cosmopolitanism.
Table B.2: Binomial Logistic Regression Binary outcome ‘fatal’ indicates whether
a MID had any fatalities or not. Additional variable ’cosmo’ added to represent
societal attributes relevant for conflict behavior and leader selection.
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(> | z |)
(Intercept) 31.2860 15.8608 1.97 0.0485
College -1.2486 1.2206 -1.02 0.3063
Cosmopolitanism -20.1581 10.1979 -1.98 0.0481
Military service 1.1060 2.4750 0.45 0.6550
Combat exp. -0.4755 2.3602 -0.20 0.8403
Polity -0.3725 0.1723 -2.16 0.0306
Initiator -5.8053 3.1120 -1.87 0.0621
log(CINC) 0.9961 0.6250 1.59 0.1110
Pres. System -6.0962 4.0184 -1.52 0.1293
Age -0.1333 0.0840 -1.59 0.1123
This suggests that the effects of education are eliminated when controlling for the
societal level attributes that might affect a country’s willingness to accept casualties
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or elect educated leaders in the first place. However, it is important to state that
this reduces the amount of disputes from 1437 (original MID data merged w/LEAD)
to 86 disputes. This suggests that further analysis is required to determine whether
education affects MID fatalities once we account for societal/cultural factors.
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Appendix C
Appendix: Bang then Blame
Treatment Effects across Respondent Party Identification
Surprise Attacks and Blame for Policymakers
Figure C.1: Average level of blame for policymakers across party identifica-
tion Treatment group means for blame levied at policymakers with timing of intelli-
gence report and elite framing varied across respondent party identification.
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Surprise Attacks and Blame for intelligence Community
Figure C.2: Average level of blame for intelligence community across party
identification Treatment group means for blame levied at intelligence agencies with
timing of intelligence report and elite framing varied across respondent party identi-
fication.
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Treatment Effects across Respondent Level of Education
Surprise Attacks and Blame for Policymakers
Figure C.3: Average level of blame for policymakers across level of education
Treatment group means for blame levied at policymakers with timing of intelligence
report and elite framing varied across respondent level of education.
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Surprise Attacks and Blame for intelligence Community
Figure C.4: Average level of blame for intelligence community across level
of education Treatment group means for blame levied at intelligence agencies with
timing of intelligence report and elite framing varied across respondent level of edu-
cation.
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